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The Satellite Action Plan Regulatory Working Group (SAP RWG) was established as 
a result of the EU Action Plan: Satellite Communications in the Information Society 
"to look -into  regulatory and market access  issues both from  a domestic  and extra-
European perspective." The  SAP  RWG includes representatives  from  industry,  the 
CEPT and the European Commission, together with representatives from  companies 
whose origins are outside of  Europe. 
The  SAP  RWG  Report  provides  details  of regulatory  and  market  acce~s barriers 
experienced by industry and makes recommendations for removal of those barriers. 
The key messages concern: 
1  the need for effective and timely implementation of  EU Directives, 
2  the  need  for  timely  and  effective  implementation  of CEPT  Decisions  and 
Recommendations, and 
3  the need for  Commission  support to  gain market  access  in third  countries, 
especially in the view of  the open markets in Europe. 
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- 5-1.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY · 
1.1  MANDATE OF THE SAP RWG 
In the  Information  Society,  regulatory  and  trade  barriers  in telecommunications, 
including  the  satellite  sector,  constrain  the  diffusion  of new  global  services  and 
applications. Removing these barriers will increase competition, improve the quality 
and range of services, lower prices to  consumers and stimulate further research and 
development. National Regulatory Authorities, therefore, have a fundamental task to-
remove barriers to the benefit of  their countries. 
There is ·already significant competition and liberalisation taking place in the Union, 
and  rapid  strides  have  been  made  towards  a  fully  open  satellite  communications 
market. Nevertheless, some barriers remain. Barriers in third countries are often more 
formidable . 
. This Report focuses on market access within the European Union and third countries. 
It  notes  recent  developments  which  have  helped  to  improve  the  regulatory 
environment and  identifies barriers  encountered by the  satellite  industry.  It makes 
recommendations to the European Cotrimission, the Member States and to industry in 
regard to removal of  those barriers. 
This Report has  its  origin in the EU Action Plan:  Satellite  Communications  in  the 
Information Society
1
• Several actions in that document address the problems of  market 
access.  These  actions  were  considered  by  the  Telecommunications  Council  at  its 
meeting of27 June 1997. The Council called upon the Commission to: 
•  take steps to ensure full implementation of  existing Community legislation; 
•  analyse remaining barriers, including those affecting access to the space segment, 
to  the  proper  functioning  of  the  internal  market  in  ·the  field  of  satellite 
communications and, if  they exist, take concrete actions for their resolution; 
•  develop  appropriate  co-operation  with  the  European  Conference  of Postal  and 
Telecommunications  Administrations  (CEPT),  for  example,  with  regard  to 
ensuring  co-ordination  of  European  positions  In  the  International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU); 
•  analyse remaining barriers in third countries relating to market access for European 
undertakings. 
On  21  October  1997,  the  European  Parliament  adopted  a  Resol1:1tion  on  the 
Commission's Communication. The Resolution stated that there remains incomplete 
implementation of  directives on liberalisation of  the satellite market and that progress 
1  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council,  the  European  Parliament, 
the Economic and Social Committee ·and the Committee of  the Regions, COM(97)9t·fmal, released 5 
March 1997. 
-6-is needed in advancing the European position on market opening through the World 
Trade Organization. 
Extracts from 
the European Parliament Resolution of 21 October 1997 on the 
Communication from the Commission on the "EU Action Plan: Satellite 
Communications in the Information Society" (COM(97)91) 
[The capabilities of the European telecommunications industry ... ] suffer from 
an incomplete internal market ... which is caused by lack of compliance with 
the  Commission's  Directives  on  the  liberalisation  of  the  satellite 
communications service and equipment sector and by the continued existence 
of military, industrial and regulatory loopholes,  thus making European-scale 
co-operations and developments difficult  in the  industry as  a  whole,  and  in 
particular  in  such  important  sub-industries  as  global  advanced  broadband 
(multimedia) services for broadcasting and broadcasting-like activities, global 
satellite  personal  communications  systems  (S-PCS)  and  universal  mobile 
telecommunications services (UMTS). 
The European Parliament-
Calls  upon the  Commission  to  quickly  take  all  measures  in  its  powers  to 
enforce  its  Directives  on  the  liberalization  of the  satellite  communications 
equipment and services  sector,  by securing  firm  commitment from  member 
states on the timetables for such liberalization;  · 
Considers that progress needs to be also made in the following areas: 
the  enforcement  of the  European  position  at  the  international  level,  and 
especially within the context of  the World Trade Organization  ... 
Shares  the  view that the  ...  CEPT has  been  insufficient  in .addressing  the 
complex harmonization problems that exist, and that therefore efforts need to 
be stepped up to resolve such problems; 
Urges the Commission to avoid bureaucratic delays and ... make this issue a 
top priority  .... 
The actions and issues relating to barriers to market access were also considered at 
meetings of  the European satellite industry hosted by the European Commission on 29 
April and 29 July 1997. At the 29 July meeting, Inmarsat put fotward a proposal ''to 
create a specific Working Group dedicated to look into regulatory and market access 
issues both from a domestic and extra-European perspective." In response to the 29 
July meeting, the Commission suggested that: 
"market players provi.de  as  in the past· their assessment of market barriers in 
conjunction with regulatory aspects where applicable on a continued basis" and 
that a systematic survey of third coun:try market barriers be made available by 
industry by beginning of  December.  · 
~7-"In the light of actions identified during the meeting, the Commission urge[  s] 
industry to take the initiative for a Working Group dealing with regulatory and 
market access matters." 
The first meeting of  the Satellite Action Plan Regulatory Working Group (SAP RWG) 
was held in Brussels on 16 October 1997. More than 35 representatives from industry, 
the CEPT and the Conimission attended this meeting. Membership in the SAP RWG 
·was open and consequently included representatives from companies whose origins 
are outside Europe (see Annex 6).  The SAP RWG met five times between October 
1997 and January 1998 and drafted this Report with recommendations. The draft has 
been  widely  circulated  within  the  satellite  industry  in  Europe  for  comments  in 
advance of its presentation at  the  SAP  meeting of the industry  and the European 
Commission scheduled for 29 January 1998. 
The establishment of the SAP RWG is an endeavour to promote  access to markets 
free of regulatory barriers and conducive to fair competition. In view of its mandate 
from  the. Satellite Action Plan,  the Council and the '29  July industry meeting,  the 
RWG agreed to pursue three objectives, as follows: 
•  determine what regulatory .or trade barriers exist around the world which hamper 
market access by the satellite industry; 
•  compile a database of  such barriers by country; 
•  by 15  December 1997, prepare a report for the next SAP industry meeting with 
recommendations for actions by the European Commission, the satellite industry, 
the Member States, CEPT and other countries to reduce or remove such barriers. 
This Report has been prepared based on contributions received fro~ members of the _ 
SAP RWG as  well as  comments received from  European industry and from  other 
groups (see Annex 1) dealing with regulatory issues and barriers to market access. For 
the  purpose  of this  Report,  the  market  for  satellite  communications  has  been 
categorised into four sectors, namely, (1) S-PCS, GMPCS, (2) VSAT, SNG, (3) DTH, 
DBS and (4) broadband, multimedia.· In some cases, the market access barriers are the 
same, in others, they are particular to the sector. 
The satellite industry in Europe is not seeking any special advantages· or protection of 
its regional and global interests. We just want the same rules to apply to everyone in 
the same market place, especiall:y in view of  the open markets in Europe. 
Members  agreed that the Regulatory  Working. Group  should serve  as  a  forum  to 
exchange information and experiences with regard to  market access and regulatory 
barriers and to identify actions which could be taken to remove them. 
1.2  KEY ISSUES 
In the European Union 
-8-The European Union has made good progress towards creation of  an open competitive · 
market. Nevertheless, delays in implementing EU directives have impeded access to 
markets by the satellite industry and, as a consequence, acted as a brake on expansion 
of  the industry. 
Growth of  the market is critically dependent on the availability of adequate spectrum. 
There are far more demands, often from "paper" systems, than can, be accommodated 
within existing allocations.  The Commission has given a mandate to the CEPT to 
manage  the  spectrum  assignments  to  be  made  to  particular  systems  and  the 
authorisation of Satellite Personal Communications Services (S-PCS) systems.  The 
approach adopted by the European Commission in regard to  S-PCS should provide 
useful experience. 
In the CEPT 
Many of the contributions from  members of the RWG to  the  formulation of this 
Report  referred  to  the  lack  of  implementation  of  CEPT  Decisions  and 
Recommendations  and  to  the  weakness  of such  Decisions  and  Recommendations 
because of  their non-enforceability. 
The  delay  in  implementing  CEPT  Decisions  and  Recommendations  creates 
uncertainty which must necessarily be factored  in as  a risk in business plans.  The 
European  Radiocommunications  Committee  (ERC)  has  acknowledged  that  full 
implementation  of  regulations  is  lacking  and  has  directed  the  European 
Radiocommunications Office (ERO) to develop a strategy to improve the situation. 
In third countries 
Outside  the Union,  barriers  to  market  entry  can  be  even more  formidable.  Some 
customers have not purchased or used satellite terminals upon learning of regulatory 
barriers in those third countries to which they intended to travel. 
The SAP RWG agreed on an approach to this Report which considered regulatory 
barriers and market access within the Union and third countries and agreed that each 
area should be accorded an equal priority for action by the European Commission and 
industry. 
Among typical regulatory barriers are: 
•  outright prohibition of use of "foreign" satellite systems, including those of the 
Intergovernmental Satellite Organizations (ISOs  ), 
•  high licence fees for satellite earth stations and for service provid~rs, 
•  high customs duties on equipment taken into a country either on a temporary basis 
or for import, 
-9-•  additio:p.al_ conformicy as.sessme]J.t (tvoe approval) 
2 requirements, 
•  delays tn tmplementtng tntemattona1  ...  agreem~nts, 
•  absence of  an appropriate policy and regulatory framework. 
The SAP RWG strongly encourages the Commission and the satellite industry itself to 
make co-ordinated and persistent efforts to remove barriers to market access, taking 
into  account the  recommendations  made in this  Report  as  well  as  the regulatory 
principles in the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications reached within the World·  ' 
Trade Organization (WTO). Trade barriers are often hidden. A clear trade regulation 
will help satellite operators, service providers and manufacturers to enter the markets 
of  third countries and help to break those non-explicit barriers. Even small barriers to 
market access  should be attacked,  although it is,  of course,  necessary to establish 
priorities.  Nevertheless,  many  seemingly  smaU  but  anti-competitive  regulatory 
decisions or circumstances could seem innocent viewed in isolation, but put together, 
their impact on market access could be enormous. Hence, the regulatory situation of 
markets should be viewed in totality. 
The SAP RWG further urges the Commission to engage in discussion and market-
opening negotiations at sufficiently high political levels to achieve positive results in 
those countries that have not yet liberalised their markets. The WTO is one vehicle for 
negotiating the removal of  barriers in third countries. The SAP RWG agrees with the 
view expressed in the Rome Communique of 7  November  1997  from  the  Trans-
Atlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), which states that "As globalization progresses, 
our regulatory agencies  can no  longer continue to function  solely on the basis of 
national considerations." 
1.3  MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main recommendations to emerg~  from the SAP RWG are given here. 
1.3.1  to the European Commission 
Regarding EU  Member States 
1.  The  Commission  should,  without  further  delay,  initiate  infringement  actions 
against those Member States that have not transposed relevant directives  in the 
satellite or licensing field. The Commission should also produce a scorecard on the 
status of transposition of key directives  affecting the satellite industry like. that 
produced by the ERO in Annex 2. 
2  Conformity assessment and type approval are equivalent terms. Conformity assessment is  the term 
most used in Europe now while type approval has been used elsewhere in the world, for example, in 
the G:rvfPCS  MoU and Arrangements. Note, however, that the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue and 
WTO  use  the  term  conformity  assessment.  Both  terms  are  used  in  this  Report,  somewhat 
interchangeably. 
- 10-2.  The  Commission  should  seek  to  harmonise  the  conditions  and  principles  for 
licence and access fees.  The Commission should encourage greater transparency 
and a simplification of  licensing procedures. 
3.  The Commission should insist th~t Member States speed up application procedures 
for earth station approval and encourage non-member countries to do likewise. 
4.  The Commission should make every effort to ensure that potential new Member 
States take early steps to implement harmonisation and liberalisation measures in 
the satellite field and to transpose directives as part of the "acceptance" package 
into the EU. 
5.  Satellite services will rely more and more on conditional access
3 and will therefore 
be more  exposed  to  piracy.  The  Commission  should  adopt  strong,  effective 
measures  as  necessary  to  protect  satellite  services  based  on,  or consisting  of, 
conditional  access.  The  Commission  should  also  ensure  Member  States  adopt 
appropriate  sanctions  against  piracy  at  the  national  level  and  should push  for 
adoption of  strong anti-piracy legislation in other CEPT countries. 
Regarding the CEPT 
1.  The  Commission  should  encourag_e  the  effective  implementation  of  CEPT 
Decisions  and Recommendations  by all EU Member States  and those  seeking 
accession to the EU. 
2.  The Commission, ECTRA, ERC and other organisations should closely monitor 
the implementation of relevant directives and current regulations in the European 
Union and CEPT member countries, using a "scorecard" system to assess ,how well 
Member States are doing in achieving implementation and to consider what actions 
should be taken if  necessary. 
3.  The Commission should seek greater harmonisation in the regulation of  satellite 
networks  and  services  amongst  CEPT  countries,  recognising  that  the  satellite 
industry inherently serves a single European market. 
4.  Pursuant  to  Article  13  of the  Licensing  Directive  97  /13/EC,  the  Commission 
should work towards "one-stop-shopping"  (OSS)  arrangements  for  licensing of 
satellite networks and services. The Commission should encourage the CEPT to 
work towards extension of the OSS procedures to satellite services. 
5.  The Commission should pay special regard to the recommendations set forth in the 
report  from,  the  European  Telecommunications ·office  on  "The  Licensing  of 
Satellite Networks and Services". 
3  The  Green  Paper  on  Convergence,  section  IV.2.3,  defmes  conditional _access  systems  as  "the 
technical means by which content and service providers can recoup their investment either through 
subscriptions or charges for individual consumption." 
- 11 -6.  The  Commission  should  urge  National  Regulatory  Authorities  (NRA.s)  to 
hannonise the use of the spectrum through appropriate bodies like the Milestone 
Review Committee for S-:-PCS or through multilateral meetings for other systems. 
Regarding all countries 
1.  The Commission should treat market access for satellite services as a key part of 
access  for  telecommunications  services  in  general.  The  DGI  market  access 
database should include data on third countries -with restrictions on the satellite 
market. 
2.  The  Commission  should  accord  equal  priority  to  ensuring  timely  and  proper 
implementation  in  Member  States  of Community  legislation  and  to  removing 
market access barriers in third countries. 
3.  The Commission should use every means at its disposal to promote market access 
for European satellite system operators and service providers abroad. It should aim 
for a level playing field in each individual market. 
- The satellite industry welcomes the Commission's willingness to provide a 
copy of its high level agenda to  the SAP RWG and to seek contributions and 
comments from industry as appropriate for bilateral and multilateral meetings. 
- In particularly  intractable  cases,  where  the  problem  country  is  a  WTO 
member, the Commission should initiate a dispute settlement process under 
the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications. 
4.  The Commission should work to  ensure that the  agreements  reached under the 
aegis  of the  WTO  and  ITU  are  implemented without undue  delay in order to 
ensure a level playing field globally. The international agreements and regulations 
in place should be monitored closely to detect cq:1y anti-competitive behaviour. The 
Commission should encourage those countries that have exercised exemptions or 
exclusions  regarding satellite  broadcasting  services  to  remove  barriers  so  that 
European satellite operators,  service providers  and  broadcasters  enjoy rights of 
access  to  those  countries  in  a  transparent,  objective  and  non-discriminatory 
manner, as liberal as those enjoyed by non-EU operators in EU markets. 
5.  The Commission and industry should co-ordinate their -efforts and contributions on , 
access barriers to the forthcoming.ITU World Telecommunications Policy Forum 
(March 1998) which is to focus on trade in services. The SAP RWG has prepared a 
brief contribution to the ITU in regard to the work of  the EC and the SAP RWG. 
6.  The Commission should actively encourage more  countries to  sign the  WTO's 
Information Technology Agreement and the Istanbul Convention agreed within the 
World Customs Organization (WCO) and, in particular, urge countries to reduce or 
remove customs duties on all satellite equipment.  _ 
- 12-7.  A joint meeting between the Commission, industry and the WCO could be helpful 
to  discuss  issues  relating  to  customs  duties  and  to  sensitise  the  WCO  and  its 
members  about  the  problems  faced  by  industry  and  individuals  in  meeting 
excessive customs duties on products. 
8.  The  Commission should make use of the Decision 710/97/EC  to  cover satellite 
systems operating below 1 GHz and in the 1.5- 1.6 GHz bands, taking into account 
international frequency co-ordination agreements reached in the context of  the ITU 
Radio Regulations. 
9.  The European Commission should continue to address the issue of and conformity 
assessment (type approval) within and beyond the borders of  the Union. 
10.The Commission  should support  a regular forum  between the  Commission and 
industry with regard to implementation and market access issues, information flow, 
co-ordination of  policy positions and actions to overcome regulatory barriers. 
11. The  Commission  should  devote  sufficient  resources  to  ensuring  effective 
implementation  of Community  legislation  and  improving  market  access.  The 
Commission should note the significant human resources which the US  and some 
other governments dedicate to market access and implementation issues. 
12.In  order  to  preserve  the  achievements  of  the  liberalisation  of  the 
telecommunication sector as a result of  WTO and EU initiatives, and to maintain a 
competitive  environment  which  permits  customers  to  find  the  optimal  market 
combinations ("one stop shopping") of  different telecommunications services (e.g., 
combined access to  mobile, fixed and satellite communications, additional value-
added  services  such  as  single billing or information  services),  the  Commission 
should consider whether existing Community law adequately provides for Network 
Independent Service Providers. 
4 
1.3.2  to the satellite industry in Europe 
1.  Industry  should  collectively  co-ordinate  and  organise  its  input  on  regulatory 
barriers  to  be  addressed  by  National  Regulatory  Authorities,  the  European 
Commission and the CEPT. 
2.  Industry should identify and document market access barriers in the EU and third 
countries  on·  a  regular  basis  and  communicate  problems.  to  their  National 
Regulatory Authorities· and to  the Commission.  See Annexes 3 and 4, which will 
benefit  from  further  data  supplied  by industry.  Industry  should  also  give  the 
Commission the necessary technical and· informative support to facilitate its work, 
especially in regard to the recommendations in this Report. 
4 See section 9.4 of  this Report where it is stated that this position is not supported by the consensus of 
entities represented in the SAP RWG. 
- 13-3.  IndustrY should note that the Commission will prepare a report by 1 January 2000 
on telecommunications  licensing,  under  Article  23  of the  Licensing  Directive 
97  /13/EC and should make a timely contribution to the report. 
· 4.  Industry should prepare briefing documents on the benefits of  open markets, which 
could be delivered to policy-makers and regulators in third countries as well as to 
the trade press. 
5.  Industry, with support from and participation by the Commission and the CEPT, 
should organise workshops for policy-makers, regulators and operators in or from 
problem countries that restrict market access. 
6.  European  industry  should  take  every  opportunity  to  collaborate  with  the 
Commission in regard to the activities of  the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue and 
in  particular  the  working  group  dealing  with  regulatory  Issues  1n 
telecommunications. 
7.  Industry should maintain a regular forum with the Commission in order to focus 
discussion  on issues  affecting  the  satellite  industry,  including  matters  such  as 
implementation of  Community legislation and market access, information flow, co-
ordination of  policy positions and actions to overcome regulatory barriers. 
1.3.3  to EU  Member States 
1.  EU Member States should dedicate a high priority to market access issues. 
2.  EU Member States should implement EU Directives such as  the Satellite Services 
Directive in a  timely and effective manner.  Moreover,  it is  essential  that once 
legislation is in place, further barriers to market entry are not erected through the 
lack of  an efficient, objective and non-discriminatory licensing process. 
3.  National  Regulatory  Authorities  should  provide  greater  transparency  regarding 
national  authorisation  procedures  of satellite  systems.  A  description  of these 
procedures should be easily accessible,  and co-ordination procedures should be 
implemented for systems which transcend national borders. 
4.  Member States should recognise the importance of  modifying in a hannonised way 
national legislation with the aim of facilitating the market entry by new satellite 
systems, network operators and service providers offering innovative applications 
to European customers. 
5.  Within the Community legislative framework; operators should be able to use the 
capacity they lease on INTELSAT and EUTELSAT from any EU country as well 
as  any country m,ember  of each  Organization.  The  SAP RWG recognises  that 
certain National Regulatory Authorities currently prevent this, but they are strongly 
encouraged to remove these barriers as quickly as possible. 
- 14-1.3.4  to CEPT  member countries 
1.  CEPT  Member  States  should  take  necessary  actions  to  ensure  prompt 
implementation of CEPT Decisions anq Recommendations at national level.  The 
CEPT  should  continue  to .  monitor  implementation  and  regularly  contact  those 
CEPT  members  which  have  not  · implemented  the  Decisions  and 
Recommendations,  determine why they  have  not  yet  done  so  and  what  actions 
could be taken to resolve the problems. 
2.  Once they have  adopted  CEPT  Decisions  and  Recommendations  involving free 
circulation of satellite  terminals,  National  Regulatory  Authorities  should  ensure 
customs officials are  informed in order to  avoid problems such as  blockages of 
trucks,  confiscation of equipment, long delays,  etc.,  as  have occurred at borders 
with Russia and Poland.-
3.  The CEPT  should conclude  its  study on  introduction of MSS  below  1 GHz  in 
Europe as  expeditiou~ly as possible, thus permitting, if  necessary, the development 
of  appropriate CEPT Decisions and Recommendations on that matter. 
4. The satellite industry in Europe believes that future personal broadband multimedia 
satellite terminals  should not require individual licences  and· urges  the  CEPT to 
take appropriate steps towards that end. 
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Abbreviations used in this Report include the following: 
AEPOC 
BSS 
CEPT. 
CTR 
DAB 
DARS 
DBS 
DISCO 
DTH 
DVB 
ECO-SAT 
ECTRA 
EET 
ERC 
·ERO 
ETO 
ETS 
ETSI 
FNPRM 
FSS 
GMPCS 
ISO 
ISOG 
ITU 
LEOs 
LMES 
LMSS 
MES 
:MPEG 
MRC 
MSS 
NISP 
NPRM 
. NRAs 
NTMs 
oss 
PTO 
SAP 
SAPRWG 
SNG 
SPCN 
S-PCS 
Association Europeenne pour la Protection· des Oeuvres et des services 
Cryptes 
Broadcasting Satellite Service 
Conference of  European Post and Telecommunications administrations 
Common Technical Regulations 
Digital audio broadcasting 
Digital audio radio satellite 
Direct broadcasting satellite 
Domestic International Satellite Consolidation Order 
Direct to home 
Digital video broadcasting 
Effective competitive opportunities test for -satellite operators 
European Committee of  Telecommunications Regulatory Authorities 
Greek National Telecommunications Commission 
European Radiocommunications Committee 
European Radiocommunications Office 
European Telecommunications Office 
European Technical Standard 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
Further Notice of  Proposed Rulemaking 
Fixed Satellite Service 
Global Mobile Personal Communications by Satellite 
Intergovernmental Satellite Organization 
Inter-Union Satellite Operations Group 
International Telecommunication Union 
Low Earth Orbit satellites  · 
Land Mobile Earth Station 
Land Mobile Satellite Service 
Mobile Earth Station 
Motion Picture Expert Group 
Milestone Review Committee 
Mobile Satellite Service 
N et\york Independent Service Provider 
Notice of  Proposed Rulemaking 
National Regulatory Authorities 
Non-tariff  measures 
One Stop Shopping 
Public Telecommunications Operator 
Satellite Action Plan 
Satellite Action Plan Regulatory Working Group 
Satellite News Gathering 
Satellite Personal Communications Network 
· Satellite Personal Communications Services 
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TBR 
UMTS 
VSAT 
WGRR 
Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue 
Technical Basis for Regulation 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
Very Small Aperture Terminal 
Radio Regulatory Working Group 
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For the purposes of  this Report, the SAP RWG has categorised the market for satellite 
communications into four sectors; as follows: 
1.  Satellite Personal Communications  Systems  (S-PCS),  which is  subsumed within 
the  ITU  terminology  of Global  Mobile  Personal  Communications  by  Satellite 
(GMPCS
5
). Examples of such systems include EMS-MSSAT, EUTELTRACS and 
ARCANET,  Globalstar,  ICO,  Inmarsat,  Iridium,  Thuraya  as  well  as  proposed 
systems such as  EAST.  Typical services are single channel voice, data, facsimile 
and messaging using digital transmission rates up to 9.6 kbit/s and in some cases 
beyond.  Little  LEOs  such  as  Orbcomm  provide  low-speed  data  services  for 
messagmg. 
2.  VSAT and Satellite News  Gathering (SNG).  Examples  of suppliers  include  BT, 
EUTELSAT,  France  Telecom,  GE  Capital  Spacenet,  Hispasat,  INTELSAT  and 
Orion Network Systems.  Typical services  are  single  or multi-channel for  voice, 
data and facsimile from 64 kbit/s up to  2 Mbit/s. Satellite News Gathering offers 
"contribution"  quality  audio  and  video  feeds  for  broadcasting  services  at 
transmission rates up to 2 GHz Mbit/s or more. 
3.  Broadband;  multimedia. Examples are Celestri (Motorola), Euroskyway (Alenia), 
EUTELSAT,  Hispasat,  INTELSAT,  SES  Astra,  Skybridge  (Alcatel),  Teledesic 
(Microsoft), WEST (Matra Marconi). Typical services are similar to current DTH 
and  VSAT  service  using  smaller,  lower  cost  terminals.  Inmarsat  describes  its 
planned fourth generation Horizons system as a mobile broadband satellite service 
with mainstream data rates of 144 kbit/s. 
4.  Direct  broadcast  satellites  (DBS),  direct-to-home  (DTH).  Examples . are 
EUTELSAT, Hispasat and SES  Astra.  These services offer a multiplicity of TV 
and radio channels. 
These categories-.are somewhat arbitrary and there is overlap between the categories. 
For example, S-PCS and GMPCS include narrow band as well as broadband systems. 
VSATs can also be used for broadband services. 
Although  this  Report  focuses  on  the  market  access  barriers  encountered  by  the 
satellite  industry,  the  European  Commission  and  National  Regulatory  Authorities 
should not think that the market access barriers faced by satellite services are so very 
different from  those affecting terrestrial services in the sense that satellites are just 
another  way  of transporting  information  as  are  optical  fibre,  coaxial  cable  and 
terrestrial  radio.  It  may  be  useful  to  recall  that  the  Agreement  on  Basic 
5  The GMPCS-MoU Arrangements defme a GMPCS  System as  "Any satellite system (i.e., fixed or 
mobile, broadband or narrow-band, global or regional,. geostationary or non-geostationary, existing or 
planned) prQviding telecommunication services directly to end users from a constellation of  satellites." 
- 18-Telecommunications reached within the World Trade Organization in February 1997 
was  framed  so  as  to  be  ''technology  transparent",  that  is,  the  focus  was  on 
telecommunications  services  rather  than  their  method  of delivery.  Nevertheless, 
satellites do have some important differences coll_lpared to terrestrial networks, such 
as their ability to provide global or regional coverage from day one and the mobility 
of  earth stations, enabling instant connectivity from virtually anywhere in the world, a 
feature  which makes  satellite  services  uniquely  suitable  in some  situations  (e.g., 
disaster relief, remote areas, etc.). 
3.1  S-PCS, GMPCS 
A number of S-PCS systems are currently under development, some of which will 
enter into service in 1998. The commercial success of these systems will depend on 
the ability of S-PCS  system operators and service providers to  enter regional and 
global markets with the minimum of regulatory constraint.  It is  essential that the 
regulatory environment be· simple, transparent and non-discriminatory as provided in 
the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications in February 1997 within the framework 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). 
One of  the most important issues facing S-PCS operators and service providers is the 
ability to offer services to consumers in a parti"cular country on equivalent terms to 
those accorded to other system operators. 
European-based S-PCS systems and service providers should be·able to gain access to 
the markets of WTO member countries on terms equivalent to systems licensed by 
those countries, as  a result of the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications.  Some 
countries took exemptions to parts of the agreement;  however,  the most favoured 
nation (MFN) provision will apply to all signatories. In most countries, the national 
treatment provision will also apply. 
Closely linked to the question of  market access is the availability of  suitable ~pectrum 
in all potential markets of  the S-PCS system. Through the process of  t4e ITU and its 
World Radiocommunications Conferences, spectrum has been allocated for use by S-
PCS systems on a global basis. The relevant frequency allocations have been made to 
the Mobile Satellite Service and are in the 1 - 3 GHz frequency range (big LEOs and 
GEOs)  and below 1 GHz (little LEOs). 
Recognising the potential long term growth in the use of  MSS systems and the likely 
emergence  of new  competing  systems,  the  ITU  and  its  member  administrations 
decided at the 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference (W  ARC 92) to make 
additional allocations of  spectrum to MSS on a world-wide basis: one at 1610-1626.5 
J\.ffiz  (uplink) and 2483.5-2500 MHz (downlink) and the other at 1980-2010 MHz 
(uplink) and 2170-2200 MHz (downlink). W  ARC-92 also allocated spectrum at 1970-
1980 MHz (uplink) and 2160-2170 J\.ffiz  (downlink) to MSS only in Region 2.  In 
addition, W ARC 92 allocated spectrum at 137-13.8 J\.ffiz  (downlink) and 148-149.9 
:MHz (uplink) to MSS (for little LEOs). 
- 19-MSS authorisation process within the CEPT 
In June-July  1997,  the  CEPT  agreed  four  Decisions  which  provide  the  basis  for 
authorising S-PCS systems throughout Europe. These are: 
1.  ERC  Decision 97(03)  relating to  the Harmonised Use of Spectrum for  Satellite 
Personal  Communications  Services  (S-PCS)  operating  within  the  bands  1610-
1626.5 MHz, 2483.5-2500 MHz, 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz; 
2.  ERC  Decision  97(04)  relating  to  the  Transition~! Arrangements  for  the  Fixed 
Service and the Mobile-Satellite Service in the Bands 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-
2200 MHz in order to Facilitate the Harmonised Introduction and Development of 
Satellite Personal Communications Services; 
3.  ERC  Decision 97(05)  on Free  Circulation, Use and  Licensing of Mobile Earth 
Stations of Satellite Personal Communications Services (S-PCS) operating within 
the bands 1610-1626.5 MHz, 2483.5-2500 MHz, 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 
MHz within the CEPT; and 
4.  ECTRA Decision  (97)02 on Harmonisation of Authorisation Conditions and Co-
ordination  of Procedures  in  the  field  of Satellite  Personal  Communications 
Services  (S-PCS)  in  Europe,  operating  within  the  bands  1610-1626.5  MHz, 
2483.5-2500 MHz, 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz. 
It is  believed  this  set  of Decisions  establishes  a  clear  and  transparent  process 
(although the process has not been used yet). Moreover, ECTRA is considering the 
establishment of a one-stop-shopping procedure in order to  complete the Milestone 
Review Committee (MRC) process. 
Among the difficulties faced by S-PCS operators in some countries are the following: 
In the European Union 
•  Delay in implementing European Union Directives and Decisions; 
•  Lack of  a national regulatory framework covering the provision of  S-PCS services; 
In the CEPT 
•  Delay in signing or implementing CEPT Decisions. By early December 1997, only 
16 Administrations from the 43 member countries of the CEPT had committed to 
adopt the relevant S-PCS decisions and to implement their provisions. Only one 
Administration had actually implemented the Decisions.  This  looks  like quite a 
poor result, but in fairness,  it should be noted that those Administrations having 
signed the relevant Decisions experienced a number of difficulties  in trying to 
reach the 1 October 1997 deadline set by the CEPT. S-PCS operators welcome the 
efforts made by Administrations, but urges them to  continue to pursue efforts in 
order to be granted licences. The situation is uncertmn in most countries, in part 
because it is not clear who has the responsibility for implementation; 
•  Difficulty  in  frequency  co-ordination  procedures,  both  at  the  national  and 
international  level.  Since  the  Decisions  ,  deal  with  harmonisation , on  use  of 
frequencies, amendments are required to the National Tables of  Frequencies, which 
-20-typically  requires  additional  national  co-ordination  efforts  and  Ministerial 
directives. 
I  In third countries 
•  Bureaucratic  delay  in processing  licence  applications,  due  to  the  difficulty  in 
interpreting  the  already  existing_  regulation  and  in  co-ordinating  different 
authorities' competence (e.g., frequencies, service licences, terminal requirements); 
•  Lack ofharmonised regulation on type approval and free circulation of  terminals: 
•  National treatment not granted to European operators or service providers in some 
countries such as Russia and the US. 
Similar problems of implementation are expected for the ITU GMPCS MoU which 
the Commission has signed on behalf ofEU Member States.
6 
The SAP RWG considered whether it would be useful for ETO, for example, to study 
and  assess  national  procedures  required  to  sign,  commit  and  implement  CEPT 
Decisions and Recommendations by member countries and to  identify solutions to 
simplify such procedures. This could help in work on one stop shopping (OSS). 
3.1.1  Conclusions 
The way in which CEPT Decisions are implemented varies significantly from country 
to country (legislation, Ministerial directive, authorisation by an NRA) as well as in 
the time it takes to implement them. Regardless of the way they do it, however, all 
CEPT member countries should implement the CEPT Decisions relating to S-
PCS in an early and timely manner. 
Good results and ~a-operation have been achieved for the mobile satellite services and 
S-PCS at the international level. Nevertheless, barriers still exist and to overcome 
them, some action is  required. Removing these barriers could benefit all satellite 
players and strengthen harmonisation in Europe in the field of telecommunications. 
Any  delay  in  the  definition  and  approval  of a  fair  and  transparent  regulatory 
framework p.egatively influences potential new operators' strategic choices in regard 
to Europe as a market in which to invest and create job opportunities. 
Where possible, the EC should advocate to other countries, including but not limited 
to WTO Member States, that they adopt an S-PCS licensing regime similar to that 
adopted by the _CEPT.  The Commission will need to demonstrate the advantages of 
adopting such regimes to the countries concerned. 
6  The GMPCS MoU group has  established a Task Force which is  to  make recommendations for 
consideration by the group at its next meeting in March in regard to procedures for implementing the 
Arrangements pursuant to the MoU. See section 8.1.3 o!this Report. 
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.  . The Commission  should continue  to  support non-discriminatory  market and 
spectrum access for European S-PCS systems. 
3.2  VSAT, SNG 
The lack of  a hannonised and/or one-stop-shopping approach to VSAT/SNG licensing 
within the EU hampers the development of  pan-European networks. Outside the EU, 
there are still delays and difficulties in gaining market access. 
3.2.1  Restrictions in Europe 
The 1995 study carried out by ERO on VSAT and SNG concluded that most, but not 
all CEPT administrations require an individual licence for these earth stations. Most 
administrations were of the opinion that this should remain the case because of site-
clearance  and/or  frequency  co-ordination  requirements.  VSAT  and  SNG  earth 
stations are typically licensed on an individual basis, although VSATs are sometimes 
licensed  as  a network.  In a number of countries,  additional  operator licences  are 
required.  The  study  also  concluded  that  the  way  VSATs  and  SNG  stations  are 
licensed varies greatly throughout the CEPT and that One Stop  Shopping might .  be 
envisaged for VSATs. 
The  CEPT  (ERC  and  ECTRA)  decided  that  OSS  should  not  be  pursued  at  the 
moment,  but  decided  to  create  a  database  with  information  on national  licensing 
regulations at the ETO'  s World Wide Web site.  Decisions have been adopted that call 
upon administrations to provide information to the database. The SAP RWG regrets 
the  lack  of progress  regarding  OSS  and  sees  this  as  an  important  step  in  the 
acceleration  of cross-border  networks.  Steps  towards  OSS  for  VSAT  and  SNG 
licensing  have  been  implemented  in  a  few  Member  States  (Denmark,  France, 
Netherlands, UK). The SAP RWG would like to see these efforts expanded. 
The SAP RWG would like to see the full and effective implementation of  the Satellite 
Services Directive 94/46/EEC in all Member States. Moreover, it is essential that once 
legislation is in place, further barriers to market entry are not erected through the lack 
of  an efficient, objective and non-discriminatory licensing process. 
The SAP RWG was pleased to note the Telecommunications Council's support for· 
the  Commission's  activities  in relation  to  the  Single  Market  Action Plan  and,  in 
particular,  the ·commission's use  of a  "scorecard"  as  a  means  of assessing  how 
Member  States  are  implementing  the ·relevant  legislation.  It  is  essential  that  the 
momentum of  this approach is maintained if  the Single Market is to be a reality and to 
enable  initiatives  involving  telecommunications  arid  satellites  to  be  a~complished 
effectively within the EU.  ·  · 
-22-Although market access has improved in Europe during the past few  years, several 
VSAT and  SNG service providers  still  encounter barriers  to  market  entry  in EU 
countries. 
In the  EU,  difficulties  in market  access  can be summarised  as  being due  to  the 
following reasons: 
•  lack of implementation  of EC  directives  and  lack of the  necessary  regulatory 
mechanisms at the national level; -
I
• lack of  h~onisation  between existing legislation further to the implementation of I 
the EC directives;  · 
•  slow appraisal of  licence requests (causing delays in the provision of  the service or 
the near impossibility in providing it); 
•  significant differences in the amount of  licence fees; 
•  privileges to the incumbent PTO; 
•  difficulty to access space segment; and 
•  complexity of  type approval processes. 
There is need for greater and continuous monitoring by the Commission of  the correct 
implementation of existing  legal  instruments  as  well  as  the  adoption of adequate 
measures in cases of  violations o~Community  law. Above all, the industry would like 
to see greater harmonisation and greater focus on one-stop-shopping arrangements, as 
the ETO itself  has recognised. 
3.2.2  Rest of  the world 
The market access problems faced by VSAT and SNG service providers in supplying 
services to other countries are often the same as in the EU, except there are additional 
problems such as the absence of a legal framework (or the presence of an unreliable 
legal framework), high customs duties or requirements for operation in conjunction 
_ with an in-country licence holder. 
The rest of  the world can be divided into three sub-categories: 
a) European States candidate to accession to the EU, 
b) CEPT States which are not EU members and not included in a), 
c) other countries. 
As a consequence, the appropriate forum where these issues should be addressed will 
be different. The pressure that can be made on national authorities will also vary.-
In the case of  countries under a) above, the adoption of  proper national legislation can 
be considered as a pre-condition to the accession of the candidate State (and maybe 
some association agreements already require - even though not explicitly - reform of 
existing legislation). 
-23-In the case of colllltries Wlder b) above, the CEPT is  the natural forum  for dealing 
with these issues. 
In the case of  colllltries Wlder c) above, the WTO would appear to be best forum. 
VSAT 
SAP  RWG  members  reported  unreasonable  delays  in  a  number  of colllltries  in 
responding to enquiries for licences to establish VSATs within their territories. Some 
SAP RWG members say they have lost business opportllllities because of delays in 
obtaining VSAT licences. High licence fees  imposed through multi-level structures 
(containing registration fees  as  well as  annual network and station fees)  are another 
problem.  In some  instances,  protective  strategies  are  applied  in deciding  whether 
specific VSAT networks are closed or open structures. 
Some  VSAT  service  providers  represented  in  the  SAP  RWG  have  experienced 
difficulties in gating access to their own leased space segment from a second coWl  try. 
In its contribution to the SAP RWG, BT said it experiences difficulties in accessing 
its own leased INTELSAT and EUTELSAT space segment within several European 
colllltries.  With respect to INTELSAT, the incumbent Signatory has sought to impose 
an access fee on BT. By preventing BT from using its own INTELSAT capacity, the 
colllltry puts BT at a distinct disadvantage.  There has been direct access in the UK to 
INTELSAT now for a number of  years. 
Telenor reported experiencing problems in establishing itself as a VSAT operator in 
some EU colllltries,  for  example,  in Finland,  France and Portugal.  Orion Network 
Systems  has  experienced  substantial  problems  in  Greece,  which  has  failed  to 
implement Satellite Services Directive 94/46/EEC and still has no regulatory structure 
in place for licensing satellite networks and VSAT services. 
In one EU country, a problem has been encolllltered where the national Signatory has 
exerted  monopoly  functions  described  by  the  operating  agreement  of an  inter-
governmental satellite organisation, in contradiction to the competition rules reflected 
in the Satellite Services Directive 94/  46/EEC. 
Satellite News Gathering 
Many telecommunications operators,  including BT, Deutsche Telekom and France 
Telecom, have significant experience in operating SNG serv.ices both 'Yithin the EU 
and in third countries. Examples of  barriers encountered are given below: 
In several EU Member States, a stand-alone (e.g., temporary) licence is required for 
every single event to be covered, be it a sporting event or news event.  There is no 
provision yet for a permanent SNG licence. Officially, the SNG operator must apply 
giving thirty days notice but under pressure, this has be.en unofficially reduced to a 
week or so. This still makes it effectively difficult for any operator to provide an SNG 
-24-service in these countries since the time scales for news events are generally less than 
one week's notice. 
Even where it is possible to provide sufficient notice, such as  fo~ a· recurring weekly 
sporting  event,  it may become  extremely  expensive  to  submit  individual  licence 
applications for  every single event:  Until recently, the incumbent PTOs were still 
operating  under their old  licence  so  they  did  not  experience  these  problems  and 
therefore gained a competitive advantage. 
When  complaints were· made to the specific Ministries, the incumbent PTOs were 
obliged to apply for licences like everyone else. 
In Poland, a European country seeking EU membership, legislation prevents VSAT 
networks operated by a non-local operator being .hub  bed from outside Poland. Point-
to-point links  are permitted provided they are operated in conjunction with an in-
country licence holder. It is not possible to operate a star network hubbed outside the 
country to  several remote  sites  inside the  country.  This  is  a  significant barrier to 
market entry. 
A number of  SAP RWG members report high licence fees and very slow earth station 
approval in Turkey, Russia and Poland.  Withholding and delays in issuing licences 
occur in Bulgaria and Slovenia. 
There are high licence fees for VSATs in some countries such as India and Mexico. 
There are restrictions as  to  which companies may receive VSAT services in India. 
Numerous barriers have been encountered in China and India. 
Deutsche Telekom has been attempting to  obtain an  SNG licence in the US  since 
1993. The FCC has not even acknowledged its requests. Within Germany, there is full 
competition  for  satellite  services.  Several  US  companies  - Mobile  Satellite 
Communications Inc.,  Alpha Lyracom  Space  Communications  Inc.,  GE  American 
Communications Inc.,  IDB  Communications  Group  Inc.  - are  holders  of Germari 
satellite licences. 
Other problems have been encountered by SNG and VSAT service providers: 
•  where a National Regulatory Authority fails to deal with authorisations or licensing 
•  in regard to  type  approval,  when more  technical  tests  are  required  than those 
required by ETSI standards; 
•  lack oftransp~ency  in licensing/authorisations fees, 
•  local practical difficulties (  e!g., local payment arrangements). 
3.2.3  Conclusions 
The number of  countries where it is relatively .easy to provide SNGNSAT services is 
stillliinited. Moreover, the SAP RWG is disappointed to see the lack of progress on 
developing one-stop-shopping arrangements. 
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SNG licence that allows an operator to cover an unlimited number of similar events 
during that period. The licence fee should be fixed and reasonable. Although the need 
for a notice for site clearance is understandable, regulatory authorities should be more 
responsive in granting licences in cases of  unforeseen events. 
Access to space segment should be made available on an equal basis. A limited forni 
of direct. access already exists within the EUTELSAT system. There has been direct 
access to INTELSAT .in the UK for some years; some levelling .  of the playing field 
should now take place in the rest ·of Europe as well as  around the world. Operators 
from other EU countries should not be at a commercial or operational advantage or 
disadvantage  compared  with  the  local  operator.  Any  such  discrimination  in  EU 
Member States violates the Satellite Directive 94/46/EEC and should be vigorously 
contested by the Commission. 
3.3  BROADBAND, MULTIMEDIA 
This  sector  overlaps  the  previous  sectors  i:r:t  certain  respects.  One  defining 
·characteristic of the next-generation satellite services will be the ability to  use new 
digital  technologies  to  transmit  vast  amounts  of data,  including  multiple  video 
channels,  high-speed  data  and  Internet  services.  Nowhere  is  the  phenomenon  of 
convergence  more  evident  than  in  the  emergence  of new  broadband,  multimedia 
satellite systems. Hitherto separate services such as  data,  telephony,  radio,  TV and 
multimedia are merging, a process which i~ facilitated by new digital techniques. 
Some satellite operators active in Europe already provide such services on existing 
satellites, including EUTELSAT, Hispasat, Orion and SES. New operators, such as 
Matra Marconi Space's WEST, Alenia's Euroskyway and Alcatel's Skybridge, plan to 
provide greatly expanded services. 
Allocation  and  sharing  of Ka-band  spectrum  was  discussed  at  the  World  Radio 
Conference  in  November  1997.  An  agreement  was  reached .  between  the  US  and 
Europe which expands the amount of  spectrum and the number of  operators from both 
sides of the Atlantic. The agreement is expected to significantly increase the level of 
competition in an already competitive environment. 
Among the proposed Ka-band systems are: 
Principal  Name of  system  Orbit 
Hughes  Spaceway
7  8GEO 
PanAmSat  PAS  2GEO 
Loral  Cyberstar  3GEO 
7  Hughes recently flled  with the FCC for  a project involving an· eight satellite system in GEO (as 
envisaged ~y  the original Spaceway, now called Spaceway EXP) and a 20-satellite system operating in 
medium Earth orbit (called Spaceway NGSO). Both systems will operate in the :ka-band frequency 
range (17.7GHz-30.0GHz).  '  · 
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QEAmericom  GE-Star  9GEO 
McCaw, Gates  Teledesic  288 LEO 
Matra Marconi  WEST  2GEO, 9MEO 
Alenia  Euroskyway  2GEO 
Motorola  Celestri  63 LEO, 9 GEO 
Among the Ku-band systems competing with those above are  Alcatel'  s  Skybridge 
system, which will also compete for the frequency band with existing and planned 
GEO  satellites operating in that band.  As noted earlier in this Report,  Inmarsat is 
planning a fourth generation system which it describes as a mobile broadband system 
operating  in  the  2  GHz  band,  and  operating  at  data  rates  of 144  kbit/s  for  its 
mainstream services. 
The phenomenon of convergence will make it more important than ever to separate 
from  a  regulatory  point of view  the  content  from  the  means  of distribution.  An 
operator should not be responsible· for the content. The issue of piracy, ·as noted in 
section 3  .4, is also a particular concern of  the satellite industry in Europe. 
3.3.1  Conclusions 
According  to  the  Commission's  Green  Paper  on Convergence,  released  in  early 
December  1997,  multimedia  systems  may  create  the  need  for  a  new  regulatory 
framework  in  view  of the  increasing  convergence  of the  telecom,  broadcasting, 
information  technology  and  content  -industries.  However,  satellite  delivery  of 
broadband and multimedia services are covered by the GMPCS Arrangements. 
3.4  DTH,DBS 
DTH TV and DBS
8 services represent more than three-quarters of  the utilisation of  the 
capacity of the satellite systems currently providing services over  Europe~ Satellite 
TV,  both  in  analogue  and  digital  form,  is  well  developed  on the  continent.  The 
European  digital  video  broadcast  (DVB)  standard  is  the  de  facto  global  non-
proprietary standard for digital TV broadcasting. Digital TV represents one of  the most 
promising  approaches  to  the  provision  of advanced  services,  such  as  multimedia 
product distribution, Internet services and high definition television. 
In the US, more than 7 million households receive satellite broadcasting services,
9  a 
number which currently grows by more than  1 million households per year. As of 
November 1997, the DBS subscriber base was  5.8 milliort
10
•  When DTH receivers 
become a consumer product, prices will decrease radically.  Then industry- structure 
and· market  shares  could  change  dramatically  in  the  same  way  that  consumer 
8 DTH is the terminology used in Europe. The equivalent term used in the US is DBS. 
9 Satellite News, 10 November 1997, p. 3. 
10 Source: SkyREPORT table-on DTH subscriber data. See www.skyreport.com/instruct.htm. 
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·. electronics have determined other markets. Access to the Internet via satellite is poised 
to become widely available in the very near future,  and some players in the satellite 
industry are already preparing for this future. 
However,  such  advanced  services  will  rely  more  and  more  on  conditional  access 
systems and will therefore be exposed to  pirates'  attacks.  Piracy is already a pan-
European  plague.  Revenues  lost  as  a  result  of piracy  involving  hacked  decoding 
devices have been estimated to be in excess of 200 mi_llion ECU  s a year in Europe, 
according to · AEPOC.  It will not be possible to eradicate this plague unless strong 
effective harmonised measures  are  adopted  at the  EU level  and  on a Europe-wide 
basis. 
Some third countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have forbidden reception of  international 
satellite TV signals.  Even satellites  covering  Europe with a spill-over into  certain 
North African countries seem to be unwanted. Meanwhile, several Arab TV programs 
are  receivable  in Europe,  for  instance,  in hotels  and by Arab  communities.  These 
programs are transmitted by Arab and European satellites. 
Direct audio radiobroadcasting satellite services (DARS) was briefly discussed by the 
SAP RWG but no contributions were received. The market access situation for DARS 
is also an issue at the global level, but there are, as yet, no dedicated European DARS 
satellite  systems.  Three  digital  audio  broadcasting  (DAB,  another  term  used 
interchangeably with DARS) systems ~  WorldSpace, CD Radio and American Mobile 
Radio- are expected to launch systems from  1998.  WorldSpace satellites are being 
built under the direction of  Alcatel Espace. The first W  orldSpace satellite, AfriStar is 
scheduled  for  launch  in  June  1998.  American  Mobile  Radio  and  CD  Radio  are 
expected to serve the US by end 1999. 
4.  REGULATORY SITUATION WITHIN THE EU (SAP Al, Al) 
In the context of  the regulatory environment within the European Union, the Satellite 
Action Plan has two actions, as follows: 
A1.  The Commission will  step-up efforts to achieve full implementation of all 
EU legislation  relevant  for  satellite communications.  The  Commission will 
also  request industry to  provide regular information  on  the basis  of a 
systemat~c overview of all barriers found  in relation to  the introduction of 
satellite communications ,systems and services. 
A2.  The  Commission  will  request  industry  to  identify  regulatory  barriers, 
allowing the Commission to formulate regulatory measures needed in the 
satellite communications sector, as  well as report on the effectiveness of the 
measures taken to date. 
The Community legislation affecting the. satellite industry in the European Union is 
described  in  the  following  section.  Annex  3  of this  Report  identifies  regulatory 
problems in some Member States. 
-28-4.1  APPLICABLE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LEGISLATION 
Several basic telecommunications directives have a direct impact on satellite services. 
The most important are: 
•  Council Directive of  28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for 
telecommunications  services  through  the  implementation  of  open  network 
provision  (ONP)  (90/387/EEC  :  OJ  L  19211,  24.07.1990),  as  amended  by 
Directive of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  6 October 1997 for the 
purpose  of adaptation  to  a  competitive  environment  in  telecommunications ' 
(97/51/EC: OJ L 295/23, 29.10.1997) 
•  Commission  Directive  of 28  June  1990  on  competition  in  the  markets  for 
telecommunications services (90/388/EEC: OJ L 192/10, 24.07.1990) 
•  Council Directive of 5 June 1992 on the application of open network provision to 
leased lines (92/44/EEC : OJ L 165/27, 19.06.1992), as amended by the Directive 
of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on 6 October 1997 for the purpose 
of  adaptation to a competitive environment in telecommunications  (97  /51/EC : OJ 
L 295/23, 29.10.1997) 
•  Council  Directive  of 13  December  1995  on  the  application  of open  network 
provision (ONP) to voice telephony (95/62/EC : OJ L 321/6, 30.12.95) (currently · 
under  review  to  incorporate  provisions  relating  to  universal  service  for 
telecommunications in a competitive environment) 
•  Commission Directive of 16 January 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with 
regard  to  mobile  and  personal  communications  (96/2/EC  :  OJ  L  20/59, 
26.01.1996) 
•  Commission  Directive  of  13  March  1996  amending  Commission  Directive 
90/388/EEC  with  regard  to  the  implementation  of full  competition  in  the 
telecommunications markets (96/19/EC: OJ L 47/13. 22.03.1996) 
•  European Parliament and Council Directive of 30 June 1997 on interconnections 
with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application 
of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP)  (97/33/EC  : OJ L  199/32, 
26.7.1997) 
•  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a 
common framework for general authorisations and individua1licences in the field 
of  telecommunications services (97/13/EC : OJ L  117, 07.05.97). Also referred to 
as the Licensing Directive.  · 
The following are particularly relevant to satellite communications : 
•  Commission Directive of 13  October 1994 amending Directive 88/301/EEC and 
Directive  90/388/EEC  in  particular  with  regard  to  satellite  communications 
(94/46/EEC: OJ L268/15, 19.10.94). 
-29-This Directive,  also  referred to  as  the  'Satellite Dire_ctive',  abolished  special  and 
exclusive rights for the provision of satellite services and equipment, with a view to 
removing restrictions on free  movement of satellite equipment and the provision of 
telecommunications services -other than voice telephony over satellite systems.  The 
Directive also lays down provisions concerning licensing and declaration procedures. 
Directive 94/46/EEC has been transposed in almost all Member States with a  few 
exceptions. Some countries had difficulties in meeting the deadline, and a number of 
infringement proceedings were opened in the past in this regard. 
•  Council Directive 91/263/EEC of29 April 1991  on the approximation of  the laws 
of  the  Member  States  concerning  telecommunications  terminal  equipment, 
including the mutual recognition of  their conformity (OJ L 128, 23/05/1991). 
This Directive, also referred to  as  the 'Terminal Directive', established procedures 
for  EU-wide type  approval based on mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
procedures based on harmonised standards. This allows terminal equipment approved 
against Common Technical Regulations (CTRs) based on harmonised standards to be 
placed on the market and to circulate freely throughout the Union. 
•  Council  Directive  93/97/EEC  of 29  October  1993  supplementing  Directive 
91/263/EEC in respect of  satellite earth station equipment (OJ L 290, 24/11/93). 
This Directive extended the scope of Directive 91/263/EEC to include satellite earth 
station equipment,  and introduced  mutual recognition  of conformity assessment 
procedures for satellite earth-station equipment. In the framework of this directive, 
appropriate type-approval arrangements are to be put in place for television receive-
only  equipment,  VSAT,  and  satellite  personal  communications  systems.  The 
Commission has started infringement proceedings against some Member States where 
national implementing measures have not yet been enacted  .. In those cases where the 
judicial stage has been reached,  the Court of Justice has ruled against the Member 
States concerned. 
•  Decision No 710/97/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 March 
1997  on a co-ordinated authorisation approach in the  field  of satellite personal 
communication services in the Community. 
This  decision provided  a  framework  for  a  co-ordinated  authorisation  approach  in 
Member  States  in ·  accordance  with  ECTRA  and  ERC  decisions  to  harmonise 
frequency use necessary for the introduction of  S-PCS systems, pending the adoption 
and transposition of  the Licensing Directive (97/13/EC, see above). 
4.1.1  Other relevant documents 
•  Towards Europe-wide systems and services: Green paper-on a common approach-
in the field of satellite communications in the European Coriununity (COM(90) 
490; 20.11.1990.) 
-30-•  Proposal  for  a  European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  on  connected 
telecommunications equipment and the mutual recognition of the conformity of 
equipment (04.06.1997, COM(97)257 final- 97/0149 (COD)). 
Harmonising  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  concerning  connected 
telecommunications  equipment will support  a  genuinely  competitive  multi-vendor 
market in an environment where there is competitive provision of  network services. If 
adopted,  the  Directive  will  replace  two  Council  Directives  (91/263/EEC  -
telecommunications  terminal  equipment  and  93/97/EEC  - satellite  earth  station 
equipment), will also include radio equipment, and simplify the application of two 
other  Council  Directives  (93/68/EEC  - conformity  marking  and  89/336/EEC  -
electromagnetic  compatibility).  It  is  based  upon  the  principle  of manufacturer's 
declaration regarding testing and certification. Its provisions regarding manufacturers' 
liability are equivalent to those contained in Council Directive 85/3 7  4/EEC (liability 
for defective products). 
•  TBRs 
These  standards,  once  adopted  by  Commission  Decision,  will  become  Common 
Technical  Regulations  (CTRs).  The  following  table  enumerates  those  satellite-
relevant TBRs which should reach CTR status within the first half of 1998 and gives 
the respective target dates.  TBRs 27, 28 and 30 should be approved by ETSI in the 
course of  December and adopted by the Commission in early 1998. 
TBRno.  Subject 
26.  L-band low data rate mobile earth stations 1.5-1.6 GHz 
27  Ku-band low data rate mobile earth stations 
28  Ku-band VSATs 
30  Ku-band SNG transportable 
41  ·s-PCN 1.6, 2.4 GHz 
42  S-PCN 1.9, 2.1 GHz 
43  6/4 GHz band VSAT 
44  1.5-1.6 GHz LMES 
•  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 
implementation  of  the  telecommunications  regulatory  package:  first  update· 
(COM/97/504 final of8.10.1997) 
This Communication provides a status report on the transposition of  the Community 
regulatory  package · aimed  at  creation  of a  liberalised  and  harmonised  European 
. telecommunications  market.  The  Commission  intends  to  provide  ·an  updated 
Communication in early 1998 which will allow to give a broader picture of the state 
of transposition, together with indicators of the real" and effective implementation of 
the measures. 
The  Commission  will  continue  its  efforts  to  ensure_  full  implementation  of the 
regulatory  package.  It will  consider  carefully _  any  information  provided,  either 
informally or by means of formal  complaints,  by market 'players  concerning  any 
situation where the rules are not being applied correctly.  Formal complaints may lead 
-31-to  infringement  proceedings,  either  by  Directorate-General  IV  (Competition)  or 
Directorate-General XIII (Telecommunications, Information Market and Exploitation 
of Research). Informal complaints about inadequate implementation of Community 
legislation will be verified with the authorities of  the Member States. 
4.1.2  Conclusions 
The EU has adopted a regulatory framework which needs only to be implemented in a 
consistent and accurate way. Hence, additional regulatory measures are not considered 
necessary  for  the  time  being.  Surveillance  and  infringement  actions  are  useful 
measures to ensure implementation. 
The  language  of  some  directives  is  open  to  interpretation,  which  makes 
implementation more difficult and raises questions about whether certain activities are 
covered by the text of  those directives. The Commission should work to improve the 
specificity  and  remove  possible  ambiguities  in  written  texts.  If appropriate,  the 
Commission could prepare interpretative texts or guidance for the Satellite Services 
Directive 94/46/EEC.  The Commission previously produced an unofficial paper on 
the interpretation of the Services Directive 90/388/EEC which circulated for several 
years before finally becoming a formal communication on the status of  that directive. 
In preparation of  this Report and in discussion among SAP RWG members, the most 
commonly cited regulatory shortfalls were the following: 
•  delays in implementing EU regulation, 
•  disparities in national treatment of  satellite operators and service _providers, 
•  uncertainties about the applicable regulatory framework, 
•  uncertainties  about the responsible authority, 
•  additional type approval requirements. 
4.2  CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT 
A  typical  essential  requirement  for  the  free  circulation  of satellite  terminals  is 
compliance with appropriate conformity assessment (type approval)  stand~ds. Many 
countries,  among  which  are  th~ following,  have  national  conformity  assessment 
requirements. 
Country  EU  CEPT  Is national type 
Member  member  approval 
State?  country?  required for 
MESs? 
Armenia  Yes 
Australia  Yes 
Belarus  Yes 
Belize  Yes 
Brazil  Yes 
Bulgaria  Yes  TBD 
Burundi  Yes (tech) 
Canada  Yes 
China  Yes 
Costa Rica  Yes (tech) 
-32-Cote d'lvoire  Yes 
Czech Republic  Yes  Yes 
Denmark  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Dominica  Yes 
Finland  Yes  Yes  Only ETSI tech 
France  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Germany  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Greece  Yes  Yes  TBD 
Guatemala  Yes 
Guyana  Yes 
Hong Kong  Yes 
Indonesia  Yes 
Israel  Yes 
Japan  Yes 
Kazakhstan  Yes 
Lithuania  Yes  Yes 
Maldives  Yes 
Nepal  Yes 
Nigeria  ·Yes 
Russia Federation  Yes  Yes 
Spain  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Switzerland  Yes  Yes 
Thailand  Yes 
Uganda  Yes ($20) 
USA  Yes 
Source: Inmarsat, January 98 
The  problem  of different  conformity  assessment  requirements  around  the  world 
seriously  hampers  manufacturers,  increases  their  cost  and  time  to  obtain  type 
approvals.  Excessive conformity assessment requirements also  affect operators and 
service providers by delaying the introduction of  new services. 
The absence of  a single, globally accepted standard for conformity assessment of, for 
example, S-PCS terminals will require the manufacturer to obtain type approvals in all 
countries where a separate regime exists and where he :wishes  to  sell his products. 
This has the effect of  increasing the ultimate cost of  the user terminal and/or limiting 
the markets open to manufacturers. For manufacturers, operators and users, the ideal 
would be a single global conformity assessment regime. 
Conclusions 
A .key problem remains the lack of recognised pan-European standards for mutual 
type approval of  VSATs. Efforts should be made to expedite the development towards 
such standards by promoting a transition from European Technical Standards (ETSs) 
to  Common  Technical  Regulations  (CTRs)  to  ensure  mutual  recognition  of 
conformity assessment within the EU. 
In the meantime, the Conuriission should accelerate its efforts in concluding balanced 
Mutual  Recognition  Agreements  (MR.As)  which  will  help  simplify  conformity 
assessment (type approval) for terminal equipment. 
-33-The Commission should encourage Member States to  speed up  the procedures  for 
earth  station  approval  and  encourage  non-member  countries  to  do  likewise. 
(Experience has shown that type approved earth stations are processed very quickly.) 
The  SAP  RWG agrees  with the  Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue which,  in its  7 
November  1997  communique,  said industry "stresses the need to  work within the 
Information Technology Agreement discussions at the WTO towards conclusion of a 
Conformity Assessment Agreement (CAA), based on the principle 'One Standard-
One Test-Supplier's Declaration of  Conformity'." 
The  conclusion of a  Conformity Assessment  Agreement  in the  WTO  framework 
would imply the development of appropriate radio terminal equipment specifications 
at the international level according to strict criteria in order to create an environment 
open to fair competition world-wide (without any barriers due to language or IPRs, for 
example).  These  specifications  should  be  stable,  published  in  internationally 
recognised languages and  take into account existing international regulations. 
The  WTO  Committee  of Participants  on  the  Expansion  of Trade  in Information 
Technology Products have discussed non-tariff measures (NTMs), as  they effect IT 
product trade, during the course of the product review and consultations on NTMs. 
There have  been proposals by participants to  examine  standards-related barriers in 
terms of  IT products, with the specific mention of  conformity assessment.  A proposal 
was  put  forth  to  survey  participants  on  standards-related  matters  (information 
gathering only), which was agreed in principal at the last meeting.  As yet, there is no 
'Conformity Assessment Agreement'. 
5.  REGULATORY SITUATION WITHIN THE CEPT (SAP A3) 
With reference to the CEPT, the Satellite Action Plan has one action, as follows: 
A3.  The Commission will request CEPT to accelerate efforts in the harmonisation 
of authorisation  conditions  and  in  hannonised  use  of frequency  bands,  to 
review its current structure and procedures with  a view  to increase the 
efficiency  of  its  regulatory  decisions  making  procedures  and  their 
implementation. The Commission will seek to improve its co-operative efforts 
with CEPT in order to enable CEPT to support better the EU policies. 
The CEPT has two committees (ERC and ECTRA) which have undertaken studies and 
developed Decisions and Recommendations aimed at overcoming problems associated 
with market access. 
5.1  EUROPEAN RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE (ERC) 
·  5.1.1  Free circulation 
The ERC has been addressing the issue of free  circulation of radio equipment for a 
number of years. It has developed various regulations for carrying and using radio 
-34-equipment for the mutual recognition of  conformity assessment. 
The CEPT uses the following definitions of  free circulation: 
Levell - free circulation without permission to use -the (mobile)' earth stations 
Level 2 - free circulation with permission to use the (mobile) earth stations 
Level 3 - free circulation with permission of  placing the (mobile) earth stations on the 
market. 
The first two Levels mean users have the possibility of bringing into another country 
their (mobile) earth stations without the need to  apply for another licence. Level  3 
means suppliers can import and sell (mobile) earth stations. 
Three different licensing regimes have been identified for the use and/or possession of 
radio equipment. 
1.  The use and possession of radio  equipment is totally licence-free.  There are no 
rules or obligations for the owner or user of  the radio equipment. 
2.  The use and possession of radio equipment is free in the sense that the owner or 
user is not required to apply for a licence for the possession or use of  the equipment. 
The administration does not collect or register any information about the individual 
users or their radio equipment.  There are, however, some general rules that each user 
must observe. 
· 3.  It is necessary to impose rules on the use of radio equipment. An individual radio 
licence is required for possession and/or use of  the radio equipment. The information 
regarding the licence holder is registered, 'and usually the licence holder has to pay an· 
annual fee. 
From the point of view of manufacturers, users  and operators, the first and second 
regimes are similar. Therefore, they are considered together and only the following 
two regimes are considered here: 
•  a regime where individual radio licences are not required;  and 
•  a regime where individual radio licences are required. 
The regime where individual licences are not required may be covered by a general 
licence, a class licence or an exemption depending on the juridical situation in the 
country in question. 
In the past, the ERC h3$  addressed Level 2 free circulation on a case-by-case basis. 
When there was a request from operators of services to arrange free· circulation for 
certain radio equipment, arrangements were produced when certain conditions were 
met.  The issue of  .placmg equipment on the market was dealt with by developing 
conformity  assessment  arrangements.  Thus,  equipment  could  qualify  for  mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment or mutual recognition of test results, but not 
-35-necessarily  for  Level  ·  2  free  circulation.  Free  circulation  was  not  dealt  with 
systematically.  One  Recommendation dealing  with -this  issue
11  which provides  for 
taking land mobile equipment built into cars, for example, has been implemented in 
16 CEPT countries 
12 by end 1997. 
One of  the first radio services where it became obvious in the late 1980s that Level 2 
harmonisation measures enabling free circulation of  terminals were necessary was the 
land mobile satellite service. 
This  resulted in 1989  in T/R 21-07  con~erning border crossing and use of mobile 
transmitter-receivers  in  CEPT  countries.  Annexed  to  this  Recommendation  was  a 
"Circulation Card". This Recommendation could in principle be used for all kinds of 
equipment,  both  satellite  and  non-satellite,  but  was  only  implemented  for  Land 
Mobile Inmarsat-C and EUTELTRACS terminals. 
Exchanging  the  required  information  between  the  participating  administrations, 
keeping the information on the circulation card up to date and issuing the card to all 
persons  requiring  it  was,  of course,  a  cumbersome  administrative  procedure, 
especially since there was at that time no central office within the CEPT like the ERO 
which could assist in these procedures. Thus, the procedure was hard to manage by 
administrations  and  EUTELSAT  volunteered  to  take  over  the  task  of gathering 
information to be incorporated on the Circulation Cards for EUTEL  TRAC~  users and 
to distribute this information to the CEPT administrations. 
Subsequently, two separate Recommendations dealing with Land Mobile lnmarsat-C 
terminals  and  OmniTRACS  terminals  were  produced  (T  IR .. 31-02  and  T  IR 21-09 
respectively)  which  regulated  the  free  circulation  of these  terminals  without  the 
necessity of a Circulation Card but on the basis of a conformity assessment mark on 
the  equipment.  In addition  to  free  circulation,  these  Recommendations  dealt  with 
conformity assessment and licensing of  the equipment. 
At _a  later date, a Recommendation similar to Land Mobile_Inmarsat-C terminals was 
produced  for  Land  Mobile  Inmarsat-M  terminals  {T/R  21-11).  A  generic 
Recommendation allowing the free  circulation, type testing and licensing of satellite 
paging terminals was also produced along the same lines as  those for Land Mobile 
Inmarsat-C and -M equipment (CEPT/ERCIREC 21-14). All these Recommendations 
(except T/R 21-07) were of a temporary nature and were to allow the acceptance of 
the  type  testing  performed  by the  satellite  operators  until  a  European  standard 
. covering Land Mobile Satellite terminals was finalised and accepted. 
In 1994, the ERC approved a long term strategy and policy document.
13  This report 
dealt with a number of policy issues.  On free  ~irculation, the following policy goal 
11T/R. 21-06 Conditions under which Land Mobile Radio Equipment may be carried but without being 
operated during short journeys and stays within CEPT countries.  . 
12 See Implementation ofERC Recommendations and Decisions, www.ero.dk 
13 ERC Long Term Strategy and Policy, Nicosia, March 1994, Annex I to Doc CEPTIERC (94)13. 
-36-. was  adopted:  "The  ERC  should  provide  for  the  free  circulation  of  radio 
communications  equipment  within  the  CEPT  countries  and  the  administrative 
procedures with respect to free circulation and use of  radio equipment applied by the 
members individually or in co-operation should be converged." As a  step towards 
fulfilling this policy goal, the Radio Regulatory Working Group (WGRR) of  the ERC 
developed  a  Decision  on  free  circulation  of radio  equipment  in CEPT  member 
countries  (ERC/DEC(95)01  ).  This  Decision  was  adopted  1  December  1995  and 
should have been implemented by 1 January 1997 at the latest. However, a year later, 
not all CEPT administrations have done so,  as shown in the following table (which 
also covers two related Recommendations). 
Country  Has implemented  Has implemented  Has implemented 
ERC/DEC/(95)01  ERC/REC/(21)15  ERC/REC/(96)16 
re free circulation?  re free circulation  re mutual recognition 
&use?  of  type approval? 
Albania 
Andorra 
Austria  Yes  Yes 
Belgium  Yes 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia  Yes 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark  Yes  Yes 
Estonia 
F. Y  .R. of  Macedonia 
Finland  Yes  Yes 
France· 
Germany  Yes 
Greece 
Hungary  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Iceland  Yes 
he  land 
Italy 
Latvia 
.Liechtenstein  Yes 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Moldova 
Monaco 
Netherlands  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Norway  Yes  Yes 
Poland 
Portugal  Yes 
Romania 
Russia Federation 
San Marino  Yes 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Spain 
-37-Sweden  Yes 
Switzerland  Yes 
Turkey  Yes  Yes 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom  Yes 
Vatican City State 
(Data taken from the www.ero.dk Web szte,  1 Dec 97) 
The  Decision  ERC/DEC(95)01  deals  only  with  the  carriage  and  use  of radio 
equipment in CEPT countries (Levels  1 and 2)  and does not cover the placing of 
radio equipment on the market (Level  3). The Decision stipulates that whenever use 
of the radio  equipment is  permitted in  the  visitors'  home country,  administrations 
shall permit free circulation and use of radio equipment (Level  2 Free Circulation) 
meeting the following criteria: 
•  the radio equipment operates on harmonised frequencies with common technical 
standards; 
•  no frequency planning or individual frequency assignment is needed. 
Currently,  the Decision covers  GSM mobile  equipment,  DECT mobile equipment, 
EUTELTRACS  terminals,  lnmarsat-C terminals,  lnmarsat-M terminals and PR-27 
mobile stations. 
The WGRR has discussed how to address the requests for adding more equipment 
categories  to  the  Annex.  Since  administrations  find  it  difficult  to  implement  the 
regulation when too  many different categories are  included, the WGRR decided to 
have additional Decisions covering other equipment categories.  Separate Decisions 
covering Inmarsat-D, Inmarsat'-phone (mini-M), EMS-Prodat and EMS-MSSAT were 
developed. These Decisions are expected to be fmally approved in March 1998. 
The 95-01 Decision stipulates that the carriage and use of  the radio equipment must be 
allowed without requiring an additional national licence or registration in the· country 
visited. The Decision states further that free circulation without permission to use the 
equipment (Level 1) is allowed for all types of  portable radio equipment permitted in 
the visitor's home country. 
In some  countrie~, implementation of the Decision requires legislative changes that 
may take considerable time. 
Some administrations  appear not to  understand that the Decision provides that  aU 
equipment licensed or allowed in the visitor's home country  may always be carried  . 
by a visitor in another country. This should cover the free circulation (without use) of 
MSS, VSAT and SNG terminals. 
WGRR next produced a Recommendation  (ERC/REC 21-15) on  Free Circulation 
and use of LMSS terminals in Europe. Although LMSS terminals are  covered by 
the ERC Decision on Free Circulation, it will take some time before the Decision is 
implemented in most CEPT member countries. Therefore, it was decided to develop 
an interim regime  to  safeguard the  existing  free  circulation arrangements  for  this 
equipment.  The Recommendation also  extends the free circulation arrangements to 
non-CEPT countries. 
-38-This Recommendation has been revised several times to  include more mobile earth 
stations.  The latest version to be approved by the WGRR in January  1998  covers 
Inmarsat-C,  Inmarsat-M  and  EUTELTRACS,  Inmarsat-D,  Inmarsat-phone,  EMS-
Prodat and EMS-MSSAT. ERC/REC 21-15  supersedes the ERC Recommendations 
21-09, 21-11 and 31-02, which were abrogated. 
A  separate  Decision  ERC/DEC/(97)05  has  been  approved  covering  the  free 
circulation  and  use  of S-PCS  mobile  earth  stations.  This  Decision  states  that  no 
individual  licences  shall  be  required  and  that  free  circulation  and  use  shall  be 
permitted for S-PCS mobile earth stations when certain conditions are met and free 
circulation without use when the conditions are not met. 
With regard to Level  3 Free Circulation for LMSS, VSAT and SNG terminals, the 
ERC has adopted: 
•  ERCIREC  21-16  on  Type  Approval  for  Land Mobile  Satellite  Terminals, 
LMSS 
•  ERCIREC  11-01  on  Type  Approval  for  satellit~ earth  station  equipment, 
VSATandSNG 
These Recommendations call for the mutual recognition of type approvals given by 
any  CEPT.  type  approval  authority  for  terminals  complying  with  the  essential 
requirements in the relevant European Technical Standard (ETS). adopted by ETSI. 
The  annex  to  these  Recommendations  specifies  the  essential  requirements.  Type 
approved equipment shall bear a mark in accordance with the marking specified in 
this Recommendation. The most recent version of  the LMss· Recommendation covers 
Inmarsat-C,  Inmarsat-D,  Inmarsat-M,  Inmarsat-phone  (Inmarsat  mini-M), 
EUTELTRACS, EMS Prodat  and EMS-MSSAT mobile earth stations. 
With ·regard to Level  3 Free Circulation in general, CEPT/ERC/DEC (97)1 0 on the 
procedures  for  mutual  recognition  of  conformity  assessment  procedures 
including  marking  of radio  equipment  and  radio  terminal  equipment  was 
developed.  This  Decision  contains  procedures  for  the  mutual  .  recognition  of 
conformity assessment of  radio equipment. 
Licensing of radio equipment has long been treated as  a purely national matter, but 
when equipment was introduced which was meant to be taken over borders,  the need 
for co-ordination, mutual recognition and hannonisation of  licences arose
14
• A number · 
of CEPT Recommendations  have  said that the class  of equipment covered by the 
Recommendation should be exempted from an individual licence· or be covered by a 
general licence. Examples are tho~e mentioned above on MSS and S-PCS. 
14 See also ERO report on Licen,sing and Charging, July 1997. 
-39-During the last two  years, licensing and harmonisation matters have been taken up 
more  systematically  since the  ERC  adopted  policy goals  which  called  for  mutual 
recognition
15 ~  simplification and  alignin.g  licensing procedures.  Such actions  are  in 
accord with the EU Licensing Directive. 
A Recommendation ERCIREC 01-07 on a harmonised regime for  exemption from 
individual licensing of  radio equipment was approved in 1995. This Recommendation 
lists the  criteria on the basis of which administrations  should exempt categories of 
radio  equipment.  The  ERC  adopted  for  public  consultation  in  December  1997  a 
Decision which  lists  some  radio  equipment  that  should  be  free  from  individual 
licensing. WGRR intends to add to this list further equipment categories in the near 
future in separate Decisions. 
The satellite industry in Europe believes that future personal broadband multimedia 
satellite terminals should not require individual licences and urges the GEPT to take 
appropriate steps towards that end. 
$.1.2  Conclusions 
There is certainly no lack of  regulation in the areas of free circulation and conformity 
assessment.  With  the  exception  of  the  conformity  assessment  Decision 
ERC/DEC/(97)10, the ERC has produced most of  the regulation in a timely manner. 
These regulations have not had the positive impact expected because many countries 
have not  implemented them. Implementation of Decisions has been an issue on the 
agenda of every ERC meeting. With regard to Recommendations, administrations are 
asked  once  a  year  about  implementation  progress.  The  response  has  not  been 
overwhelming. In some cases, the Recommendations have not been implemented, but 
in other cases the Recommendations may have been implemented but no information 
IS given. 
EUTELSAT  told  the  SAP  RWG  that  many of its  EUTELTRACS  customers  had 
trucks blocked at border points because they were carrying a satellite terminal. These 
customers  subsequently  have  asked  EUTELSAT  or  the  local  Service  Provider  to 
compensate them financially for the time lost at the border points with customs. The 
slow  progress  in  the  implementation  of CEPT  regulations  in  some  countries  has 
affected some EUTELSAT customers in other ways.  For example,  they sometimes 
have had  to  find  alternative routes  in order to  avoid  transiting through a problem 
country. As the number of satellite systems in Europe increases, the magnitude of  the 
problem with border police in some countries will probably also  grow. EUTELSAT 
said in a contribution to the SAP R  WG that· it sees the need for provision of a list of 
-all satellite terminals to customs officials and for provision of  a list of  countries which 
pemiit free circulation  to users. 
15  Mutual recognition means a licence obtained in any CEPT country is recognised QY all other CEPT 
administrations. Mutual recognition of licences is also applicable to radio amateurs and to maritime 
and aeronautical radio equipment. 
-40-Since the beginning of 1997, a database on the status of implementation has been 
available on the ERO's World Wide Web home page. 
A complicating factor in the area of free circulation Levels 1 and 2 has been the fact 
that  the  regulation  of  MSS  has  changed  several  times.  First,  there  were 
Recommendations for  each type of mobile earth station (see Annex 2), then it was 
considered that general regulation were more appropriate and ERC/DEC/(95)01 was 
developed,  then  interim  Recommendations  covering  the  same  equipment  were 
developed which were changed a_ couple of  times to include new types of  mobile earth 
stations.  There are proposals to  consolidate and not to  try to  improve the existing 
regulation further. 
In the area of licensing and harmonising licensing conditions, work has just started 
within the ERC. In the area ofMSS and S-PCS, the existing regulation states clearly 
that no individual licence shall be required for this kind of  mobile earth stations. So 
when CEPT administrations still require an individual licence, this can be traced back 
to the lack of  implementation. 
The ERO has studied the licensing of  VSAT and SNG terminals, but the issue has not 
yet been fully addressed in the ERC. A Report on individual licensing conditions has 
been drafted and this, together with the recommendations from the ETO study, might 
lead to simplification and harmonisation in the near future. 
5.2  ECTRA 
5.2.1  ETO study on harmonisation of  satellite licensing regimes 
ETO has produced a  report  on harmonisation of satellite licensing regimes within 
CEPT countries. The report was prepared on behalf of ECTRA for the Commission. 
The ETO report presents the licensing regimes in the  EU Member States and four 
other  CEPT  countries.  It  also  provides  information  on  licensing  fees  in  these 
countries. Industry views ·were reflected in the final report, which was adopted by the 
ECTRA plenary in December 1997. Some minor modifications were included mainly 
on the situation in some countries, e.g., the fees in Germany, the licensing regime in 
Ireland.  An  annex  was  added  which  includes  corinnents  from  Portugal.  The 
consequences of the adoption of the ETO report will be considered by the ECTRA 
Project Team (PT) on licensing at the end of January 1997 in conjunction with the 
ERC, and perhaps by the Licensing Committee established by the CollllPission. Apart 
from the definition, no modification was made to ETO's proposals. 
Most  Member  States  have  implemented  new  licensing  regimes  on  satellites  in 
conformance with the EC directives by 1 January 1998. Most Member States have 
also  authorised voice telephony· over satellite networks just as  they have over the 
PSTN.  The Commission has authorised delays by a few  Member States. However, 
some of  these Member States will make exemptions on a case-by-case basis, e.g., for 
S-PCS. 
-41-The ECTRA project team on licensing (ECTR.A-PTL) will be involved in some issues 
such as the possible extension of  the One-Stop-Shopping (OSS) procedure to S-PCS, 
the ETO database on licensing regimes and the above-mentioned ETO study. 
ETO has already obtained information from CEPT countries on the implementation of 
EC  directives.  This  task  will  continue  with  the  collection  of information  on the 
licensing regimes for satellites. The information will be available on the ETO Web 
site in a common format enabling comparisons between countries. 
ETO is also prepared to provide information on licensing fees  in accordance with a 
work order funded by the Commission. 
Conclusions 
The Commission should co-operate with ECTRA and the ERC in encouraging CEPT 
member countries to remove or reduce regulatory barriers and to implement ERC and 
ECTRA  Decisions  and  Recommendations.  Bilateral  discussions  with  National 
Regulatory Authorities would be helpful. 
The creation of  an effective 'one stop shop' in ETO would be helpful to the industry. 
The implementation procedures for CEPT Decisions and Recommendations on free 
circulation of  LMSS should be harmonised. 
The Commission should review the adequacy of  information exchange between itself 
and CEPT bodies involved in frequency management and market access issues. 
6.  REGULATORY SITUATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES (SAP A6, A12) 
The EU Satellite Action Plan has two actions relating to the regulatory situation in 
third countries: 
A6.  On the basis of information to be supplied by Member States and the private 
sector,  the  Commission  will  continue  to  review  of  the  developments 
concerning  the  International  Satellite  Organisations  and  take  the 
appropriate steps with a view to ensure that these developments contribute to 
the achievement of  a fully competitive satellite communications marketplace. 
Al2.  The  Commission  will  take  the  appropriate  measures  to  -promote  effective 
competition  in  this  field .  at  a  world  level  and· continue  to  ensure  that  the 
operation  of global  satellite  systems  does  not  impede  competition  on  the 
relevant European markets, in conformity with Treaty. 
The European satellite industry usually encounters more regulatory barriers to non-EU 
markets ~an  in the EU. Often there are non-explicit trade barriers. Many developing 
. -42-countries  do  not  have  a  clear  regulatory  environment.  The  absence  of a  clear 
regulatory environment in many countries creates risks in any business plans. 
The European satellite industry has encountered numerous barriers to market access in 
third coUntries. Among the reasons for such barriers are the following: 
•  no regulatory body; 
•  no adequate regulatory framework (licensing, etc.); 
•  market access limitations; 
•  limitations restricting the free circulation of  satellite terminals; 
•  no interconnection framework; 
•  high licence fees; 
•  high customs duties; 
•  additional type approval (conformity assessment) regimes. 
Even where  there is  a well  established regulator,  as  in the  US,  the  action of the 
regulator may favour domestic companies. In implementing its commitments under 
the  WTO  Agreement  on  Basic  Telecoms,  the  FCC's  25  Nov.  1997  Order  on 
International  Satellite  Services  removes  some  restrictions,  notably  for  satellite 
operators of other WTO member countries, in their provision of services in the US. 
Some restrictions remain, such as barring domestic use of INTELSAT and Inmarsat. 
Even if  Comsat agreed to waive immunities and meet other conditions set within the 
· Order so that it could provide lnmarsat services in the US, the FCC would still permit 
access to the two ISOs by users in the US only through Comsat as the US Signatory to 
both organizations. 
For many systems, the US is a key market for development of a successful business. 
Until the FCC's Order of 25  November, some service could be initiated only if the 
lead was a US company (even if  most of  the capital was non-US). This practical limit 
created barriers to the satellite industry in Europe with respect to its business strategy, 
future expansion, employment and investment security. The Order to allow non-US 
licensed space stations to provide domestic and international satellite services in the 
United States should improve access to the US  market, at least for some operators. 
The Report and Order are intended to  implement the market opening commitments 
made by the US in the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, which came 
into force on 1 January 1998. 
One contributor to this Report suggested that market access to third countries could be 
considered against a number of  key success factors, including the following:. 
1.  Quality of  service 
Satellite services are destined to compete in a global environment. Quality of service 
for the end user (the customer) is improved where there is market access. 
2.  High initial investment requires a broad customer base. 
Global satellite services are characterised by high initial investments. Hence a basic 
precondition for competitiveness is timely access to a global customer base. 
3.  Certainty of  market access 
-43-. Apparent market access is not sufficient. The lack of  certainty about market access in 
major  markets  may  stop  potential  investors  from  investing  in  European  satellite 
initiatives. If the Coinmission and/or the industry in Europe fails  to  gain access to 
important markets, then satellite services controlled by Americans or others will be a 
more attractive opportunity to investors, including investors from Europe. 
4.  Domestic liberalisation must imply external market access 
The  high degree  of liberalisation  in the  European Union would  in the  long  term 
damage the global competitiveness of  European services and systems if  other markets 
are not opened quickly enough. 
5.  Priority to competitive countries and regions 
Countries with their own competitive global satellite systems and significant markets 
are  in a  strong position to  hinder the  success  of global  satellite  initiatives  in  the 
European  Union.  For  example,  if European-based  satellite  operators  and  service 
providers were unable to gain entry to the US market, the effect would be two-fold: 
first,  the  competitiveness  of the  European  service  would be harmed.  Second,  the 
competitiveness of  the US services would be enhanced because US  satellite networks 
would be more  attractive  partners  for  service  providers  even  in the  EU Member 
States. 
Some members have been concerned about the disparity in market access between the 
Union and other countries.
16 American companies, for example, can invest in Europe 
and  offer  competitive  satellite  services,  yet  Europeans  have  not  had  comparable 
access to  the American market. A position was advocated within the SAP R  WG that 
industry should urge  that a ·high priority be given to  implementation of the  WTO 
Agreement  by  National  Regulatory  Authorities,  CEPT  and  other  competition 
authorities. DGIV should be asked to evaluate market access within Europe and third 
countries. 
6.1  CUSTOMS DUTIES 
Customs duties add to the cost of  equipment for users and reduce the potential market 
for operators and manufacturers. Customs duties must be paid on equipment imported 
into a country, sometimes even on equipment taken into a country on a temporary 
basis. Customs duties are not a problem in the Union, but they are a formidable barrier 
to  market  access  in m~y  other  countries.  Examples  of countries  charging  high 
customs duties are the following: 
I  Country  How much  are import  I  Do import duties differ if the I 
16  Note that the Licensing Directive has a provision which says that "Community undertakings should 
have effective and comparable access to third countries' markets and enjoy treatment  in third countries 
similar to that offered in the Community to undertakings owned wholly, controlled through majority 
ownership or effectively controlled by nationals of  the third countries concerned." 
-44-duties on MESs?  MES is in the country 
:  temporarily? 
Tanzania  45-85%, up 105%  Bond 
Niger  55-80%  Yes 
India  53 to 75%  No< 6 months 
Algeria  68%  Yes 
Cote d'Ivoire  max. 65%  No duty<3 months 
Comoros  65% 
Burundi  61% 
Mauritania  60%  Yes (10%) 
Ghana  57.5%  No<3 months 
Sri Lanka  57.5%  Yes 
Burkina Faso  56.65% 
Argentina  23% to 50%  No duty 
Cameroon  50%  Yes 
Kenya  50% 
Seychelles  50%  Yes 
Togo Republic of  48.84% 
Uruguay  upto48%  No 
Angola  47%  No duty 
Central African Republic  46% 
Bangladesh  45% 
Zambia  37.5 to 42.5% 
Brazil  40%  Yes(5%) 
Benin  40%  Yes- 10-15% 
Trinidad & Tobago  40% 
Nigeria  40%  Deposit 
Guyana  35%  Yes 
Bahamas  35%  Yes (7%) 
Pakistan  35% 
Slovak Republic  34.8% 
Australia  up to 32.72% 
Malawi  32%.  Deposit 
Dominica  32.25%  Deposit 
Chile  up to 31%  Yes 
Laos  30%  No 
Indonesia  25%+10% VAT  Yes 
Malaysia  25%+ 10%Tax 
Bermuda  22.5-33.5%  Yes 
Source: Inmarsat, January 98 
The  WTO's  Information  Technology  Agreement  and  the  World  Customs 
Organization's Istanbul Convention will help reduce customs duties. 
6.1.1  Information Technology Agreement 
Under the WTO's Information Technology Agreement (ITA), signed in Singapore in 
December 199(), customs duties are to be reduced to zero on a range of telecom and 
information technology products in four progressive reductions from July 1997 (when 
the ITA came into force) to the year 2000. Satellite.terminals would most likely come 
under the category of  'HS-96-8517 ·Other telephone sets and videophones' and/or 'HS-
96-8525 Transmission apparatus incorporating reception apparatus', which are among 
the product headings in Attachment A to the IT  A. 
Twenty-eight countries signed the ITA in Singapore. As of  January 1998,43 countries 
have so far signed the IT  A including: ·  . 
-45-· Australia  India  Philippines 
Canada  Indonesia  Poland 
Chinese Taipei  Israel  Romania 
Costa Rica  Japan  Singapore 
Czech Republic  Korea  Slovak Republic 
El Salvador  Liechtenstein  Switzerland 
Estonia  Macao  Thailand 
European Union  Malaysia  Turkey 
Hong Kong  New Zealand  United States 
·Iceland  Norway 
The current IT  A signatories represent 92.5% of world trade in the telecom sector.
17 
Those that have not signed are  often the  ones  that  could benefit most  from  new 
satellite  services  and  equipment to  shore  up  their limited national  infrastructures. 
Thus, these countries· represent good potential markets for new satellite equipment and 
services, even though their share, of the global telecommunications market may be 
small.  The  Commission  and  the  satellite  industry  should  obviously  continue  to 
encourage more countries to sign the ITA. 
6.2  GLOBAL COMPETITION 
The global satellite communications market is very' competitive. It is dominated by 
the US. The largest European manufacturers are small compared to the two big US 
conglomerates.
18  The European market share in satellite terminals is small. European 
participation exists in only a few US satellite systems such as Orion, Globalstar and 
Iridium. 
The world-wide market (excluding the former USSR) represents a total of 7.2 billion 
ECU  per  annum  (1996)  for  satellites,  53  per  cent  of which  comes  from  the 
commercial market, while another 21  billion ECU per annum comes from operations 
and services. 
The market for communication satellites and latinch services is increasing at a rate of 
some 20 per cent per annum. In a decade, satellites are expected to represent  a market 
of US $15-20 billion; terminals three to four times more, and services, five to eight 
times more. 
17  Although it has  not yet signed the  ITA,  China indicated in a joint statement released after the 
October 1997 visit to the US by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, that it intended to participate in the 
agreement "as soon as possible." The US  has  said  ~igning the agreement was one conditipn for US 
support for China's bid to join the WTO.  -
18  Lockheed Martin had revenues of $7.9 billion from its missiles & space divisions in 1996, while 
Hughes had revenues of  $4.1 billion from its comparable divisions. In Europe, the companies with ·the 
biggest revenues from this sector were Aerospatiale ($1.6 billion). and Matra Marconi ($1.6 billion). 
-46-Non-geostationary communications satellites are expected to represent a market of  the 
same  order as  geostationary satellites  in the  period  1997-2007,  and  terminals  and 
services for non-geostationary satellites are expected to represent a market superior to 
that for geostationary satellites. 
The  global  market  for  communications  satellites  comprised  the  Intergovernmental 
Satellite Organisations (ISOs) -INTELSAT, Inmarsat, Intersputnik, EUTELSAT and 
Arabsat - and  the national  or regional  systems  operated by government agencies. 
Some systems have been developed by the private sector, particularly in the US. More 
than US $65 billion will be needed from investors to pay for new satellites planned in 
the next 10 years. 
As the telecommunications market becomes increasingly liberalised and the range of 
services offered by satellites increases,  a significant change is  t~g  place  . in the 
relationship  between the  satellite  services  industry  and  the  satellite manufacturing 
industry. Major industrial players are now sponsors or significant investors in almost 
all the recently proposed systems.  Examples from the US include Iridium (Motorola), 
Teledesic  (Boeing),  Globalstar  (Loral),  and  Celestri .  (Motorola).  Examples  from 
Europe  include EAST (Matra Marconi  Space),  Skybridge (Alcatel),  WEST  (Matra 
Marconi Space) and Euroskyway (Alenia). Vertical integration is also apparent as part 
of the  consolidation process  in  the  US  aerospace  industry.  For example,  Hughes 
acquired PanAmSat, which complements its existing DirectTV service, and Loral has 
acquired  Orion. 
As they change their structure and either create new organisations or become national 
law companies, the ISOs may try to  attract the participation of strategic investors, 
including satellite suppliers, in the new companies. Nevertheless, the SAP RWG does 
not believe it is in the interest of the transformed ISOs (or any other operator) to be 
forced to buy satellites from a particular supplier. 
The difference in the structure and size of  the satellite manufacturing industry and in 
the  mechanism and  level of gove~ental support between the US  and  Europe is 
important.  The US manufacturing industry has become globally dominant, and it is 
likely that the US will also dominate the operation and provision of  satellite services. 
The  position of Europe~ manufacturers  of communications  satellites  and  related 
equipment is not strong compared with the US competition. 
In its Resolution adopted on 21.0ctober 1997; the European Parliament 
•  "Calls upon the Commission to support the projects of  common interest in the field 
of trans-European  networks  in  order  to  speed  up  the  development  of satellite 
networks; 
•  "Calls upon the Commission to undertake efforts to  encourage the market-based 
development of  commercially viable European Global Positioning Systems (GPS); 
•  "Considers that the Commission should include in co-operation programmes with 
neighbouring  Central  and  Eastern  European  and  Mediterranean  countries  the 
establishment of satellite services on a bilateral' and multilateral basis to improve 
telecommunication and transport infrastructures of  common interest and to support 
development, training and cultural exchange programmes." 
-47-Many novel satellite services have their roots in US  government systems, and vice 
versa. Novel applications are also  supported by long-term launch rental contracts of 
the government (e.g., Iridium, GPS-Navsat, Space Imaging). There is no comparable 
support for the satellite industry in Europe. 
Export/import  licensing  may  pose  another  barrier  to  market  access.  Thiough  an 
unfavourable use of  such regulation, it is possible to distort competition. 
Working in a US-led commercial programme, Alenia told the SAP RWG that it had 
invested money in a number of activities, but it had not been possible to accomplish 
any of those activities because the US  prime contractor was  hampered by the US 
Department of Defense (DoD)  in obtaining an export licence for military-classified 
design documents. 
'6.2.1  Conclusions 
Competition rules constitute the best regulatory framework  for  telecommunications 
including the satellite sector. Market forces should apply and every operator should be 
entitled to participate in new technology projects. Valuable experience from existing 
telecommunications providers should not be excluded a priori. 
The Commission and European industry should document and consider the extent to 
which competition is distort~d taking into acqount factors such as: 
•  the  dominance  US  companies  have  achieved  over  European  industry  through 
support from or their origin in the defence industry; 
•  the role of  the US government as a customer ofUS satellite systems; 
•  US export restrictions. 
7.  WTO (SAP A7) 
One  action can be found  in the EU Satellite Action Plan relating to  the activities 
within the World Trade Organization: 
A  7.  The  Commission  will  now  focus  on  the  full  implementation  of  the 
commitments of countries in the framework of the recently concluded WTO 
Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications. Furthermore, the Commission will 
carry  out,  whilst  consulting  industry,  an  in-depth  analysis  of trade policy 
implications regarding international satellite communications issues ahd, 
for those areas where appropriate, make proposals to remove in a systematic 
fashion the remaining market access barriers. The Commission will also put 
forward proposals for the co-ordination of positions of EU Member States 
in international fora. 
Global deployment of satellite services will depend on suppliers  gaining access to 
world-wide. markets.  Several  recent  international  agreements  have  facilitated  the 
-48-opening of  markets. Notable among these are those which come within the purview of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), i.e., the Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA,  which is  referenced in a later section of this  Report)  and the  Agreement on 
Basic Telecommunications. 
7.1.1  Agreement on Basic Telecommunications 
The Agreement was signed by 69 of  the 132 WTO member countries on 15 February 
1997.  The  Agreement  covers  market  access,  investment  and  pro-competitive 
regulatory principles. 
The  signatories
19  account for  95  per cent of the world telecommunications market, 
worth  an  estimated $600  billion in 1995.  The  commitments of these  governments 
(contained  in  55  schedules)  are  annexed  to  the  Fourth  Protocol of the  General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The Protocol was open for acceptance until 
30 November 1997 and enters into force on 1 January .1998. In a number of  schedules, 
a member's commitments for particular services are to be phased in, in some instances 
over a period of  several years. 
Market access commitments cover the cross-border supply of telecommunications as 
well  as  services provided  through the  establishment of foreign  firms  (commercial 
presence),  including  the  ability  to  own  and  operate  independent  telecom  network 
infrastructure. 
Unless a member country noted otherwise in its offer, any basic telecom service may 
be provided through any means of  technology. 
The  countries  participating  in  the  Agreement  also  agreed  a  set  of principles  on 
competition,  contained in the  so-called Reference Paper,  covering  matters  such as 
interconnection  guarantees,  transparent  licensing  processes,  the  independence  of 
regulators,  universal  service  and  allocation  of scarce  resources,  such  as  the  radio 
spectrum. This was the first time that competitive concepts have been brought into a 
trade agreement. 
The  results  of the  agreement  are  extended  to  all  WTO  members  on  a  non-
discriminatory basis through most favoured nation (MFN) treatment. However, each 
WTO  member could decide whether to  file  an MFN exemption.  Without an MFN 
exemption,  a  member must  treat  the  services  or service  suppliers  of every  other 
19 Antigua &  Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire,  Czech Republic, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, European Communities and its Member States,  Ghana,  Grenada,  Guatemala, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway,  Pakistan, Papua New Guine·a,  Peru,  Philippines, Poland, 
Romania,  Senegal,  Singapore,  Slovak  Republic,  South  Africa,  Sri  Lanka,  Switzerland,  Thailand, 
.Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Stat~s and Venezuela. 
-49-member  as  favourably  as  those  of any  other  country,  member  or  not.  Nine 
governments submitted MFN exemptions to be annexed to the Protocol. 
Of the 69 countries to make offers, 4  7 made offers that permit foreign ownership and 
control of  all telecom services and facilities (most from January 1998, but others to be 
phased in over time).  Ten ·countries permit foreign ownership or control of certain 
telecom services, while 10 countries do not permit foreign control (but accept some 
lower percentage of  foreign ownership). For its part, the US retained the provisions in 
the Communications Act of 1934 - and, in particular, section 31 O(b) - which limits 
direct foreign ownership to 25 per cent of an American telecommunications firm that 
is a licensee of  radio spectrum and provides common carrier service. Europe does not 
retain such a restriction. 
Fifty-three countries guarantee market access to  international telecom services  and 
facilities.  Six more countries are open for selected international services, while eight 
countries have limited or no market access commitments for international services. 
Forty-two  countries  guarantee  market  access  for  satellite  services  and  facilities 
(domestic  and international).
20  Six  countries  guarantee market access  for  selected 
services  and  facilities.
21  Nine  countries  made  no  market  access  commitments  re 
satellite services. 
22 
Limitations of  the agreement 
While  the  commitments  made  under  the  WTO  agreement  are  a  step  in the right 
direction,  SAP R  WG  members were of the  firm  belief that more countries  should 
make commitments under the  new regime  and  some  of those which have  already 
made commitments need to  make further improvements in their regulatory regimes 
and that they should do  so  in view of the positive impacts of the emerging Global 
Information Society. 
Also,  while there is no  doubt that the  WTO  agreement will benefit suppliers  and 
consumers of  satellite services, some countries nevertheless qualified their offers with 
limitations such as when competition will be introduced (in some cases ~fter the year 
2012), the extent of competition (in some cases no more than two operators), which 
services will be open to competition, foreign ownership, etc.  . 
20 The 42 countries which committed to market access for satellite services and facilities (domestic and 
international) from 1998 included Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic,  El Salvador,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Guatemala,  Iceland,  Israe4  Italy,  Japan,  Korea, 
Luxembourg,  Malaysia,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Spain  (end  1998),  Sri  Lanka,  Sweden, 
Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kirigdom,  United States.  From 1999, Peru.  From 2000, 
Argentina, Canada (for ftxed,  1998 for mobile), Ireland, Singapore, Venezuela, Portugal. From 2001, 
Bolivia, C;2:ech Republic. From 2002; Mexico, Bulgaria (for closed user groups, all public services as 
of 2004). From 2003,  Greece,  Hungary,  Poland, Romania,  Slovak Republic.  From 2004  and later, 
Brunei, Indonesia, Jamaica, Grenada, Thailand, Turkey, Senegal. 
21  Brazil, Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, Hong Kong, Mauritius, South Africa. 
22 Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines.· 
-50-The list of 69 countries which made commitments does not include some important 
markets, such as China
23 and Russia. 
Inmarsat and INTELSAT were  excluded in the  GBT  negotiations  because neither 
organisation is "of a country". However, lnmarsat is of  the view that satellite services 
supplied by ISO Signatories,  which are of a country, are covered unless specifically 
excluded. In any event, both Organizations are well advanced in the process· of being 
restructured, in Inmarsat's case as a company under UK national law. Inmarsat could 
be helped by Commission efforts to ensure its treatment in the US just like any other 
national law company when the restructuring is finally approved by member countries 
in 1998. 
The  audio-visual  sector was excluded from  the agreement.  It is not clear how the 
terms  of the  WTO  agreement  will  reconcile  market  similarities  between  images 
transmitted over the Internet with those transmitted via broadcast media to the same 
consumers. 
The regulatory principles contained in  th~ Reference Paper are rather general. 
Paragraph 5 of  the GATS Annex on Telecommunications already provides some basic 
regulatory  precepts  for  access  to  and  use  of public  telecommunications  transport 
networks  and  services,  but  it  may  still  leave  loopholes  for  protectionist-minded 
regulatory  agencies.  For example,  paragraph  S(e)(ii)  allows  regulators  to  impose 
access conditions to protect the 'technical integrity' of  the system. It is not clear when 
and how such a condition can be attacked as an illegitimate non-tariff trade barrier, 
nor  when  and  how  a  WTO  panel  can  review  the  validity  of such  a  regulatory 
condition. 
24 
It  is  not clear whether efforts  by some  WTO  members  to  restrict  voice over the 
Internet will be deemed a violation of  the agreement and subject to WTO enforcement 
penalties. 
Disputes over the implementation of  market access commitments can be subject of a 
process equivalent to mandatory binding arbitration, conducted on a government-to-
government basis. How well this process will work for telecoms disputes involving 
23  China is not likely to become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) until at least the 
year 2000. China's telecom minister has said China will not open its telecommunications market to 
foreign fums.  The US has said China will have to open its telecoms market to foreign competition 
before it is  allowed to join the WTO.  Currently, foreign frrms  are not allowed to own or ~ge 
telecom networks in the country. China does  n~t have a  telecom law that would provide requisite 
guarantees of  transparency for all regulatory and licensing decisions. 
24 Alexander W.  Sierck, "The Role of the ·World Trade Organization's Dispute Resolution Process in 
Emuring That Foreign Governments Faithfully Implement Their ~ommitments  in the WTO Telecoms 
Agreement",  The  WTO  Telecom  Agreement:  Engineering  the  Global  Information  Highway:  a 
Conference Report of  the Global Information Infrastructure Commission, Washington, D.C., 1997, p. 
99.  ,.  . 
-51 -novel regulatory and competition policy issues·remains to be seen. There have been 
no dispute settlement cases yet completed under the GATS, thus, the first few dispute 
cases under the Agreement on Basic Telecoms will be especially significant. 
25 
Many  developing  countries  lack  the  experience  in  setting  and  enforcing  clearly 
defined and pro-competitive regulations.  Many developing countries do  not have a 
national telecommunications policy in place. 
The  WTO  agreement  does  not  cover  defence  department  contracts,  sponsorships, 
support or other arrangements with industry (which is a distinct advantage for the US 
industry)
26
• Nor does it take patents into account. 
While  the  US  is  trying  to  open  more  markets  abroad,  procurements  of satellite 
services and equipment by US cities and states may not always abide by international 
rules such as those contained in the WTO Agreement.' 
Implementation of  the Agreement 
Forty developing countries signed the Agreement on Basic Telecoms, but some of 
them may have difficulties· in improving their regulatory frameworks in line with the 
requirements  of GATS.  Developing  countries,  like  the  other  signatories  to  the 
Agreement, must consider several issues in implementing the Agreement, notably: 
•  a body of  law that enshrines a basic telecom regime in the domestic laws; 
•  an independent and transparent regulatory authority in each country; 
•  a process for dealing with anti-competitive behaviour; 
•  clear rules for interconnection; 
•  a way to deal with hidden and not-so-hidden subsidies; 
•  a domestic independent appeals process
27
• 
25  The new WTO  dispute  settlement system does  not give  a panel any formal  power to  order the 
defending country to change its laws. In response to an adverse panel report, the defending country 
may choose to make a change in its laws or it may decide instead to offer trade 'compensation', such 
as lower tariffs. Alternatively: the defending country could do nothing. In that event, the complaining 
country could retaliate by suspending unrelated trade benefits equivalent to the trade benefits it lost. A 
company could get the WTO dispute settlement process started by asking its WTO representative to 
file a complaint at the WTO. In the case of  a EU company, it would inform its national authorities and 
ask the  European Commission to  raise  the  complaint at the  WTO.  The  company will need to  be 
involved  in the  process  by providing detailed factual  and legal memoranda to  help the  European 
Commission to decide when and how to  raise the  issue with the  foreign  government involved and 
.  whether to bring a case at the WTO. The company may need to show that it has exhausted its foreign 
administrative  and appellate remedies;  that there  is  factual  and  economic  evidence  to  support the 
complaint; that the company can spell out exactly why the foreign government agency's position is not 
in accord with the WTO agreement; and what it would propose as a solution to the complaint. 
. 
26'Defence in  ·particular represents a large share of  the space turnover of  US companies, "1th defence  · 
space expenditures amounting to approximately the same as NASA's space budget of  approximately 
US $14 billion.  · 
27 In the US, there is no private right of action for any of the US obligations in the WTO agreements. 
No supplier could take the US or the FCC to court on the grounds that it had not undertaken or carried 
out its WTO obligations. A supplier can take the FCC to court on the grounds that a particular rule is 
-52-The  European  Parliament's  Committee  on  External  Economic  Relations  gave  its 
backing  to  the  WTO  Agreement  on  liberalising  the  global  telecommunications 
market.  The  Committee  unanimously  approved  a  report  and  a  draft  legislative 
Resolution providing the Parliament's Opinion on the  WTO Agreement.  The report 
highlights the need: 
•  to monitor the application of  the WTO general principles; 
•  to  soften  the  Agreement's  impact  on  developing  countries  and  adopt  specific 
measures to ensure they do not suffer inordinate difficulties; 
•  to examine the likely effects of  the restrictions made in many areas to the proposals 
of  numerous countries, particularly with the US; 
•  to clarify the situation regarding whether audio-visual services are covered by the 
Agreement. 
28 
· 
The European Parliament approved the Resolution on 22 October 1997. 
On 25 November 1997, the FCC adopted two Orders addressing US  implementation 
of its WTO  commitments. The first Order addresses foreign participation in the US 
market for provision of  telecomn;tunications services, while the second Order creates a 
framework for opening the US market to foreign satellite carriers. 
In its 25  Nov.  1997 press release, the FCC says that with the International Satellite 
Service Order, along with its companion Order liberalising market access for foreign 
telecom providers, it "has carried out the letter and spirit of  the commitments made by 
the  United  States  in  February."  Nevertheless,  the  FCC  has  maintained  some 
restrictions  for  operators  from  non-WTO  countries  and  against  INTELSAT  and 
Inmarsat. 
Contrary  to  what  had  been  agreed  at  the  time  of the  conclusion  of the  WTO 
Agreement, the Agreement did not enter into  force  on  1 January  1998,  due to the 
position taken by the US  on the basis of what they considered to  be an insufficient 
number of WTO Member countries having ratified the Agreement by the agreed 30 
November 1997 deadline.  To provide time to allow those countries to complete their 
ratification procedures, it was agreed to  extend the  ratification deadline to  31  July 
1998. 
unconstitutional  or  that  it exceeds  the  FCC's authority,  but they  cannot  contest  the  validity  of a 
particular ruling of  the FCC vis-a-vis the WTO agreement. See Sierck, op cit., p. 43. 
28 Don Abelson of the US1R has said the US classifies and regulates these services, as well as digital 
audio satellite services, as  telecom services, but be.cause no  other country was willing to  accept this 
regulatory  classification,  the  US  withdrew  these  services  from  its  offer.  Thus,  the  US  does  not 
guarantee market access or national treatment for  th~se "telecom" services and reserved its right to 
treat other countries preferentially by taking an MFN treatment exception for these services. See The 
WTO Telecom Agreement: Engineering the.Global Information Highway,  pp. 33-4. 
-53-Some of  those countries who made commitments under the Agreement gave dates for 
"phase-in" beyond the 1 January 1998 deadline for implementation of  the Agreement. 
Among these, together with their phase-in d~te, are: 
Antigua & Barbuda (20 12) 
Argentina (2000) 
Belize (2003) 
Bolivia (200 1) 
Brunei (20 1  0) 
Bulgaria (2003) 
Dominica-=- no international commitments 
Grenada (2007) 
Papua New Guinea-no international commitments 
Poland (2003) 
Spain  (1  December 1998)-bound through European Community 
Most of  above are expected to be able to ratify. 
7.1.2  Conclusions 
The  WTO  Agreement  offers  a  useful  framework  for  removtng  trade  barriers 
encountered in third countries. 
Individual  Member  States  may  not  have  sufficient  economic  weight  to  obtain 
particular  trade  conditions  to  balance  those  obtained  by  the  US,  although  the 
combined  weight  of the  EU  does  have  considerable  negotiating  strength.  Fair 
competition conditions should be negotiated by the EU either on a bilateral basis or 
within the framework of  the WTO. 
The  Commission  should  take  non-regulatory  trade  barriers  into  account  m  its 
negotiations with third countries to improve market access. 
The  application  of WTO  protection  clauses  and  exemptions  may  result  in  new 
regulatory  barriers.  Hispasat  expressed  its  concern  to  the  SAP  RWG  about  the 
exemptions in the commitments to the WTO Agreement of  Argen.tina, Brazil and the 
US, regarding DTH services. 
The Commission should be empowered by the Council and the Parliament to conduct · 
negotiations either within the WTO framework, where possible, or on a bilateral basis. 
Results  coming  from  the  SAP  RWG  will  help  to  find  where  trade  barriers  are 
encountered and what cases could. be solved through negotiations. Article 18 of the 
Licensing  Directive  97  /13/EC  permits  negotiating  mandates  to  be  issued  by the 
Telecom Council to  the  Commission.  If the  European  satellite industry wants  the 
Commission to negotiate, it must explicitly support grant of  this mandate. 
In  the  rest  of the  world,  the  Commission  should  encourage  separation  between 
operational and regulatory functions among the countries which have not done so. In 
particular, an independent regulator should be created to ensure the prevention of  anti-
competitive  practices  .  in  the  telecommunications  sector,  transparent  and  non 
-54-discriminatory  licensing  and  interconnection regimes,  etc.  in  accordance  with  the 
WTO Reference Paper. 
A special focus  should be put on the application of national treatment in countries 
outside the EU. 
8.  ITU (SAP A9) 
One action in the EU  Satellite Action Plan relates to the ITU: 
A9.  The  Commission,  together  with  CEPT  and  industry,  will  review  the 
European strategy in ITU sectors i.e. standardisation, radiocommunications, 
development on satellite communications. 
8.1.1  Spectrum issues 
For any satellite operator, as serious as any regulatory barrier to market access is the 
challenge  of getting  adequate  spectrum.  Co-ordination  of satellite  systems  has· 
traditionally taken place under ITU Rules  and,  in particular, the  principle of "first 
come,  first  served".  However,  economic  and  technology  developments  proceed  at 
different speeds in different regions of  the world, which has meant later entrants were 
handicapped by this rule. Since the US has by far the most advanced satellite industry, 
it has been the country to  benefit most.  European ventures have also profited from 
these  rules.  However,  this·  advantage  is  disappearing  as  new  satellite  systems  are 
announced - it seems almost daily ~  somewhere in the world. The "first come, first 
served" rule has led the ITU to adopt a priori planning of access to certain spectrum 
resources,  at  Ku-band  in  particular,  which  in  practice  has  resulted  in increased 
difficulties for accessing adequate resources, for Europe especially. The CEPT in co-
ordination with the Commission should use their weight in the ITU to ensure adequate 
spectrum can be accessed more easily by a greater number of  real systems. The issue 
of  "paper"  systems  was  discussed  at  the  1997  World  Radiocommunications 
Conference (WRC 97) and administrative due diligence procedures were agreed. 
The results ofWRC 97 will come into force from January 1999 with changes made to 
the Radio Regulations. 
8.1.2  Conclusion 
Access  to  spectrum  is  increasingly .used  as  a  competitive  tool.  The  Commission 
should develop mechanisms to  strengthen the  Europe~ position at the ITU via the 
CEPT. 
':"55-'  . 
The  Commission  should  develop  a  position  on  the  future  of  ITU 
Radiocommunications sector in consultation with Member States and industry. The 
Commission should be an active in preparation and agreement of the ITU  ~trategic 
Plan for  1999-2003, which presents a good opportunity for considering the sector's 
future. 
The  Commission should  also  support  actions  in the  Standardisation  Sector which 
could  contribute  to  implementation  of  the  principles  contained  in  the  WTO 
Agreement.  Although  the  WTO  is  responsible  for  the  GATS  regulations  and 
establishing dispute settlement panels, the ITU may need to take on certain tasks in 
regard to _developing measures of a regulatory nature to accompany and supplement 
the commitments made by the signatories of  the WTO. 
Industry  should  increase  its  presence  in the  ITU in order to  monitor progress  and 
participate in ITU activities related to the allocation of  spectrum for satellite services, in 
particular  for  UMTS  and  future  multimedia  satellite  services.  The  Commission, 
together with the satellite industry in Europe, can play an important role in maintaining 
the momentum aimed at achieving good results from the Plenipotentiary conference in 
1998 and the next WRC in 1999. 
8.1.3  GMPCS issues 
Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite (GMPCS) was the subject of  the 
first ITU World Telecommunication Policy Forum (WTPF, October 1996)
29
• This ITU 
initiative has to be placed in the context of  new global communications technologies, 
which have raised questions about global regulation and trade issues. This first Policy 
Forum had to find a solution which would facilitate the deployment of  global systems 
while addressing concerns about perceived threats to national sovereignty, as well as 
other regulatory issues, in view of the concern that GMPCS  systems could bypass 
national terrestrial networks.  · 
Many of the issues  raised during  the Policy Forum  are  applicable  to  all  satellite 
systems  (i.e.,  fixed  and mobile,  broadband and narrow band,  global  and regional, 
· geostationary  and  non-geostationary,  extstlng  and  planned)  providing· 
telecommunication services directly to end users from a constellation of  satellites. 
The Policy Forum adopted five Opinions, agreed not only by traditional ITU members 
(the  Administrations,  representing  the  sovereign  nations),  but  also  by  industry 
(GMPCS satellite operators; service providers and manufacturers)~ Opinion 4 led to 
agreement on a  Memorandum of Understanding,  which was finalised  in February. 
29  The Policy  Forum was  held  in the  Geneva  from  21-23 October  1996.  It was  attended by 833 
delegates  representing  128  Member  States  and  70  Sector  Members.  Jonathan  Parapak,  Secretary-
General of the  Department of Tourism,  Posts  and  Telecommunications  of Indonesia,  was  elected 
Chairman. 
-56-1997, and associated Arrangements, finalised in October 1997, both of  which address 
matters relating to licensing, type approval and marking of  terminals, customs duties 
and access to traffic data  . 
. The Opinions adopted by the Policy Forum 
The WTPF was not mandated to produce prescriptive regulatory outcomes or outputs 
with binding force. Rather, the mandate of the Policy Forum was to  prepare reports 
and/or opinions for consideration by ITU Members. The ~ve Opinions agreed by the 
Policy Forum concern: 
1.  the role of  GMPCS in the globalisation of  telecommunications; 
2.  a Shared Vision and Principles for GMPCS. Ten voluntary Principles were agreed 
in  this  Opinion
30
,  which  calls  upon . Administrations  to  facilitate  the  early 
introduction of GMPCS  services and to  co-operate internationally in developing 
and harmonising policies regarding GMPCS, and to recognise that GMPCS system 
operators will take steps to inhibit the use of  their systems in any country that has 
not authorised their service. 
3.  preparation of  studies by all the three sectors of  the ITU to facilitate introduction of 
GMPCS; 
4.  establishment  of a  Memorandum  of Understanding  (MoU)  to  facilitate  the 
circulation of  GMPCS user terminals. This Opinion says urgent action is needed to 
facilitate  the  global  circulation  and  transborder  roaming  of  terminals  and 
recognises that some systems are already in operation and others soon will be; 
5.  implementation of  GMPCS in developing countries. Opinion 5 invited the Director 
of  the ITU Telecommunication Development Bureau (BDT) to establish a group of 
experts tasked with preparation of  a checklist of  factors which developing countries 
may take into account in authorising GMPCS services and of  a report which would 
consider  the  policy,  technical  and  operational  issues  regarding  provision  of 
GMPCS service, as well as the socio-economic impacts of GMPCS on developing 
countries. As a result of Opinion 5, the satellite industry and BDT collaborated in 
organising five  regional workshops to  debate  the  implications and  evolution of 
GMPCS  among  satellite  operators,  National  Regulatory  Authorities  and/or 
Administrations. 
30  The principles relate to early introduction of  GMPCS services, international co-operation of  national 
policy-makers and regulators, global service availability, GMPCS regulation (creation of a simplified, 
non-discriminatory and transparent regulatory environment, particularly with respect to such matters as 
service  licensing,  gateway  station  authorisation,  interconnection arrangements  and user terminals), 
conditions  for  investment and participation,  unauthorised use,  user terminals  and  free  circulation, 
universal access (provision of  basic telecommunication services particularly in rural and remote areas), 
interconnectivity between GMPCS systems and public networks, and further co-operation to facilitate 
co-ordinated solutions. 
-57-The  Forum  did  not  directly  address  the  issue  of "global"  licences  for  satellite 
operators.  The  notifying  Administration  will  continue  to  assign  frequencies  and 
regulate the satellite service domestically. However, it was recognised that the local 
service providers of  Gl\1PCS operators would need to obtain national authorisation. 
The GMPCS-MoU 
The MoU, finalised on 14 February 1997, is open for signature by administrations, 
system operators, service providers and manufacturers. By this MoU, the signatories 
agree to  co-operate, according to their respective roles and competencies, on the six 
following issues, in order to facilitate circulation
31  of  user terminals: 
Article 1 - Type approval of  terminals 
The Signatories will develop arrangements on the essential requirements necessary for 
the  type  approval  of terminals,  and  the  means  by  which  such  approvals  will  be 
mutually recognised.  The type  approval standards  should be based on the  relevant 
ITU  Recommendations,  and  should  be  impartial  with  respect  to  all  G:rv.IPCS 
technologies. 
Article 2 - Licensing of  terminals 
The Signatories will develop arrangements on the means by which licences should be 
granted based on general  licences  (e.g.,  class  licences  or blanket  approvals).  Such 
arrangements would include the means by which these general licences could be used 
to best advantage. 
Article 3 - Marking of  terminals 
The  Signatories will develop  arrangements on the marking of terminals which will 
permit  their  recognition  and  allow  for  implementation  of those  sections  of the 
Arrangements dealing with mutual recognition of  type approval and licensing. 
Article  4 - Customs arrangements 
The  Signatories  will  develop  recommendations  to  their  competent  authorities 
proposing exemption of Gl\1PCS  terininals from  customs restrictions when brought 
into a country on a temporary or transitory basis. 
Article 5 - Access to traffic data 
The  Signatories will develop  arrangements for  GMPCS  operators to  provide,  on a 
confidential basis, within a reasonable period of time to any duly authorised national 
authority  which  so  requests,  appropriate  data  concerning  traffic  originating  in or 
routed to its national territory, and to assist it with any measures intended to identify 
unauthorised traffic flows therein. 
31  Some developing countries raised objections to use of the terminology "free circulation", which is 
used in Europe, partly on the grounds that authorisation of  G~CS  services by each country would not 
necessarily be "free". 
-58-Article 6 - Review 
The  Signatories will  periodically review the results  and  consequences  of their co-
operation  under  this  Memorandum  of  Understanding.  When  appropriate,  the 
Signatories will consider the need for improvements in their co-operation and make 
suitable proposals for modifying and updating the Arrangements, and the scope of  this 
GMPCS-MoU. 
By November  1997,  65  administrations  and  operators  had  signed  this  MoU.  The 
European Commission signed on behalf of  all EU Member States. 
The success in reaching agreement in regard to  GMPCS  is  significant.  Participants 
reached a consensus  and produced an  original regulatory process,  without binding 
force,  but facilitating co-operation in order to  facilitate  the availability of GMPCS 
systems. Essentially, however, this MoU was an agreement to produce more detailed 
arrangements for authorisation of  GMPCS systems. 
The GMPCS-MoU  Arrangements 
The objective of  these Arrangements is to provide a framework for the introduction of 
GMPCS, including: 
•  permission to  carry  a  terminal  into  a visited  country  and  to  use  it,  within  the-
framework of a licensing scheme (i.e., without the need for  obtaining individual 
authorisation for the terminal in the visited country); 
•  permission to carry the terminal into a visited country but not to use it; 
•  technical conditions for placing terminals on the market. 
Under the  provisions  of these  Arrangements,  the  participants  will  be  able  to  co-
operate  in  the  development  of GMPCS  to  the  benefit  of users  world-wide.  The 
benefits  of  GMPCS  will  be  fully  realised  when  a  sign,ificant  number  of 
Administrations  and/or  Competent  Authorities  offer  necessary  authorisation  for 
service provision and access to spectrum. 
National implementation of  the Arrangements should cover: 
•  mutual r~cognition of  type approvals of  GMPCS terminals; 
•  simplified licensing of  GMPCS terminals; 
•  identification (marking) ofGMPCS temrinaJs; 
•  access to traffic data by authorised authorities; 
•  the  Recommendation  on  the  principles  for  customs  procedures  to  facilitate 
unrestricted trans  borde~  movement of  GMPCS terminals. 
The  GMPCS-MoU group meeting,  held on 6-7  October  1997,  decided to  create  a 
special Task Force to  finalise the detailed procedural aspects of the implementation 
and review of  the Arrangements. 
The Task Force 
-59-The Task Force was set the following goals: 
•  to  develop  proposals  for  assisting  the  implementation  of  the  GMPCS 
Arrangements  in  the  most  effective  and  efficient  manner  (covering  models  or 
representative forms, notices, and letters; the role of the ITU as Depository of the 
Arrangements;  consideration  of the  issues  associated  with  the  GMPCS-MoU 
Mark); 
•  to  develop  proposals  on  the  roles,  responsibilities,  and  financial  arrangements 
concerning the administration of the GMPCS-MoU,  and to  propose a budget for 
activities such as the Depository. 
The Task Force is expected to complete its work in one ·meeting, and compile a report 
in time for the next meeting of Signatories and Intended Signatories of the GMPCS-
MoU,  scheduled  for  3-4  March  1998.  An issue  which  is  generating  considerable 
discussion is whether the GMPCS mark should incorporate the ITU symbol. 
8.1.4  Conclusions 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this whole process: 
Although the Arrangements themselves have now been finalised,  the  details of the 
implementation  process , (including  the  depository  function,  and  any  fmancial 
implications) are not expected to be finalised until the GMPCS MoU meeting of 3-4 
March 1998. 
Contention  between  the  US  and  Europe  contributed  to  delays  in  finalising  the 
Arrangements, particularly in the area of type approval and marking. This delay was 
one of  the contributing factors which led to reduced participation in the later meetings, 
particularly  by  developing  countries  for  whom  cost  was  an  important  factor  in 
attending all of  the meetings. 
In  type  approval  discussions,  the  legal  differences, between  "approval  to  place 
terminals  on  the  market"  and  "acceptance  of approval  for  temporary  purposes" 
(equivalent to Levels 1 and 2 free-circulation in the CEPT)  were difficult to define. In 
EU directives, the difference is not clearly made with the result that disparities can be 
found in the ways in·which  the directives are implemented under national law. The 
satellite industry would like to see a more accommodating interpretation of  the case of 
"acceptance  of approval  for  temporary  (free-circulation)  purposes"  in  terms  of 
demonstrating compliance and marking. 
The work of the GMPCS-MoU  group  has  nominally taken place  outside the  ITU 
(although the ITU has hosted the meetings and facilitated the work) and outside the 
traditional manner of  doing things in the ITU._The ITU Council agreed that the groups 
working to  elaborate the MoU and Arrangements should not be part of the normal 
ITUbudget. 
The CEPT played a useful role in co-ordinating and representing the satellite industry 
in _Europe. The CE~T  made several written contributions to the GMPCS meetings. 
-60-In view of  the utility of  the five regional GMPCS workshops, the Commission, CEPT 
and the satellite industry in Europe should organise similar regional workshops for 
emerging markets to promote the evolution of new regulatory frameworks covering 
satellite services. 
8.1.5  Second WTPF 
The second World Telecommunication Policy Forum is  scheduled to take place in 
Geneva 16-18 March 1998. On the agenda are three main items: 
•  The general implications of the World Trade. Organization (WTO) Agreement on 
trade in basic telecommunication services for the ITU membership with respect to: 
- the telecommunication policies, regulations and regulatory structures of  ITU 
Member States; and 
- the  implications  of  the  WTO  Agreement  for  developing  countries, 
particularly with respect  to  policies,  regulations  and  financial  strategies  to 
promote the development of  telecommunication networks and services, as well 
as on their national economy. 
•  Actions to assist member states and sector members in adapting to the changes in 
the  telecommunications  environment,  for  example,  by  analysing  the  current 
situation through the use of case studies,  and  formulating possible co-operative 
actions to help adapt to the new environment; 
•  The evolution of the international telecommunications environment,  particularly 
the accounting and settlement system. 
The SAP RWG intends to  make  availa~le to the ITU a copy of this Report and to 
encourage the ITU to take into account the information and recommendations in this 
Report in preparation of the document from the Secretary General of the ITU to the 
WTPF in March. 
8.1.6  Accounting authorities 
Restrictions  on establishing and  accrediting  Accounting  Authorities  (AAs)  c~  be 
used to protect national maritime markets. There are three typical cases: 
1.  According to  ITU regulations,  only 25  AAs are  allowed in each country.  This 
makes it difficult to  establish a new AA in those countries which have already 
accredited 25  AAs.  In some cases,  there  are  even  lower limits  set by national 
.  regulations.  . 
2.  Some countries do not allow accreditation of AAs which  ar~ not located in the 
country concerned.· 
3.  In some countries where there are still monopolies, only one AA is allowed. 
· Restrictions on establishing Accounting Authorities make it impossible in many cases 
to keep an· established customer relationship when a ship is transferred to a flag of 
convenience or to another country not allowing accreditation of  an already established 
AA in the country from which the ship's registry was transferred.· Thus, there are both 
ITU and national restrictions which inhibit competition between AAs. 
-61-9.  REGULATORY BARRIERS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES (SAP AlO, All) 
AlO.  The Commission,  in partnership with industry,  will  assess  on a  systematic 
basis the global market opportunities, intellectual property rights issues 
relating to technology, and the role of potential European-led initiatives 
and formulate the appropriate supporting political actions. 
All.  The  Commission,  assisted  by  industry,  will  evaluate  the  opportunities 
arising from increased political and technological/industrial co-operation 
between EU and third countries including the US, Russia, Canada, Japan 
and  developing  countries.  In  view  of the  importance  to  associate  the 
developing countries in this area,  the Commission will also evaluate the use 
of the EU development funds.  Moreover,  the Commission will propose the 
necessary measures to stimulate a stronger presence of  Europe in international 
markets. 
9.1  DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
Deployment  of the  satellite  component  of UMTS  may  be  affected  by the  same 
regulatory barriers which affect existing types of  satellite systems and services. 
Technologies such as S-PCS and the new broadband systems are aimed at creating a 
mass market. While these new technologies create new opportunities for the satellite 
industry, some ·countries perceive these technologies as  a threat to  existing national 
infrastructures,  consequently  they  may  be  tempted  to  introduce  new  regulatory 
barriers. 
Some new satellite services have failed to reach their full potential in the Union in the 
absence of  a harmonised regulation of  telecommunications services (service provision as 
opposed to content).  This problem will especially disadvantage broadband multimedia 
services if  it is not overcome. 
9.1.1  Conclusions 
It is difficult to predict what might impede new technologies, but already there are a 
significant number of factors that the Commission should closely watch, in order to 
avoid .new barriers being created. 
The satellite industry's growing co-operation with regard to an appropriate regulatory 
framework for  G1v1PCS  could set an important precedent for establishing appropriate 
licensing structures for  other new satellite services, including multimedia, broadband 
applications. 
9.2  GREEN PAPER ON CONVERGENCE 
-62-The  Commission  released  its  Green  Paper  on  Convergence
32  in  December  1997. 
Among other things, it discusses regulatory implications of convergence and makes 
these points: 
The future regulatory environment will be of crucial importance.  The European Union has 
already  developed  a  comprehensive  framework  for  managing  the  transition  in 
telecommunications from a monop9ly to a fully competitive world from 1 January 1998.  We 
have also put in place a framework supporting· an internal market for broadcasting.  Getting 
the right regulatory framework must be firmly placed within these existing achievements.  At 
the same time, this Green Paper represents a milestone in allowing the Community to look 
beyond  the  1998  deadline  and  to  assess  the  implications  for  the  sectors  affected  by 
convergence. 
This Green Paper argues that the  development of new services could be hindered by the 
existence  of a  range  of barriers,  including  regulatory  barriers,  at  different  levels  of the 
market.  There  are,  however,  differing  views  on  the  adequacy  of existing  regulatory 
frameworks to-deal with the changing environment. One view is that the development of  new 
products and services is being held back by regulatory uncertainty - that existing rules were 
defined for a national, analogue and mono-media environment, but that services increasingly 
cut across different traditional sectors and geographical boundaries,  and that they may be 
provided  over  a  variety  of platforms.  This  calls  into  question  the  underlying  rationale 
beneath regulatory approaches in the different sectors affected by convergence.  Proponents 
of  this view would argue that such regulatory uncertainty holds back investment and damages 
the prospects for the implementation of  the Information Society. 
An alternative  view  would  hold  that  the  specific  characteristics  of the  existing  separate 
sectors will limit the scope for service convergence. It further would contend that the role of 
the media industry as the bearer of social, cultural and ethical values within our society is 
independent of the technology relied upon to  reach the  consumer.  This would mean that 
regulation of  economic conditions and that of  the provision of information services should be 
separated to ensure efficiency and quality. 
These matters need to b,e debated and resolved.  Finding solutions will need to take account 
of  the full range of  interests in the various sectors affected by convergence.  At the same time, 
the potential for change will be felt in different ways and at different levels (e.g. technology, 
industry,  services  and  markets).  Whilst  digitalisation  means  that  convergence  is  well 
advanced at the level of technology, this Green Paper does not automatically assume that 
convergence at one level inevitably leads to the same degree of convergence at other levels. 
Equally, there is no assumption that convergence in technologies, industries, services and/or 
markets will necessarily imply a need for a uniform regulatory environment. 
32  Green  Paper on  the  Convergence of  the  telecommunications,  media  and information  technology 
sectors,  and the  implications for regulation:  Towards  an  Information  Society  Approach,  Brussels: 
European Commission,  3 December  1997.  For more  information about convergence,  see  also  the 
Report  on  Opportunities for  Content  and Service .  Provision,  prepared  by P  A  Consulting  Group, 
London,  for  the  UK Department of Trade  and  Industry (DTI).  The DTI set  a deadline  for  public 
comment of 28  Nov  1997  on,  among  other  issues,  "whether  ... there  are  further  initiatives  in  the 
regulatory, marketing or technical areas that could be introduced that would benefit this sector." The 
ITU  has  also  published  a  report  on  convergence  entitled  Regulatory  Implications  of 
-.63-The Green Paper analyses  issues,  identifies options and poses questions  for public 
comment.  It does not take positions at this stage nor reach conclusions. It identifies 
actual and potential barriers, which serve as a basis for considering the need, if  any, to 
adapt current regulatory frameworks in the light of  the convergence phenomenon. On 
the basis of  the comments received within five months from publication of the Green 
Paper, the Commission intends to produce a Communication by June 1998. 
9.2.1  Conclusion 
An appropriate regulatory environment for  multimedia services  should be developed 
and  implemented  in  a  way  that  fosters  harmonised  regulations  and  promotes 
competition. 
Access to markets is critical to implementation of new multimedia broadband satellite 
services.  Full  and  liberal  implementation  of GATS  commitments  is  important  to 
development of this  sector.  European industry should be able  to  rely  on both full 
implementation within the Community and strong efforts by the Community to ensure 
that other WTO members implement their commitments. 
The  economic  structure  of multimedia  broadband  service  will  often  be  based  on 
conditional access systems.  Incomplete or conflicting rules for such systems will thwart 
development of  this market. 
9.3  SPECTRUM PRICING 
Many administrations are considering the introduction of new methods for assigning 
frequencies,  namely using instruments such as  auctioning and  comparative bidding. 
The ERC  WGRR has drafted a Report on the  introduction of economic criteria in 
spectrum management and the principles of fees and charging in the CEPT, which is 
to be considered at the WGRR meeting to be held in late January 1998. It is clear from 
the WGRR draft Report as well as  other studies (the UMTS Forum also has a task 
group looking at these issues) that spectrum pricing policies vary a great deal within 
the CEPT. 
The  SAP  RWG agrees  that assignment of frequencies  should be left  to  National 
Regulatory  Authorities  but  regulators  should  co-ordinate  the  assignment  of the 
frequencies when necessary and where those frequencies would facilitate transborder 
use of  satellite equipment in a timely way.  -
A number of countries have implemented spectrum auctions either as  a method of 
resolving situations where the demand exceeds the available spectrum or simply as a 
means of  raising revenues for the government. These approaches may be appropriate 
in  a  national  context  for  terrestrial  systems  where  coverage  areas  are  naturally 
Telecommunications  Convergence:  The  Changing  Role  of Government  in  an  Era  of Telecom 
Deregulation: Report of  the Sixth Regulatory Colloquium, Geneva, 11-13 December 1996. 
-64-confined and high orders of frequency re-use  are  possible.  There  is  a·  widespread 
consensus,  however,· that  it  is  not  appropriate  to  auction  spectrum  used  for 
international satellite services for several reasons: 
•  The total auction cost to a satellite operator would be the sum of the costs in all 
countries where auctions are operated. This could amount to a figure exceeding the 
cost of implementing the system,  could make the system unattractive to investors . 
· and could result in Uneconomic service-charges. 
•  Even the uncertainty as to the level of auction cost to be paid and of the time to 
finalise the necessary arrangements would undermine investment in new satellite 
systems. 
•  Rather  than  accelerate  the  implementation  of satellite  systems,  auctioning  the 
satellite spectrum is likely to thwart their implementation. 
•.  International satellite systems require access to spectrum on a global basis, ideally 
the  same  spectrum  in  all  countries.  An auction process  would  likely result  in 
different assignments in different countries and would lead to  inefficient use of 
~  spectrum. 
•  Auctions  could  result  in  a  reduction  in  competition  once  the  winner  has  his 
assignment. 
•  Auctions may inhibit investments in new technologies. 
Nevertheless, the satellite industry recognises that, generally speaking, setting a value 
for  spectrum leads  to  a more rational usage  of it.  The  SAP  RWG recognises the 
importance of  optimal use of  radio frequency spectrum. Sometimes satellites offer the 
most effective spectrum use, sometimes terrestrial spectrum use is more efficient. 
9.4  NETWORK INDEPENDENT SERVICE PROVIDERS 
A  Network  Independent  Service  Provider  (NISP)  operates  without  a  network 
infrastructure of its own. It offers the services of other network operators in its own 
name.  It  manages  its  own  subscriber base,  including  its  acquisition,  registration, 
billing, accounting and customer support.  NISP  activities may include reselling air 
time,  offering  co-branded products· of the  network operators,  providing  enhanced, 
value-added  services  and  developing  their own products  based on one or several 
networks.  NISPs may focus  on convergent products  integrating mobile,  fixed  and 
satellite networks.  They may offer mobile  and fixed  network  services which they 
repackage.  They have  plans to  offer satellite  communications  services,  either in 
combination or separately. A NJSP may combine and repackage telecommunication 
services using networks all over Europe. 
NISPs believe it is vital to fair competition in the European satellite communications 
market that access to networks and products be made available to the highest possible 
number of players, including NISPs. They argue their support for competition in the 
telecommunication market will lead to better services for the customer. 
An example of a NISP is debitel, which operates its business as a private telephone 
company without its  own network infrastructure.  It is  debitel'  s intention to  create 
European-wide convergent products integrating mobile, fixed and satellite networks in 
-65-order to match the needs of customers. In its input to  the SAP RWG, debitel said it 
has encountered market barriers in mobile communications. In the past, such barriers 
have been built up  by government  authorities  as  well  as  network operators.  As  a 
result, debitel has not been able to start its business in some European countries, nor 
been able to enlarge the scope of its business from simple reselling to the creation of 
its "own" products. 
debitel believes the Commission should monitor and support competition within and 
outside the EU in order to ensure that the customer's needs are served in an optimal 
way. Service providers are essential to the market because of  their independent status 
and their promoting competition.  Further liberalisation of the  telecommunications 
market will increase the significance ofNISPs. 
One  industry group  contributed the following  thoughts
33  in an  effort  to  overcome 
market entry barriers for NISPs: 
Some regulatory authorities and some network operators have created market entry 
barriers which discourage competition from NISPs with the result that NISPs have not 
been able to create and sell their own branded services.  Instead they are restricted in 
some countries to reselling value-added services produced by network operators. 
NISPs informed the SAP RWG that they want the following:  _ 
•  All relevant legal provisions must grant the right to  service providers to  market 
satellite services, irrespective of whether those services have been created by the 
service provider himself or whether t~ey are modified or original network operator 
products. 
•  Service providers must be guaranteed access to all satellite networks and products. 
-To this end  satellite network operators  should be obliged to  conclude contracts 
with  service  providers  regarding  reselling  and  network  access.  This  is  highly 
important  for  the  independent  service  provider's  creation  of integrated  and 
convergent products which are not restricted to individual countries or networks. 
•  Equality of  network independent and network dependent service providers must be 
guaranteed.  Discrimination must not be allowed. 
•  General applicability of  the ONP principles of  equality of  access, transparency and 
non-discrimination should be ensured.  The ONP  principles should  apply to  the 
interface between satellite operators and serVice providers. 
•  Service providers should be authorised to offer original and modified products of 
the network operators,  and network  operators  should be held to  conceive  their 
33 These views were put forward in a contribution to the SAP RWG by VAT, an association founded in 
1992  as  Verband  der  Anbieter  vo~ Mobilfunkdiensten  (V  AM,  an  association  of mobile  service 
providers).  Its founding members are providers of mobile telecommunications services in Germany. 
At  the  start  of 1997,  the  name  of the  association  was  changed  to  Verband  der  Anbieter  von 
Telekommunikationsdiensten (association  of telecommunications  service  providers),  or  VAT,  for 
short. One of the aims of the VAT is  to help establish a regulatory framework that encourages fair 
competition in the liberalised market. 
-66-products  in a  configuration allowing  service providers  to  modify and  remarket 
them. 
•  Satellite network oper~tors should be obliged to accept all reasonable requests by 
service providers for conclusion of a contract, whether it is a request for simple 
resale or special access to the network. 
•  Independent  service  providers  should  enjoy  the  same  rights  and  conditions  as 
service providers that are part of  the organisation of  satellite network operators. 
In conclusion, NISPs seek the unconditional provision of open network and product 
access  in satellite  communications  as  a  basis  for  fair  competition in this  field  in 
Europe and other markets. This position is not supported by the consensus of entities 
represented in the SAP RWG. 
9.5  NUMBERING AND ADDRESSING ISSUES 
Numbering  in  Europe  is  being  addressed  within  the  ITU  and  CEPT  fora.  The · 
Commission should ensure that the  requirements  of transnational  networks,  such as  -
those that will be established as part of  new multimedia or broadband satellite systems, 
are taken into consideration.  In addition, numbering issues should not be used to restrict 
the  ability  of satellite  network  operators  to  provide  servtces,  including  Internet 
telephony. 
9.6  REFORM OF EUROPEAN PATENT LAW FOR SPACE USE 
Until now,  only the United States has extended its patent law into outer space for 
enforcement purposes via its Space Bill. The US Space Bill adds an article  to US 
patent law, which reads in part: "Any invention made, used or  sold~  in outer space on a 
space object or component .thereof under the jurisdiction or control of the  United 
States, shall be considered to be made, used or sold within the United States for the 
purposes of this title, except with respect to  any .space object or component thereof 
that is specifically identified and otherwise provided for by an international agreement 
to which the United States is a party, or ... carried on the registry of a foreign state in 
accordance  with  the  Convention of Registration· of Objects  Launched  into  Outer 
Space." 
Europe has no intellectual property protection in space which puts European industry 
at  a  competitive  disadvantage  with  respect  to  US  competitors.  The  European 
Commission  is  currently  considering  reforming  European  patent  law  to  install  a 
European Community patent, similar to that for~seen by the Luxembourg convention, 
which was never ratified.  The  Commission issued a  Green Paper (  COM(97) 314 
fmal) in June 1997, asking for comments from interested parties by the deadline of 7 · 
November 1997. With the support ofESA, Alcatel garnered support froni some in the 
satellite  industry in Europe for  a  position paper to  be presented to  the  European 
Commission. 
The  European  Space . Agency  ·prepared  a  letter  pointing  out  the  competitive . 
disadvantage of the industry in Europe with regard to its US counterparts because of 
·the imbalance in the applicability of the relevant patent laws.  The letter pointed om 
-67-that a modification of  European patent law is supported by the European space players 
polled, including the satellite industry, national space agencies and operators. 
-68-' 10.  ANNEX 1 :REGULATORY BODIES AND INTEREST GROUPS 
Following  is  a  list  of some  of the  key  bodies  based  in  Europe  concerned  with 
regulatory issues which affect the satellite industry. 
EUROPEAN UNION 
In  addition  to  the  National  Regulatory  Authorities,  there  are  several  directorates 
within the European Coinmission which could be involved in trade and regulatory 
barriers, such as: 
DGI - External Relations: Commercial policy 
DGIV - Competition 
DGXIII- Telecommunications 
DGXV - Internal market 
CEPT 
ERC Radio Regulatory Working Group (WG RR) 
ERC Frequency Management Working Group 
ERC Joint Civil/Military Project Team 
ERCTG 1 
ECTRA project team on licensing (ECTRA-PTL) 
ERO 
ETO 
GLOBAL BODIES 
ITU-R 
ITU-D Study Group 1 
ITU World Telecommunication Policy Forum (WTPF) 
WTO 
World Customs Organization 
SECTOR REPRESENTATIVE BODIES 
ONP-CCP 
ECTEL 
ETNO 
EITIRT 
UMTSRAG 
-69-11.  ANNEX 2: IMPLEMENTATION OF CEPT REGULATIONS 
This Annex indicates the status of implementation of various CEPT Decisions and 
Recommendations. 
CEPT/ERC/DEC(95)01 
ERC Decision of 1st December 1995  on the free  circulation of radio equipment in 
CEPT member countries 
A elm  lmpl  Remarks 
34 
AUT  Yes  Radar warning equipment and laser warning equipment is excluded 
from the Decision. General Licences Ordinance. Published in 
Federal Law Gazette No. 228/1994, latest revision in Federal Law 
Gazette No. 314/1996 dated 5 July 1996 
BEL  Yes 
D  Yes 
DNK  Yes  Implementation through reference in the national table of 
frequency allocations 
EST  Planned 
FIN  Yes  National instruments used for implementing the ERC Decision 
(95)01: 
Radio Decree (869/92). THK 12 I  THK 15 H 
illegal equipment: 
1  )equipment intended to disturb or detect road traffic speed in 
dictating radars 
2)equipment intended to remove from radiocommunication its 
privacy protection 
3  )equipment on a foreign vessel or aircraft intended for broadcasts 
from the vessel or aircraft 
34 AUT=Austria, BEL=Belgium, D=Germany, DNK=Denmark, E=Spain, EST=Estonia, FIN=Finland, 
G=United  Kingdom,  HNG=Hungary,  HOL=The  Netherlands,  HRV=Croatia,  I=ltaly,  IRL=Ireland, 
ISL=Iceland,  LIE=Liechtenstein,  LTU=Lithuania,  LVA=Latvia,  MKD=FYRof  Macedonia, 
NOR=Norway, . POL=Poland,  POR=Portugal,  ROU=Roumania,  S=Sweden,  SMR=San  .  Marino, 
SUI=Switzerland, SVN=Slovenia, TUR=Turkey 
-70-Adm  Impl  Remarks 
34 
G  Yes  Implemented mainly by administrative means. 
The circulation of  most kinds of  radio equipment is permitted in 
the UK whether or not it may be legally used. There are some 
exceptions to this: 
CB equipment: There is free movement  (into the UK) and use 
(under licence) ofMPT type.approved UK-CB apparatus. There is 
similarly free movement and use (under individual licence) within 
CEPT ofPR~27  equipment that is properly marked and type 
approved. 
Nevertheless, there are restrictions on all other kinds ofCB 
apparatus that cannot be legally used in the UK. To comply with 
EU single market requirements, the UK does allow imports of  such 
equipment from the EU. However its possession, advertisement, 
sale and manufacture is prohibited. Furthermore imports of  such 
equipment are prohibited from countries outside the EU (including, 
because they are not EU members, some CEPT countries). 
Cordless telephones: Those cordless telephones that do not meet 
MPTs 1322, 1334 or 1371- and thus may not be used in the UK-
are restricted as to importation from all countries, manufacture, 
advertisement, sale or possession. The UK does, however, allow 
imports for re-export and for sale to overseas visitors by special 
authority. 
Videosenders: The UK is making an Order prohibiting imports 
from any country, manufacture, advertisement, sale or possession 
of  videosenders. At present clearance has been obtained from the 
European Commission and approval from GATT  /WTO is 
currently being sought. 
HNG  Under  Free circulation and use have already been allowed for GSM 
study  mobile phones, OmniTRACS terminals for the EUTELTRACS 
system, Inmarsat-C terminals, Inmarsat-M terminals, PR-27 
mobile stations and TRAK-SAT terminals. 
Decides 5 not implemented 
HOL  Yes 
HRV  Yes 
I  Planned 
ISL  Yes  Regulation issued by the Ministry of  Communications. Circular 
letter from National Telecom Inspectorate to the Customs 
Authorities 
LIE  Yes  Verordnung tiber Teilnehmeranlagen (T  A  V) Art.ll 
Bst.h;  V  erordnung tiber die technischen Anforderungen fiir 
Teilnehmeranlagen; FKV Art. 6 Abs.l Bst.g. illegal equipment: 
Speed radar detection devices· 
LVA  Under 
study 
NOR  Yes 
-71-Adm  Impl  Remarks 
34 
POL  Planned 
POR  Planned  Under consideration due to a revision of  National Regulations 
ROU  Under 
study 
s  Yes 
SUI  ·Yes  Verordnung fiber Teilnehmeranlagen (T  A  V) Art.11 Bst.h; 
Verordnung fiber die technischen Anforderungen fiir 
Teilnehmeranlagen; FKV Art. 6 Abs.1 Bst.g.  illegal equipment: 
Speed radar detection devices 
SVN  Planned  Nov. 1997. Ministerial decree 
TUR  Yes 
CEPT/ERCIDEC(97)05 
ERC Decision of  30 June 1997 on free circulation, use and licensing of  Mobile Earth 
Stations of Satellite Personal Communications Services (S-PCS) operating within the 
bands 1610-1626.5 MHz, 2483.5-2500 MHz, 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz 
within the CEPT 
Adm  Impl  Remarks 
AUT  Planned  Planned 1-10-1998. General Licenses Ordinance 
D  Planned 
E  Planned 
FIN  Planned 
G  Planned 
HOL  Plarmed 
I  Planned 
IRL  Planned 
LIE  Yes  Decree of  the Federal Council on Licensing in 
Telecommunications, article 6, 1st paragraph, letter g and article 
33, 2nd paragraph (SR784.102.1); Decree of  the Federal Council 
on Terminal Equipment, article 11, letter h (SR 784.103.1) 
LTU  Planned  This Decision shall be implemented amending accordingly the 
National list of  radio equipment allowed for restricted border-
crossing and use, as from 1 January 1998 
NOR  Yes 
s  Planned 
SUI  Yes  Decree of  the Federal Council on Licensing in 
Telecommunications, article 6, 1st paragraph, letter g and article 
33, 2nd paragraph (SR784.102.1); Decree of  the Federal Council 
on Terminal Equipment, article· 11, letter h (SR 784.103.1) 
'\ 
CEPT/ERCIDEC(97)09 
-72-ERC Decision of30 Jurie 1997 on the provision of  information for a data base of 
licensing requirements for VSAT  /SNG 
Adm  Impl  Remarks 
AUT  Planned  1.10.1997. Ministerial order 
D  Planned 
I 
FIN  Planned 
G  Planned 
HOL  Planned 
I  Under 
study 
IRL  Planned 
LIE  Yes  Decree of  the Federal Council on Licensing in 
Telecommunications, article 55, 2nd paragraph (SR 784.102.1); 
NOR  Yes 
POR  Planned 
s  Planned 
SUI  Yes  Decree of  the Federal Council on Licensing in 
Telecommunications, article 55, 2nd paragraph (SR 784.102.1 ); 
CEPT/ERC/DEC(97)10 
ERC Decision of  30 June 1997 on the mutual recognition of  conformity assessment 
procedures including marking of  radio equipment and radio terminal equipment 
~dm  Impl  Remarks 
AUT  Planned- 1.10.1998. General Licenses Ordinance and Radio equipment 
and Terminal equipment Ordinance 
FIN  Planned 
G  Planned 
HOL  Planned 
I  Committed 
IRL  Planned 
LIE  Yes  Federal Telecommunications Act, article 37, 3rd paragraph (SR 
784.10); Decree ofthe Federal Council on Terminal Equipment, 
article 17, 2nd paragraph and article 18, 1st paragraph (SR 
784.103.1) 
NOR  Yes 
s  Planned 
SUI  Yes  Federal Telecommunications Act, article 37, 3rd paragraph (SR 
784.10); Decree of  the Federal Council on Terminal Equipment,  -
article 17, 2nd paragraph and article 18, 1st paragraph (SR 
784.103.1) 
-73-CEPT/ERCIREC 01-07 
Harmonised regime for exemption from individual licensing of  radio equipment 
Adm  Impl  Remarks 
AUT  Yes 
DNK  Yes 
EST  Planned 
FIN  Yes 
HNG  Planned  Partial implementation 
HOL  Yes 
I  Under 
study 
NOR  Under 
study 
POR  Planned 
SUI  Yes 
SVN  Yes  2.9.2997. Regulation on radio licenses, art. 5 and 9 (Off. Gaz. of 
SVN, No. 50/97) 
CEPT/ERC/REC 11-01 
Type approval for satellite earth stations equipment VSAT (Very Small Aperture 
Terminals) and SNG (Satellite News Gathering) 
Adm  Impl  Remarks 
AUT  Under 
study 
DNK  Planne4  Will be implemented in short time, subject to modification of  the 
relevant order 
EST  Under 
study 
FIN  Planned 
HNG  Yes  I 
HOL  Yes  Pending mutual recognition 
NOR  Under 
study 
POR  Under 
study 
SUI  Yes 
SVN  Planned  Nov 1997. Ministerial decree 
CEPT/ERC/REC 13-03 
-74-The use of  the band 14.0- 14.5 GHz for Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) and 
Satellite News Gathering (SNG) 
(None) 
CEPT/ERC/REC 21-14 
Satellite paging service terminal equipment in Europe 
Adm  lmpl  Remarks 
AUT  Yes 
DNK  Planned  Will be implemented in short time, subject to modification of  the 
relevant order 
E  Planned 
F  Yes 
FIN  Yes 
G  No 
HNG  Planned 
HOL  Planned 
HRV  Planned 
IRL  Planned  Under consideration due to a revision of  National Regulations 
ISL  Yes 
LIE  Planned 
LUX  Yes 
1MKD  Planned 
NOR  Yes 
POR  Planned  Under consideration due to a revision of  National Regulations 
s  Yes 
SUI  Planned 
SVN  Planned  Nov 1997. Ministerial decree 
TUR  Yes 
CEPT/ERC/REC 21-15 
Free circulation and use of  land mobile satellite service terminals in Europe 
Adm  lmpl  Remarks 
AUT  Yes  Inmarsat C, Inmarsat M and EUTELTRACS terminals may be 
carried and used. Operating authorisation from satellite 
organisation is sufficient for free circulation 
DNK  Yes 
EST  Under 
study 
FIN  Yes 
HNG  Yes  Questionnaire of  Appendix IV will be sent later 
HOL  Yes 
J 
I  Planned 
-75-Adm  Impl  Remarks 
NOR  Yes 
POR  Yes  Inmarsat C, Inmarsat M and EUTEL  TRACS terminals can be 
carried and used wheri accompanied by a Circulation Card 
SMR  Yes  Inmarsat C, Inmarsat M and EUTELTRACS terminals may be 
carried and used A Circulation Card is not required 
SUI  Planned 
SVN  Planned  Nov 1997. Ministerial decree 
TUR  Yes  Inmarsat Cllnmarsat Dllnmarsat Mllnmarsat Mini-M terminals and 
EUTELTRACS terminals can be carried and used, marking is 
sufficient 
CEPT/ERC/REC 21-16 
Type approval for Land Mobile Satellite Service terminals, LMSS 
Adm  Impl  Remarks 
AUT  Under 
study 
DNK  Plan.iled  Will be implemented in short time, subject to modification of  the 
relevant order 
EST  Under. 
study 
FIN  Planned 
HNG  Yes  Partial implementation. Implemented for Inmarsat-C and 
EUTELTRACS 
HOL  Yes-
LVA  Under 
study 
NOR  Planned 
POR  Under 
study 
SUI  Planned 
SVN  Planned  Nov 1997. Ministerial decree 
-76-12.  ANNEX 3 : MARKET ACCESS BARRIERS IN THE EU 
This Annex identifies the regulatory barriers to market access encountered by industry 
in European Union Member States.  The format  used for  countries referenced here 
corresponds to that of  the country fiches in the Commission's market access database. 
The  information  presented  in this  and  the  following  Annex  does  not  provide  a 
comprehensive review of the situation. Only some problems in some countries have 
been highlighted.  The SAP RWG intends to  do  more work on this .Apnex  and the 
following Annex, which must be regarded as  drafts only at this stage (end January 
1998). 
The information provided in this Report highlights the specific concerns of market 
players. It is not intended to give a detailed description of the regulatory situation. 
Lack of  transparency, in particular with regard to the applicable regulation, can lead to 
misunderstanding in assessing the regulatory situation in some countries. 
The European Commission has  announced that it will initiate formal  infringement 
procedures  against  seven  European  Union  Member  States  and  send  a  reasoned 
opinion (second stage of the  infringement procedure)  to  another Member State  to 
speed up the transposition into national law of the EU 1998  telecoms liberalisation 
package. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Other. 
12.1  BELGIUM 
Difficulty in getting permission to install DTH dishes. 
12.2  GREECE 
Background and status of  Greek regulation 
Commission  Directive  94/46/EEC  required  liberalisation  of the  satellite  service 
market as of  November 1994.  Member States were supposed to submit information 
on  their  implementation  of these  obligations.  by  August  1995.  Not  long  after 
Directive 94/46/EEC was published, Greek officials noted ongoing efforts to create a 
regulatory  structure, to  implement  Directive  94/46/EEC.  Despite  these  promises, 
Greece failed to act, and the Commission noted a lack of  Greek compliance in its June 
1997 decision· granting an additional implementation period to Greece-under Service 
Directive 90/388/EEC. 
At the  time  it requested  this  derogation,  Greece  pledged  to  implement  Directive 
94/46/EEC by 1 August .1997.  The Commission in part based the derogation on that 
promise.  Nevertheless,  that promise  was  not successfully implemented.  Instead, 
Greece adopted Presidential Decree 212/97 on 28.August 1997, which in turn permits 
the later adoption of  a Ministerial Decree.  The Presidential Decree in essence adopts 
Satellite Directive 94/46/EEC wholesale.  It does not, however, supply sufficient- or 
-77-any - details  for the directive to be implemented, which will be left to the regulations 
adopted through the Ministerial Decree. 
This  later  decree  will  be  based  on regulations  to  be  prepared  by  the  National 
Telecommunications Commission (EET .based on the Greek acronym), the National 
Regulatory Authority.  Unofficial drafts of the regulations have circulated for over a 
year in Greece, but as of early December have not been officially issued.  Moreover, 
there is no certainty as to when the regulations will be released or in what form.  One 
operator was told in early October 1997 that the regulations will be published "in a 
few days", which did not happen.  In mid October, it was told that the regulations 
might be adopted in November, which again did not happen. 
The Commission's derogation decision stated that EET now will accept  application~ 
for satellite communications and grant those applications in so far as they meet the 
criteria set out in the Presidential Decree.  Greek authorities did not comply with this 
commitment, however, since  (a) the Presidential Decree itself contains no criteria and 
(b)  no  applications  had been granted  as  of December  1997.
35  For instance,  one 
application for satellite facilities was submitted in April 1996 and remains pending. 
Problems with Proposed Regulations 
The  following  discussion  is  preliminary,  based  on  unofficial  drafts  of possible 
regulations.  As noted below, the Commission should conduct a more thorough and 
in-depth review of these problems with the aim of assisting the EET to adopt final 
regulations consistent with Community law in a reasonable time frame.  Thus, this 
discussion  is  intended  to  identify  possible  problems  and  questions,  but is  not  a 
comprehensive catalogue of  all such issues. 
(a)  Timing 
The biggest problem· is that there is no guarantee of when the regulations will be 
adopted.  Since Greece has missed every single deadline required under Community 
law so  far,  this lack of a  guarantee is a problem.  Moreover,  since a  draft of the· 
regulations also had not been issued as of late 1997, there must be significant doubt 
that anything can be adopted soon. 
EET has  informally stated that it plans to conduct public hearings or give formal 
opportunity for comment on the draft,  although this is not formally defined in any 
Greek regulation or notice.  Final regulations, however, depend on approval by the 
Ministry.  This last factor introduces yet another element of delay that causes great 
concern, especially to companies that have been working for more than two years to 
obtain legal authority to operate. 
35  The Commission's 18  June Greek derogation decision is published at O.J.  L 245/6, 9 September 
1997.  The reference  to  EET accepting  and granting  applications  is  set forth  at section 44,  sixth 
paragraph, indent (1).  This Greek pledge was also stated in Commission press release IP/97/373, dated 
.  30 April 1997. 
-78-This element of  timing could to some extent be minimised if  EET accepts and grants 
applications during the interim.  Indeed, current Greek law 2246/96 appears to permit 
applicants generally to apply and immediately commence operation pending action on 
an application.  Legal questions remain, however, whether this approach extends to 
satellite services and, if so, whether a similar approach will apply to frequency co-
ordination.  The draft regulations appear to  require applicants to  obtain service or 
faCilities  license first,  and then to seek frequency co-ordination through yet another 
process that is not defined. 
The  lack of assured  deadlines  for  satellite  licensing  procedures  violates  Satellite 
Directive  94/46/EEC,  Article 4.
36  The  inaction of the  Greek  authorities  and the 
resulting uncertainty are a serious barrier to providing satellite services in Greece and 
prevent achievement of  the single market in this area. 
(b)  Discriminatory licensing structure 
One version of the draft Greek regulations would establish four categories of  licences 
related  to  satellite  facilities  and services.  Different appendices to the regulations 
apply to these categories. 
License  categories  in 
Greek regula~ons 
These draft regulations might be changed 
substantially when they are finally issued. 
Thus,  these  comments  are  necessarily 
tentative,  given  the  non-transparent 
nature  of the  process.  The preliminary 
view is that there is no need to  establish 
the  License  3  category,  particularly  as 
early  draft  regulations  do  so  by 
discriminating  against  new  entry  to  the 
1. Satellite Network Services 
2. Satellite Services 
3. Space Segment 
4. Own Use Services 
Greek market in favour of  established monopoly providers. 
draft 
For instance, early drafts of the Space Segment License 3  requirements contained 
exceptions for International Satellite Operators such as INTELSAT and would have 
applied only to new entrants such as Orion Network Systems Inc or other new satellite 
operators.  Such a discriminatory requirement clearly would violate Community law.
37 
Such an approach also would be a serious barrier to expansion into the Greek market. 
Officials  of the  European  Telecommunications  Office  stated  in  recent  workshop 
36 At a minimum, these questions of  timing impede realisation of  the goals of  Satellite Directive 94/46. 
They also independently conflict with requirements of the Licensing Directive 97/13 which calls for 
Member State implementation "as soon as possible".  (Article 25)  The Licensing Directive provides~ 
outside time limit of  31 December 1997 for Member State publication of  implementing legislation. 
37  In particular, see  the provision in Satellite Directive 94/46 Article 2 requiring Member States to 
abolish regulatory restrictions on the offer of  space segment capacity. 
-79-presentations that no other Member State in the Community seeks to  license space 
segment in a similar manner. 
(c)  Non transparent rules 
The  proposed regulations  are  difficult to  assess  and  appear to  leave  key concepts 
undefined or-vague.  For example, draft versions of  the regulations do not define with 
any clarity standards for when Network  licen~es are  required instead of Own Use 
Service  licenses.  Distinctions  between  hub,  dependent  and  point-to-point  earth 
stations  are  also  not clear, .  and  there  is  no  clear demarcation of when declaration 
procedures rather than· individual licensing requirements will be applied. 
(d)  Non proportionate requirements 
The regulatory burdens and filing requirements set forth in the draft regulations are 
not proportionate to the EET's need to oversee licensed activities.  By contrast, the 
Greek licensing approach for international private line services (which rely on OTE's 
monopoly infrastructure) are extremely simple and require a four page submission. 
The proposed satellite licensing procedures, even those not connected with frequency 
co-ordination issues,  by contrast,  would be far  more  intrusive.  Satellite licensing 
should not be more burdensome than the procedures for other comparable services. 
For instance, one condition set forth in the draft appendices, which would apply to 
Space Segment licenses,  requires extensive information on an applicant's business 
plan.  The applicant would have to  submit to  EET the applicant's business plan or 
summary, including information on sales, invoices, revenue, staff, and development 
schedules  for  three.  periods  during  the  licensing  term.  These  requirements  are 
uncalled for  and  clearly disproportionate.  There is  no  provision for  treating  such 
information as confidential. 
(e)  Unlawful conditions for providing service 
The  draft  regulations  also  require  satellite  network  operators  to  certify  that  their 
facilities technically cannot be used in ways that violate the monopoly rights of  OTE, 
the national monopoly operator.  This requirement is set forth in Chapter 1 of  the draft 
regulations, Articles 3 and 6, which apply to licenses for Satellite Networks and Own 
Use Services, respectively.  These articles place a burden of  proof  on the operator that 
on its face is impossible to demonstrate.  In so doing, they violate Satellite Directive 
94/46/EEC and Services Directive 90/388/EEC.  The Commission has made clear that 
the burden of  proof that a new service constitutes reserved voice telephony ·rests with 
the regulator. 
38 
Recommendations 
38  Communication on the status and implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC  ... , O.J. No. C 275/2, 20 
October 1995, Section IV (b) at page 11. 
-80-Operators have urged the Commission to assist Greece in appropriate implementation 
of obligations established in Satellite Directive 94/46/EEC. If no Greek regulations 
have been issued by January 1998, or if  the regulations as adbpted contain some of  the 
flaws  discussed  preliminarily  above,  the  Commission  must  take  immediate  and 
strenuous efforts to insist on compliance with the Satellite Directive. 
(a)  Urge expedited action on the satellite regulations 
The  Commission  issued  its  June  1997  derogation  to  Greece  premised  on 
implementation actions that the Greek ·administration pledged to undertake.  One of 
these pledges was to accept applications and commence. to grant them as early as  1 
August 1997.  rhat did not happen, and the Commission should have insisted that 
Greece commence no later,than 31 December 1997 to act on this pledge, or reconsider 
the grant of the derogation.  The December deadline is the date that the Licensing 
Directive 97/13/EC became effective and seems an appropriate new target for action. 
Problems with current draft regulations may take time to fix.  Nevertheless, the time 
needed  to  modify  the  current  draft  regulations  should  not .  further  delay  the 
development of  the entire satellite industry.  Thus, for instance, EET should begin to 
accept applications and permit the applicants to  commence operation immediately, 
which appears to be consistent with Greek Law 2246/94.  · 
(b)  Advise on the draft regulations 
In order to help ensure that the Greek authorities develop transparent pro-competitive 
regulations,  Commission  officials  should  offer  immediate  assistance,  formally  or 
informally, to EET. 
(c)  Call  on EET to  set forth  declaration procedures  and  delete  space  segment 
licensing 
Draft  regulations  have  not  clearly  delineated  when  declaration  procedures  are 
permissible for satellite facilities and services.  As drafted, the regulations appear to 
establish  a  regime  of individual  licensing  for  most .services  and  facilities.  This 
approach is directly contrary to the principles of Licensing Directive 97  /13/EC, are 
disproportionate and will impede market entry into Greece.  The Commission should 
call upon EET to adopt declaration procedures to the maximum extent, consistent with 
Directive 97  /13/EC. 
The  Commission  should  also  call  upon  EET  to  delete  any  new  discriminatory 
restrictions on the provision of  space segment.  Any such rule would violate Satellite 
Directive 94/46/EEC and  Community competition rules.  No other country in the 
Community has adopted such an approach. 
(d)  Include satellite issues when assessing Greek implementation 
The Commission has indicated its  inte~.t to  engage in frank and serious .discussion 
with  the  Greek  administration  over  implementation  of  telecommunications 
-81-liberalisation.  Satellite services and facilities are a critical part of  that liberalisation in 
Greece,  due  to  its  geography,  network  development  and  economy.  Thus,  the 
Commission should not only include implementation of Directive 94/46/EEC in its 
discussion points, bqt it should also strongly emphasise this aspect. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Other. 
12.3  IRELAND 
Delays in implementing European liberalisation requirements. 
Proceedings for service licensing and frequency allocations remain unclear. Initiation 
of licensing proceedings  has  been delayed  due  to  lack  of appropriate  application 
forms.  The Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation has not been 
responsive to  efforts by industry to clarify the applicable regulatory framework and 
enable filing of service licence applications. There is a lack of understanding of the 
regulatory framework established through S-PCS DeCision and CEPT Decisions. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Other. 
12.4  ITALY 
Slow implementation of  Directives. However, a Decree was issued in September 1997 
concerning the implementation of  EU directives in the telecommunications sector. 
12.5  NETHERLANDS 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Standards and other technical  requireme~J,ts. 
Additional VSAT type approvals required. 
12.6  PORTUGAL 
REGULATORY SITUATION 
General regulatory situation 
The provision of  satellite communications services is governed in Portugal mainly by 
Decree-Law  120/96  of 7  August  1996,  which provides  for  implementation of the 
European Commission Directive 94/46/EEC of 13  October 1994 concerning satellite 
communications. 
Further details with regard to regulatory issues concerning the provision of satellite 
services will be dealt with by legislation that was to be enacted in the course of this 
year. 
Type approval 
Additional type approvals are reqUired. 
-82-Licensing 
Portugal has been granted an extension of  the deadline for abolishing the existing state 
monopoly rights for the provision of voice telephony services until 1 January 2000. 
Thus, it will not be possible to obtain a licence for the provision of voice telephony 
services  until·then.  Apparently,  this  monopoly right  ~overs the provision of voice 
telephony services through satellites as well. 
The National Regtilatory Authority, Instituto das  Comunica9oes de Portugal (ICP), 
does not yet have a clear view as to how S-PCS systems are to be considered under 
Portuguese  law.  The  current  legal  framework  applicable  to  telecommunications 
services _  and  operators'  licensing  does  not  provide  the  necessary  rules  for  global 
systems such as S-PCS systems. 
Furthermore; ICP officials have expressed doubt as to the applicability of  Decree-Law 
120/96 of 7 August 1996, to LEO systems. Currently Decree-Law 120/96 is the only 
Portuguese  legislation  dealing  with  licensing  requirements  for  the  provision  of 
satellite communications  services.  The  filing  of any  licence  application for  S-PCS 
systems is not possible at present. 
Frequency assignment 
The use of frequencies is, in principle, subject to frequency assignment requirements. 
No  sp~cific application procedure has been established as yet. 
A  new  Decree  Law  is  expected  to  be  published  in  January  which  will  establish 
provisions with regard to  frequency assignment.  IThe new Decree Law is to provide 
proceedings  for  applications  for  frequency  assignment  and  to  determine  the 
responsible authority. Furthermore, ICP  intends to  establish a working group whose 
task will be to propose a ~pecific regulatory framework for S-PCS. However, it is not 
expected that the results of  the working group will be presented before mid-March of 
1998. 
12.7  SPAIN 
REGULATORY SITUATION IN SPAIN 
Legal regime applicable to satellite services 
In  Spain,  satellite  telecommunications  are  governed  by  the  Act  on  Satellite 
Telecommunications  of  1995
39
,  which  introduces  the  liberalisation  of 
telecommunications  services  using  satellites  in  application  of  Directive 
94/46/EEC
40
• 
39 Act 37/1995 of 12 December 1995 on Satellite Telecommunications (Official Gazette no. 297 of 13 
December 1995).  · 
40  Commission  Directive  of  13  October  1994  amending  Directive  88/301/EEC  and  Directive 
90/388/EEC  in  particular  with  regard  to  Satellite  Communications  (94/46/EEC;  OJ  L268/15, 
19.10.1994). 
- 83-The  Act  on  Satellite  Telecommunications  abolishes  the  special  rights  for  the 
provision of satellite services.  Satellite services are subject to a prior authorisation, 
granted  under  an  open-ended,.  "first  in,  fust  served"  frame,  unless  there  are 
limitations on frequency availability,  in which case a public tender process will be 
required.  Basic telephony, Hertzian television and radio broadcasting,  and carrier 
services  for  Hertzian television are not covered by  the  Act.  The  granting of the 
authorisation implies the concession of the radioelectric public domain necessary to 
provide the service. 
The Spanish National Chart of Assignment of Frequencies, approved 29 July 1996, 
reserves the 1613.8- 1626.5 MHz band for mobile satellite communications as well 
as  for  other uses.  It expressly  indicates  that the  frequencies  allocated  for ·use  by 
satellites  which  are  not  geostationary  are  considered  to  be  available  but  limited 
resources.  Thus, under the provisions in force at present the authorisation required 
for  the rendering of Satellite Personal Commumcation Services  (S-PCS)  would be 
granted on the basis of a public tender procedure. 
The  Act  on Satellite  Telecommunications  requires  specific  Technical  Regulations 
developing  and detailing the  provisions of the Act and,  in particular,  establishing 
the procedure for the granting of licences to provide the services.  On 30 January 
1997,  the  Spanish  government  approved  a  Technical  Regulation  for  Satellite 
Telecommunications.  The Regulation  expressly  excludes  low  earth orbit satellites 
(LEOs) and medium earth orbit satellites (MEOs) from its scope of applicability. 
At present, there is  no Technical Regulation for non-geostationary satellites, which 
would  regulate the  services  to  be provided and the  procedure for  the  granting of 
licences t~ provide such services. 
Nevertheless,  Spain has  signed  the  three  decisions  adopted  by  the  CEPT  in July 
1997  (the  "CEPT  Decisions")
41  and,  therefore,  has  committed  to  apply  these 
decisions  enabling  the  authorisation  of S-PCS  entities  wishing  to  be  authorised 
within the terms in the Decision 71 0/97/EC
42
• 
. 
41  European Radiocommunications Committee (ERC) Decision of 30 June 1997 on Free Circulation, 
Use and Licensing of Mobile Earth Stations of Satellite Personal Communications Services (S-PCS) 
operating within the bands 1610-1626.5 MHz, 2483.5-2500 MHz,  1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 
MHz within the CEPT (ERC/DEC/(97)05). 
ERC  Decision  of 30  June  1997  on the  Hannonised  Use  of Spectrum. for  Satellite  Personal 
Communication Services (S-PCS) operating within the bands 1610-1626.5 MHz, 2483.5-2500 ~' 
1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz (ERC/DEC/(97)03). 
European Committee on Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs (ECTRA)  Decision of 2  July 
1997 on the Harmonisation of  authorisation Conditions and Co-ordination of  Procedures in the field of 
Satellite  Personal  Communication Services  (S-P.CS)  in Europe,  operating  within the  bands  1610-
1626.5 MHz, 2483.5-2500 MHz, 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz (ECTRA/DEC(97)02). 
42 Decision of  6 March 1997 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on a Co-ordinated 
Authorisations Approach in the field ofS-PCS in the Community (710/97/EC; OJ L105, 23.04_.1997). 
-84-The signing of the CEPT Decisions  implie~ that Spain has accepted the provisional 
designation of frequency bands as determined by CEPT  /ERC in Decision 97/03 and 
should therefore not conduct a biqding procedure,  but follow  the recommendation 
of the CEPT Milestone Review Committee (MRC)  with regard to the eligibility ·of 
an applicant for frequency assignment. 
However,  for  national  adoption  of  the  CEPT  Decisions  and  before.  Spanish 
regulatory  authorities  can  issue  S-PCS  licences,  appropriate  implementing 
legislation would be required. 
Relevant authorities. 
The  authority  in charge of preparing the  regulation for  S-PCS  is  the  Ministry  of 
Development
43  ("Ministerio  de  Fomento").  The  specific  department  within  the 
Ministry  involved  in the process  is  the  General Subdirectorate of Management of 
Scarce Rt;sources
44
• 
The  Telecommunications  Market Commission
45  (the  regulatory  independent entity 
which has been granted authority to  process certain licence applications)  could be 
given authority for  satellite mobile licences or be,  to  some extent,  involved in the 
legislative process. 
SPECIFIC ISSUES 
VSAT 
Additional VSAT type approvals are required. 
Obstacles for obtaining a S-PCS License 
The major obstacle to obtaining an S-PCS licence in Spain is the fact that there is no 
Technical Regulation applicable to mobile satellite services through LEOs and that 
such  Technical  Regulation  or other  piece  of legislation  establishing  the  specific 
licensing  procedure  would  in  principle  be  necessary  for  the  Spanish 
telecommunications regulator to issue a licence. 
Even  though  Spain  has  signed  the  CEPT  Decisions  and,  therefore,  is  bound  to 
enable the authorisation of S-PCS entities wishing to be authorised within the time 
frame  spelled out in the S-PCS Decision 71 0/97/EC, a legal process of issuing the 
appropriate regulations will be required.  Taking into account. the transitional period 
in  which  Spanish  telecommUnications  are.  at  present  (with  a  draft  General 
Telecommunications  Act  being  discussed  in  Parliament),  the  risk  exists  that  the 
Spanish Government decides to postpone the -issue of a regulation on. mobile satellite 
services until the new General Telecommunications Act is approved.  Even though 
approval of a new law was expected by the end of 1997  or the beginning .of 1998, 
it seems now that the passing of the law may be delayed for a few  more months at 
least.  If that were the case, the lack of appropriate legislation on S-PCS until such 
43 Ministro de Fomento, P0  de la Castellana, 67, 28046 MADRID 
44 Subdirecci6n General de Gesti6n de Recursos, Escasos de Telecomunicaciones, Direcci6n General 
de Telecomunicaciones, Palacio de Comunicaciones, Plaza de Cibeles s/n, 28071 MADRID 
45 Comisi6n del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones, Velazquez,-164, 28002 MADRID 
-85-approval would delay the granting of S-PCS licences for a long period.  Therefore, 
it  would  be  desirable  that  the  Spanish  Government  regulate  the  S-PCS  before 
approval of the new General Telecommunications Act. 
-86-13.  ANNEX 4 : MARKET ACCESS BARRIERS IN TIDRD COUNTRIES 
This Annex identifies barriers to market access encountered by the European satellite 
industry.  The  subheadings  under  each  country  are  those  used  in  the  European 
Commission's country fiche (see Annex 5) for the market access database maintained 
in DGI (http://mkaccdb.eu.int). In this Annex, the only subheadings from the country 
·fiche which are given here are those which relate to specific barriers encountered by 
the  satellite  industry.  [Note:  Like  the  preceding  Annex,  this  Annex  must  be 
considered as  only a  draft at this  stage,  as  at  end January  1998.  The  SAP  RWG 
intends to do more work in_ regard to specific countries.] 
13.1  ANGOLA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
Empresa do  Telecomunicacoes  de  Angola  is  the  only company that can provide 
Inmarsat services. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
Customs duti~s: 47% 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Registration,  documentation,  customs procedures . 
. The  licence  can  be  obtained  by  sending  a  request  and  indicating  the  following 
information: Time of  stay, characteristics of  the mobile earth station (MES): capacity, 
model,  number,  etc.,  where  it  is  commissioned,  name  and  contact  details  of the 
applicant. The visitor will receive by fax  a copy of the licence. He has to bring the 
copy  with  him  and  in  customs  he  must  declare  the  MES  and  le~ve a  deposit. 
Afterwards, the person goes to the Controller Chief of  Direccao Nacional de Correios 
e Telecom (DNCT), gets the original licence and pays the licence fee. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
The price of the licence fee  is  approximately $300 for  6 months  ..  For one year is 
approximately $500. 
Import prohibitions. 
The licence is difficult to  obtain if it is perceived to have a negative effect on the 
national PTO company. 
Import  lic~nsing. -
For visitors the licence fee is $300 per 6 months. 
Other. 
There is no policy covering the Mobile Satellite Services. 
-87-13.2  ARGENTINA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
A) schedules of  specific commitments 
exclusions: provision of fixed  satellite services (FSS) through geostationary 
orbit satellites (GSO). 
B) lists of  Article IT (MFN) exemptions 
access to markets for FSS through GSO satellites on a reciprocity basis, at 
governmental level. 
duration indefinite 
need for the exemption: development of  domestic satellite systems. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
Since the  9 ·November 1997, lnmarsat Service Providers are  allowed in Argentina 
after obtaining approval from Comisi6n Nacional de Comunicaciones. Argentina has 
given three experimental licences to Iridium, Globalstar and Orbcomm. 
Domestic satellite systems are protected. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
For personal importation as baggage the customs duties are 50% of the value of the 
equipment,  though  until  US$  300  of equipment  value,  no  duties  are  paid.  For 
permanent importation of equipment as merchandise (import of equipment) customs  . 
duties  for  Inmarsat  terminals  will  be  assimilated  to  other  telecommunication 
equipment which is around 20% + 3o/o import CIF. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Standards and other technical requirements. 
Current  regulation  tends  toward  a  general  licence  for  type  approval  in  order  to 
facilitate free circulation. 
Oth[!r. 
There  are  laws  concerning  satellite  telecommunication  services  and  basic 
telecommunication  services.  There  is  no  specific  law  regarding  mobile  satellite 
services. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Other. 
13.3  BELARUS 
Trucks carrying satellite terminals often encounter the same problems at border points 
as occur at the Russian borders.  · 
-88-13.4  BOLIVIA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
Need of  commercial presence in Bolivia. 
Entel has exclusive rights in long distance services until2001. 
13.5  BRAZIL 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
Under the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecoms, Brazil committed to an open market 
access for all non-public domestic and international services for closed user groups 
(not connected to the public switched networks). It will in future reform legislation 
which is  expected to  cover all  services  within  one  year of enactment.  There  is  a 
requirement  to  route  all  inte~ational traffic  through  Brazili~ gateways.  Foreign 
ownership restrictions to be removed from July 1999. 
Under the schedules of  specific commitments, Brazil tabled the following: 
•  A specific governmental licence is required for each service. 
•  There must be  a representative office in Brazil for all legal effects. 
•  Embratel has exclusive rights to link with INTELSAT and Inmarsat. 
•  Use of  other foreign satellites allowed whenever they offer better conditions. 
•  There  are  exclusions in the audio-visual  sector (see  below),  i.e.,  distribution of 
radio or television programming for direct reception. 
Article II (MFN) exemptions were tabled for: 
•  distribution of  radio or television programming for direct reception; 
•  access  to  market  on  a  reciprocity  basis,  or  differential  treatment  of specific 
countries; 
•  duration indefinite. 
The exemption is said to be needed in order to provide effective market access for 
Brazilian suppliers. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
No  Inmarsat  Service  Providers  are  allowed  except  for  Embratel,  the  Brazilian 
Signatory. Direct market access denied. 
Local content schemes. 
Licence fees apply only to non-Brazilian registered terminals. 
Other. 
Brazil has not yet established a policy and regulatory framework covering the mobile 
satellite services. Embratel and the Brazilian Ministry of Communications have been 
working on defining a clear procedure to authorise use of a non-Brazilian registered 
Inmarsat terminals in Brazil. One of  the criteria being considered is reciprocity, i.e., if 
-89-the  Telecommunications  Authority  of the  country  where  the  satellite  terminal  is 
registered accepts use of a Brazilian-registered satellite terminal on its territory on a 
temporary basis.  · 
Telecommunications Equipment 
General Features of Trade Policy (Industry) 
There are no strong domestic suppliers. NEC, Alcatel, Ericsson and Siemens have set 
up local production facilities. 
The Brazilian market was estimated at US$ 3.6 billion in 1996, and the trade deficit in 
this sector was about US$  1 billion.  The Brazilian government indicated in March 
1997 its intention to promote production of  local telecom equipment. 
Applied Tariff Levels 
Customs  duties  for  mobile earth  stations  are  60%  over FOB  prices  for  permanent 
importation, and 5% for temporary importation. 
Tariff  Predictability (Maximum Rates Permitted Under WTO Bindings) _ 
Tariff  Quotas 
Registration, Documentation, Customs Procedures 
Visitors to Brazil must provide Embratel with details of any satellite terminals which 
they wish to take into Brazil. Temporary use is permitted for a maximum of  3 months. 
An amount of  US$ 735  must be deposited in the account of Embratel in New York, 
and  a copy of the deposit receipt must be sent to  Embratel.  A  temporary licence, 
written in Portuguese, is then delivered to the user within 7 days. This fee only applies 
to non-Brazilian registered terminals. 
Embratel  and  the  Brazilian  Ministry  of Communications  have  been  working  on 
defining  a clear procedure to  authorise  use of a non-Brazilian registered Inmarsat 
terminal  in Brazil.  One of the  criteria being  considered  is  reciprocity,  i.e.,  if the 
Telecommunications Authority of  the country where the satellit~ terminal is registered 
accepts use of a Brazilian-registered satellite terminal on its territory on a temporary 
basis. 
Standards and Other Technical Requirements 
There are national type approval requirements. 
Government Procurement· 
Decree No  1070 of 2 March  1994 grants  a preference to  Brazilian suppliers with 
respect to  government procurement of telecoinmunications and computer goods and 
services. 
Local Content Schemes 
-90-In order to obtain a contract for manufacturing a satellite system, one has to guarantee 
at least 50% of  the work share to Brazilian companies. 
13.6  BULGARIA 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
Customs duties are 36% of  the price written on the invoice. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Registration, documentation,  customs procedures. 
Inmarsat terminals can not be used in Bulgaria at the moment 
Levies and charges (other than import duties).. 
The licence fee for an Inmarsat terminal will be around $200. 
Local content schemes. 
As of  January 1995, the Republic of  Bulgaria has a restrictive regime for land mobile 
earth stations. 
Other. 
Withholding or delays in issuing VSAT licences. 
No licensing regime is in place for mobile satellite services. Frequency assignment for 
S-PCS is dependent on tender proceeding. 
13.7  CmLE 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
A) schedules of  specific commitments 
limitations: none. 
exclusion: one-way satellite transmission of  DTH and ·nBS television services 
and of  digital audio services, as well as radio broadcast services. 
B) lists of  Article II (MFN) exemptions 
none 
13.8  CHINA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the sector. 
Telecommunications Services 
China is  in a  transitional  period.  It has  to  establish  a  nation-wide  basic  telecom 
infrastructure. With a telephone penetration of 6% (Chinese sources speak of 10% by 
end 1997 and 30 - 40 %  for_ the urban population), ·China feels  a definite need for 
government monopoly. However, that does :t;tot  mean .that China will wait until the 
,_ 91-entire network is set up to pursue reform. A new law is currently drafted. The new law 
is considered to cover only telecommunications. It will cover neither broadcasting, 
·nor manufacturing of telecom equipment. It will concentrate on building of networks 
and provision of  telecolll: services. 
The market for telecom services remains monopolistic. China Telecom acts under the 
authority of  the Ministry of  Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). The only licensed 
competitor is China Unicorn, but the success of this company is still unsatisfactory 
with a reported stock of only 30,000 clients.  However,  Unicorn represents  for  the 
moment the only company which is open to foreign capital. MPT foresees an opening 
of the market for  foreign  investors  on the basis of pilot projects  in some selected 
cities.  These  projects  might  concern  services  in  e-mail,  fax  transmission  and 
electronic data transmission. 
Prices for telecom services are still fixed by the state. 
Mobile  communications  is  a  rapidly  growing  market.  In  this  sector,  foreign 
investment is  already  strong with Nokia,  Ericsson,  Motorola,  Sie~ens and others. 
Most of  these companies build important production facilities (e.g., Motorola with 2.1 
million phones,  Ericsson  with 300,000  mobile  phones  and  a  foreseen  capacity of 
600,000). Chinese sourc~s estimate the number of  mobile telephones until the end of 
1997 at over 4 million compared to 1 million in 1996. 
Satellite Telecommunication Services 
No Inmarsat Service Providers are allowed except for Beijing Marine Communication 
and  Navigation  Company,  the  Chinese  Signatory.  Direct  market  access  has  been 
denied~ 
A  foreign  user  is  not allowed to  apply for  a licence in China without  a Chinese 
partner. A temporary licence could be applied for  a special reason and approved by 
the local government but only on a case-:by-case basis. 
Inmarsat terminals in China must use the Chinese gateway station (i.e., the Beijing 
Land Earth  Station)  unless  use  of some  other LES  is  explicitly permitted by the 
Chinese authoritie.s. 
Information Services 
So  far,  the  government has been suspicious  about the Internet.  ·A  1996  regulation 
introduced the mandatory registration of computer networks and a ban on political 
information  as  well  as  of pornography.  However,  recent  estimations  show  an 
enormous growth in the number of Internet users in China which accounts to about 
. 200,000. The first joint venture for Internet services has been recently realised by the 
US firm Prodigy together with China North Industries. North Industries, the former 
Ministry of  Munitions, covers activities in civil and military sectors. 
Audio-visual Services 
-92-Private operators are forbidden to uplink from the Chinese territory for broadcasting 
programmes. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
Import duties: 9% of  value of  the communication instrument. 
Registration, documentation,  customs procedures. 
Foreign licensed mobile earth stations (MESs) can be used in China if approved. A 
temporary licence can be requested for special reasons and it will be given if  it is 
approved  by the  State  Radio  Regulatory  Commission (SRRC),  through  the  same 
procedure as for the permanent licence. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties) 
17%  VAT.  Additional  2%  tax  if the  company  has  not  got  the  right  to  import. 
Frequency usage charges: RMB 250 per year ($30) for each Inmarsat terminal. 
Registration fee: RMB 15 ($2, a one-off fee). 
Licence fees also apply to disaster relief agencies. 
The commissioning fee for each Inmarsat terminal is RMB 2000 ($240). 
The licence fee for temporary use of  lnmarsat.:.phone will be RMB 15 as a registration 
fee and RMB 250 per year for frequency usage fee through the same procedure as for 
the permanent licence. If the visitor stays less than a year, the frequency usage fee 
depends on how long frequencies will be used. 
Temporary licences can be issued for special reasons. Approval by the State Radio 
Regulatory Commission (SRCC) is necessary. 
Standards and other technical requirements 
According  to  China's  Regulation  on  the  Management  of  Import  of  Radio 
Transmission Equipment, for any radio transmission equipment imported into China, 
the visitor should hold a "Radio Transmission Equipment Type Approval Certificate" 
issued by the SRRC.  Inmarsat equipment manufacturers or their designated agents 
should apply and obtain a licence ,.of approval. if they wish to import terminals into 
China. 
The fee for type approval is RMB 5000 ($605). 
13.9  COLOMBIA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
A) schedules of  specific commitments 
limitation: none. 
need of a  representative  office  in Colombia to  get  a  licence,  for  all  legal 
effects. 
-93-exclusions: broadcast and television services. 
B) lists of  Article II (MFN) exemptions 
none. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
High customs duties and other taxes 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
High licence fees for service providers 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
High custom duties 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
13.10  CZECH REPUBLIC 
Standards and other technical requirements. 
Additional VSAT type approvals required. 
Other. 
Delays in implementing European liberalisation requirements 
Monopoly rights continue to exist in the telecoms sector and prevent provision of 
telecoms  services  by private  entities.  A  policy  decision  on  liberalisation  of the 
telecoms sector has been announced by the Czech Telecommunications Office for 
beginning of  1998. 
Frequencies for S-PCS (1610 - 1626.5 MHz) are reserved formilitary use.  A  new 
national frequency plan is in preparation which is supposed to release the frequencies 
for civil use. 
13.11  ECUADOR 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
Emetel, SA, has exclusive rights in local, national and international telephony services 
until 60 months after the privatisation of  Emetel. 
13.12  EL SALVADOR 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
The Signatory has exclusive rights to link with INTELSAT. 
-94-13.13  ETIDOPIA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
No Inmarsat Service Provider is allowed. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
Custol!l duties: 5'% on the value of  the equipment. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Registration, documentation,  customs procedures. 
The user should submit his application before importing the Inmarsat terminal into the 
count;cy. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
Sales tax of 12% of  the value of  the equipment after custom duty is added. 
For all terminals: $ 2250 I month+ $ 330 I year. 
Import prohibitions. 
Temporary importation can be accepted. There must not be transfer of  the terminal. 
Import licensing. 
Conditions attached to the  licensing and  use of MES:  the place of use  should be 
without any other communications means or unreliable communication. 
13.14  GEORGIA 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
The licence fee for an Inmarsat terminal is US$ 1000-2000. 
Other. 
Trucks carrying satellite terminals have been blocked at the border, although  such 
blockages have been solved either by paying a  licence  at  the border or -thanks  to· 
Ministry's intervention. 
13.15  GUATEMALA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
Provision of  international services requires a certificate given by La Superintendencia · 
de Telecomunicaciones. 
13.16. HUNGARY 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Standards and ·other technical requirements. 
-95-Additional VSAT type approvals required 
Other. 
Delays in implementing European liberalisation requirements. 
The licensing regime for mobile satellite services under the Telecommunications Act 
of 1992,  as  last  amended  in  October  1997,  remains  unclear.  Clarification by the 
Ministry of  Communications is required. 
13.17  INDIA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
Restriction as to which companies may receive VSAT services. 
Direct market access denied. 
Domestic structure of  the secior.  Competitive analysis. 
Inmarsat Service Providers are not allowed. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
Custom duties: 50%, with countervailing duties probably closer to 70%. Visitors are 
exempted if  they have a certificate of  re-exportatio:n.. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Registration, documentation,  customs procedures. 
Users are obliged to route their calls through Indian Land Earth Station when 
available. Mobile Earth Station will be permitted if  their needs cannot be met by 
PSTN network 
Levies and charges  (other than import duties). 
The current annual licence fee for an lnmarsat MES isUS$550. For temporary use: 
US$140 per quarter. 
VSAT licence fees are high. 
13.18  IRAN 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the  se~or. Competitive analysis. · 
Only  Telecommunication  Company of Iran  has  been  allowed _to  be  an  lnmarsat 
Service Provider. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffS. 
Custom duties on telecommunications equipment are not fixed but vary according to a 
number of elements. Visitors need a letter or fax from the person/company inviting 
them to explain that the terminal is necessary and what will be its use. 
-96-'  13.19  JAMAICA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
Until  2013,  the  exclusive  company  of operation  has  priority  right  to  establish 
agreements within the provider of satellite services. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Other. 
13.20  JAPAN 
Bilateral agreements with the US favour American satellite service 
'  . 
13.21  KENYA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
No  competition to  Kenya  Posts  and  Telecommunications  Corporation  (KPTC)  IS 
permitted. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Registration,  documentation,  customs procedures. 
Importation oflnmarsat terminals is decided on a case by case basis. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
If  use is allowed, the licence fee is $400 year or about $200 a month. 
Import prohibitions. 
Use oflnmarsat terminals by residents is not allowed at the moment. New regulations 
are being drafted and currently requests are being dealt with on a case by case basis by 
KPTC. 
Local content schemes. 
Inmarsat terminal use in ports and territorial waters is forbidden, except transmissions 
concerning safety of  life at sea, medical and navigational information. 
Other. 
A new telecommunications policy is being drafted. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
13.22  MAURITANIA 
Customs duties: 60% + 15000 UM tax per unit imported into the country. 
There  is  a· "special· ·temporary  admission"  category  with very low  customs  duties· · 
(maximum 10%), calculated according to length of  stay. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
-97  ~ 
.  / Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
66,661.30 FF (approximately $11,670 per year). 
Import prohibitions. 
Temporary admission is granted on only an exceptional basis (e.g., if  the equipment is 
to be used for a procurement contract or contract with a public company (Societe de 
l'Etat). 
Local content schemes. 
Inmarsat terminals can be used only in areas  not served or reached by the public 
telecom operator (OPT). 
13.23  MEXICO 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
A) schedules of  specific commitments 
limitations: use of  Mexican satellite infrastructure until 2002. 
exclusions:  distribution of radio or television for direct reception (DTH and 
DBS), as well as digital audio. 
licences given by Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes (SCT). 
Telecomm has exclusive rights to link with INTELSAT and Inmarsat. 
access to markets based on bilateral agreements. 
B) lists of  Article II (MFN) exemptions 
none 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
The provision of satellite telecommunication services in Mexico is determined in the 
first instance by the "Federal Law of  Telecommunications" of7 June 1995, and in the 
second instance by the "Regulation of Satellite Communications" of the  1 August 
1997. Both are published in the "Diario Oficial de la.Federaci6n". 
Article 30 of the Telecommunications Law establishes that the Secretary General of 
Communications may award concessions or rights of transmissions  or reception to 
foreign satellite systems that may cover Mexican territory, providing that a treaty has 
been signed with the country of  origin of  the signals in terms of  reciprocity. 
The Regulation- in its Articles 8,  32 and following- develops the conditions that 
have to  be met to  obtain  a  concession to  operate  over non-Mexican satellites.  In 
addition  to  the  provision  of considerable  technical  information,  those  conditions 
"include  a  bus~ess plan  and  the  need  to  obtain  a  favourable  opinion  from  the 
"Comisi6n Nacional de la Competencia". 
A reciprocity treaty has been signed with the USA. The Mexican Solidaridad satellite 
system has been privatised and a large. portion (  49%) appears to have been acquired by 
US firms (notably Loral). This situation puts' non-Mexican, non-American operators at 
a disadvantage. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
-98-Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
High VSAT licence fees 
Standards and other technical requirements. 
Additional type approvals required 
13.24  MOROCCO 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
There has been a state monopoly regarding routing and telephone services, although 
the specific decrees to the new Posts and Telecommunications Law might change the 
situation. 
Direct market access denied 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS  • 
. Registration,  documentation,  customs procedures. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
The current annual licence fee  for an Inmarsat terminal is US$2000, plus a fee  for 
communicatio~s. For visitors it is calculated proportionate to  the  length of stay if· 
under 6 months. 
13.25  NIGERIA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
No Inmarsat Service Provider is allowed other than NITEL. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
Import duties are applicable to all telecommunications equipment at 40% of 
equipment value as estimated by the Customs inspectors (not value on invoice). 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
VAT is 5% of  the custom duty. There is also a 1% CIS tax and 7% handling tax (on 
custom duty). 
Users must pay an annual operation fee (in foreign currency) which is: 
Inmarsat-A: $ 1,000, Inmarsat-B/M: $ 500, Inmarsat-C and Inmarsat-phone: $ 250. 
Users must all pay for  a  one-off equipment licence ·of$ 100 and an annual radio 
frequency fee of  500 Naira ($23 official rate, $5 market rate). 
Standards and other technical requirements. 
National type approval is required., 
Local content schemes. 
-·99-Any establishment wishing to carry out any form of  telecommunications activity in 
Nigeria must acquire a licence from the Nigerian Communications Commission 
(NCC). 
13.26  PAKISTAN 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs.  _ 
Customs duties of  40-60 % are levied on the cost of  the item. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
There is a royalty fee:$ 1,000 one-time-off and a licence fee ofPAK Rs 5,000 ($135) 
per year. 
Standards and other technical requirements. 
National type approval is not required. 
Other. 
Pakistan  Telecommunication Authority  (PTA)  has  been  recently  established.  The 
authority  is  presently working  on issues  of a  regulatory  framework,  covering the 
mobile satellite services. 
Customers report difficulties  in gaining permission to  take  satellite: terminals  into 
Pakistan and, when permitted, there is  often a requirement to make "payments" to 
- local officials. 
13.27  PERU 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
The national operator has exclusive rights in long distance and international services 
until1999. 
13.28  PWLIPPINES 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive  analysis~ 
Domestic and land mobile use of Inmarsat has been completely blocked for the last 
several months as a consequence of  bypass complaints by the domestic long distance 
carrier. No lnmarsat Service Providers are permitted except for the Signatory. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
The  current  annual  licence  fee  isUS$125  approximately,  plus  a  fee  radio  station 
licence renewable every 3 years costing US$3 7.5. Visitors do not need a licence but 
have to. pay a registration fee (US$5) and the radio station licence. 
-100-Standards and other technical requirements. 
There is a national type approval procedure 
13.29  POLAND 
3.- NoN-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Registration, documentation,  customs procedures. 
Use oflnmarsat terminals is not allowed in the country. 
Standards and other technical requirements. 
Additional VSAT type approvals required. 
Local content schemes. 
The majority of  shares for companies operating as service providers shall be Polish. 
cnher.  ' 
-There is no regulation for mobile satellite services. 
There have been· delays in implementing European liberalisation requirements. 
The  State monopoly for  international telecoms  traffic  continues to  exist  and  thus 
prevents  the  provision  of any  services  by  private- entities.  Foreign  ownership 
restrictions prevent activities of  foreign entities on the telecoms market. 
Trucks carrying satellite terminals have been blocked at borders, even though Poland 
has partly implemented the free circulation licence for the EUTEL  TRACS terminals. 
Very slow Earth Station Approval process for VSATs. 
13.30  RUSSIA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
· The only Inmarsat Service Provider is Morsviazsputnik. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied .tariffs. 
Customs duties for residents are 615000 Rbls ($136) +VAT 20% and for foreigners 
=$250  +VAT 20%. 
Customs clearance is issued only on the. basi_s  of the import licence obtained from 
"Gossviaznadzor". The application for the licence should normally be faxed by the 
customer directly. Intermediaries are not accepted. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Registration, documentation,  customs procedures.  · 
To be properly authorised to use any Inmarsat terminal in Russia, a "Gossviaznadzor" 
operation licence is required 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
Licence fees for residents is· $800 for three years. For foreigners up to 3 months: US $ 
1,500, from 3 months to 1 year: US$ 2,500 and from 1 to 3 years: US$ 5,000. 
High VS~.T  licence fees. 
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Standards and other technical requirements. 
All  imported lnmarsat equipment  must be supported by a  national  type  approval 
certificate which is obtained from Morsviazsputnik. 
Additional VSAT type approvals required. Slow type approval procedure for VSATs 
bureaucratic reasons. 
Other. 
Problems  with  customs  or with  the  police  because  of EUTELTRACS,  because 
customs  officers  and  .  police  officers  lack  information  regarding  the  ~atellite 
communications  systems  equipment  authorised to  circulate  freely  and be used on 
Russian territory. This leads to trucks blocked at the border. 
13.31  SAUDIARABIA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
Direct market access denied 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
Custom duties: 20%. 
No custom duties for temporary importation 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties) 
All Inmarsat terminals: US$533 per year, plus $1330 or $2600 one-off. There is no 
special fee for temporary use. 
Sales tax: 25% 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Other. 
13.32  SERBIA 
Trucks carrying satellite terminals have been blocked at the border, although  such 
blockages have been solved either by paying a  licence at  the border or thanks to 
Ministry's intervention. 
13.33  SLOVAKIA 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Standards and other technical requirements. 
Additional VSAT type approvals required 
13.34  SLOVENIA 
-102-3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Other. 
Withholding or delays in issuing VSAT licence 
13.35  SYRIA 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Registration, documentation,  customs procedures. 
Foreign-registered Inmarsat terminals cannot obtain a licence for use in Syria at the 
moment. Syria leases terminals (Inmarsat-phone) for a fee. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
To lease one of  Syria's own terminals: 25000 Syrian Pounds one-off  fee plus 25555 
SP per month and 315 SP per minute charge. 
Other. 
There have been reports of  Inmarsat terminals being confiscated by the security forces 
even though the terminals were duly licensed. 
\  . 
13.36  TANZANIA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
Tanzania has not yet established a policy and regulatory framework but plans to do so. 
Inmarsat Service Providers are allowed through Tanzania Telecommunications 
Company Limited (TTCL  ), the PTO. 
Tanzania is a signatory to the GMPCS MoU 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
Custom duties: 30% on all satellite telecommunication equipment. 
Exemption can be obtained for temporary importation, with the deposit of a bond 
refunded at departure. 
Sales tax: 25%. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Registration, documentation,  customs procedures. 
The  licence  is  not  transferable  and  the  equipment  should  not  cause  harmful 
interference to other radio stations. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties) 
All Inmarsat terminals: US$ 4096 per year. A rebate can be granted by the Tanzanian 
Communications Commission for humanitarian use as well as for short stays (under 3 
months), down to US$ 1000. 
13.37  TURKEY 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
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I Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
Direct market access denied 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
High VSAT licence fees. Licence fees have doubled in 1997. 
Other. 
Extremely slow earth station approval procedure. 
13.38  UKRAINE . 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
Only Ukrspace is allowed as an Inmarsat Service Provider. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
The  custom  duties  are  10%  of equipment  value  for  permanent  or  temporary 
importation. 
For  t~e first three months, the custom duties on Inmarsat terminals are 250 US$. Then 
add 50 US$ for each additional three months. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Registration, documentation,  customs procedures. 
Before an Inmarsat terminal can be operated in the Ukraine, permanent or temporary 
permission for use must be obtained from  the  State Inspection of Communication 
(SIC) with payment of  registration and commission fees. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
Licence fees for all type oflnmarsat terminals are:$ 1,800 (for two years) plus$. 350 
for each following quarter. 
There is an Import Commission fee of$100. 
Local content schemes. 
There is a provision by State Inspection of Communication of  Ukraine according to 
which the use of  an Inmarsat terminal with a foreign ID for more than three months is 
prohibited. 
Other. 
The licensing regime for the provision of S-PCS services is unclear. Frequencies for 
S-PCS are reserved for military use. It is unclear if and when frequencies  will be 
released for civilian use. 
Delays in implementing European liberalisation requirements. 
Trucks have been blocked at the border points $everal times in the last three years. 
13.39  UNITED STATES 
-104-The European Commission is very well aware of  the market access barriers in the US 
for non-US satellite services and has taken several actions. 
The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued two Notices of  Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRMs) concerning access by non-US-licensed satellite systems to the 
US market: 
•  the ·Domestic  International  Satellite  Consolidation  Order  (DISCO-I),  issued  in 
January 1996, applies to US-licensed satellite systems. 
•  the DISCO-II NPRM issued in May 1996 would apply to non-US-licensed satellite 
systems.  Under the proposed terms of the DISCO-II,  ICO  (for example) would 
probably not have been able to provide services in the US. 
On 18 July 1997, the FCC issued a Further Notice of  Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) 
to  DISCO-II seeking comment on "how best to  open up  US  markets  in a manner 
consistent with our goal of promoting a competitive satellite market in the United 
States."  The  FNPRM  proposed  that  satellite  systems  licensed  by WTO  member 
countries would not be subject to the so-called ECO-Sat test which called for evidence 
that US-licensed operators enjoyed effective competitive opportunities in the satellite 
service market ofthe licensing or notifying administration. Instead, parties opposed to 
the grant of  market access to a non-US-licensed system would need to demonstrate a 
very high risk to competition in the US  satellite market that could not be cured by 
additional conditions attached to the licence. The FNPRM proposed that the FCC may 
condition or deny authorisation to provide satellite services in the United States based 
on  other  important  public  interest  factors,  including  national  security,  law 
enforcement, foreign policy and trade concerns. 
The FNPRM would have created the following market access barriers for European 
investment and satellite systems: 
•  Market access for non-US systems (e.g., European systems), which are of a WTO 
member country, would be granted under a rebuttable presumption that no very 
high risk to  competition is  created.  But this presumption could be contested by 
third parties,  e.g.,  US  competitors.  Some (but not all)  RWG  members ·felt this 
concept  is  inherently  vague  and  incompatible  with  GATS  (MFN,  national 
treatment) and the WTO (US schedule). 
•  Market access for satellite systems licensed by non-WTO member countries would 
be subject to the ECO-Sat test,  even if their route markets were WTO member 
countries. 
•  Market access for Intergovernmental Satellite Organizations (ISOs) would only be 
possible if  the "home markets" of the ISO members were open No market access 
would be granted if only one of its route markets or one of its member's home 
market was not open. Alternatively access to the US market would only be open if 
a "critical mass" of  ISO member countries were open to US systems. 
•  Market access for ISO affiliates would be subject to a review of  the relation to its 
parent to prevent "competitive distortions" which would be a violation of  GATS. 
•  Market access for non-US  s~t~llite systems would be subject to a "public interest" . 
test. 
.:.tos-
-, Conditioning  market  access  to  US  consumers,  based  on foreign  policy  and  trade 
concerns, would be discriminatory and contrary to both the spirit and the letter of  the 
WTO  Agreement  on  Basic  Telecoms.  The  NPRMs  were  characterised  by vague 
·definitions, the possibility of  intervention by third parties and market access tests such 
as  the ECO test, the ECO-Sat test, the "public interest" test or the "benchmarking" 
test for interconnection. The NPRMs would have created uncertainty for the global 
business of  European telecommunication players. 
The NPRMs led to the adoption on 25  November 1997 by the FCC of two  Orders 
addressing US  implementation of its WTO commitments. The first Order addresses 
foreign participation in the US  market for provision of telecommunications services, 
while the second Order
46 creates a framework for opening the US  market to foreign 
satellite carriers. 
Under the new Order, 'the US will drop the ECO-Sat test for satellite providers from 
all WTO member countries and will review their applications "under a presumption in 
favour of entry".  The FCC will, however, retain the  '~public interest test" and will 
reserve the right to  deny applications which it does  not view as  favourable  to the 
public interest (for national security reasons or because the applicant is viewed as  a 
strong threat to the competitive environment).  Under the Order, the FCC will also 
"treat satellites of affiliates of INTELSAT and Inmarsat that are licensed by a WTO 
member the same as other WTO member-licensed systems." However, the FCC says 
that  "In determining  whether  an  application  to  serve  the  US  market  by an  IGO 
affiliate  raises  the potential  for  competitive  harm,  we will  consider  any  potential 
anticompeti.tive  or  market  distorting  consequences  of continued  relationships  or 
connections between an IGO and its affiliate."  As expressed in the comments of  the 
EC and its Member States in September 1997, "some of  the 'tests' to which the FCC 
intends to submit IGO affiliates ... could potentially lead to an over-regulation of  these 
affiliates",  as  "IGO  affiliates  will  already  be  subject  to  the  prohibition  of anti-
competitive practices, and to safeguards preventing inter alia cross-subsidisation." 
The ECO-Sat test will remain in place for satellite providers from non-WTO member 
countries,  and for  services not covered in the US  commitment to  the WTO {DTH, 
DBS  and DARS).  The FCC  also  established a "basis upon which it will consider 
requests from Comsat to provide US domestic service via INTELSAT and Inmarsat" . 
that will require Comsat to waive any immunities that it derives from its relationship 
"and then to show that use of those satellites will  enhance competition in the US 
satellite market." 
Status of  market access of  competitors 
Access to the US  market by ICO  Globe~.! Communications is affected by the above-
mentioned trade barriers. Meanwhile, !CO's competitors- Iridium and Globalstar-
are licensed in the US and have unlimited access to the US market. They also  do not 
46 Amendment of  the Commission's Regulatory Policies to Provide Domestic and International 
Satellite Service in the United States (ffi Docket No. 9(>-111 -DISCO II). 
- 106-face. any trade barriers in the European Union like those faced by ICO in gaining 
access to the US market. 
1.5/1.6 GHz allocations in the US 
More than a decade ago, when the FCC instituted its Notice of  Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM) on the mobile satellite services, it said there was not enough spectrum in the 
L-band to  allow  anyone  other  than  AMSC  to  provide  service  within the  United 
States.
47  Since then, AMSC has co-ordinated with Inmarsat, but still the US market 
remains closed to lnmarsat. Subsequently, the reason given for barring access to the 
US market was that lnmarsat, as  an intergovernmental  ~atellite organisation (ISO), 
might distort competition. In reality, lnmarsat faces exactly the same difficulties as its 
competitors in gaining access to markets. 
1.6/2.4 GHz allocations 
In 1994, in accord with the W  ARC-92 Final Acts, the FCC allocated 1.6/2.4 GHz to 
MSS  in the United States.  The European Commission,  in filing  comments on the 
FCC's allocation for the Big LEO MSS  systems, expressed concerns that the FCC 
Notice of  Proposed Rulemaking: 
"does not address the important issue of access to the 2 GHz frequency band, 
the relation between access to the 2 GHz band and access to the bands under 
discussion in the Notice, potential unfair competitive situations resulting from 
the availability scenarios of the bands, and the relation to the planned future 
generation mobile and mobile satellite services." 
In its Order establishing service rules for the provision of·MSS at 1.6/2.4 GHz, the 
FCC responded that it was "aware of proposals to  use the 2 GHz bands for services 
similar and competitive to those envisaged by the Big LEO applicants" and that the 
United States ''would like to facilitate access to these bands, as does the EC." Since 
then, the FCC has licensed three domestic entities - Iridium, Globalstar and Odyssey
48 
-to operate in that band. In July 1997, the FCC authorised two additional US-based 
MSS systems to operate in these bands, namely Ellipso/MCHI and Constellation. The 
US  1.6/2.4 GHz licensees. were not required to  pay either for  spectrum or for the 
relocation costs of  any incumbent licensees in the US. 
It should be noted that no formal opportunity was available by the FCC for non-US S-
PCS systems to access the 1.6/2.4 GHz bands. 
47 In its NPRM released 28 January 1985, the FCC said (paras 23  and 24):  "we believe that only one 
entity can be authorized to operate on the frequencies  allocated for MSS. The high cost of an MSS 
system probably means economic viability will require full use of the system, making unlikely t;he 
authorization  of a  second  (or additional)  licensee(s) ...  we  do  not  foresee  the  development  of a 
competitive market in the near term." 
48 The Odyssey project has since been abandoned due to lack of  ~ding. 
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On 31 January 1995, the FCC initiated a proceeding to-allocate 70 MHz to MSS in the 
1990-2025 :MHz and 2165-2000 MHz bands. In its Notice of  Proposed Rulemaking, 
the FCC noted that it intended its proposed 2 GHz MSS allocation to be consistent 
with the W  ARC-92 allocations as well as  forthcoming proposed MSS allocations at 
WRC-95. The FCC also proposed to require MSS entities at 2 GHz to pay to relocate 
incumbent terrestrial users in the US  in the proposed MSS bands and to pay for the 
use of  2 GHz spectrum through auctions. 
The FCC requirement for S-PCS operators to pay the relocation costs of incumbent 
users in the 2 GHz band represents an additional barrier to entry to the US market. 
These costs are potentially of  the order of  the total cost of  a global S-PCS system. 
At WRC-95, the date for access to  the 2 GHz MSS  bands was advanced,' in most 
countries, to  1 January 2000, subject to certain regulatory conditions. Subsequent to 
the  1992  W  ARC,  however,  the FCC auctioned several blocks of the 2  GHz MSS 
spectrum  to  terrestrial  personal  communication  services  ("PCS")  systems  in the 
United States, an action inconsistent with the W  ARC-92 MSS allocation. The United 
States proposed to  the WRC-95  conference to  alter the  global MSS  allocations to 
accommodate the FCC's domestic allocations to PCS. Regions 1 and 3 did not accept 
the proposals at WRC-9~,  but some accommodation was made in Region 2 where the 
allocated MSS bands are, in effect,  1990-2025 MHz (earth-to-space) and 2165-2200 
MHz (space-to-earth). 
On 22 July 1997, the FCC issued a Public Notice inviting, inter alia, letters of intent 
to use non-US licensed space stations to provide mobile satellite service to, from and 
within the United States to be considered in the First 2 GHz Band Processing Round 
in accordance with the Commission's 2 GHz Allocation Order released on 14 March 
1997. 
Specifically, the Notice invited those entities seeking to operate in the United States 
using non-US licensed space sta:tions to file  an earth station application, or to file a 
letter of  intent to provide service in the 2 GHz bands. The FCC stated that it does not 
intend to require MSS systems licensed by other administrations to seek an additional 
space segment licence before providing services in the US. 
Letters of Intent were submitted by ICO, Iridium, Globalstar, MCHI, Constellation, 
Boeing, Celsat, Inmarsat and TMI. 
Conclusion 
The FCC has  issued  several NPRMs  and  Orders relating to  spectrum  and  market 
access in the US for non-US-licensed satellite systems but the conditions for access 
have not yet been resolved.  The continued legal uncertainty raised by this situation 
creates  a  less  than  favourable  environment  for  potential  investors  and  service 
providers of  European licensed S-PCS systems. 
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compete on a  fair  and  equitable basis  in  the US  market,  and  may be placed at  a 
significant disadvantage in that market to  comparable US-licensed systems such as 
Iridium,  Globalstar  and  Odyssey,  unless  the  conditions  for  access  are  resolved 
quickly. 
Auctioning spectrum for S-PCS in the 2 GHz band (considered, but not yet decided) 
would create a barrier to market  ac~ess. No US-licensed competitor such as  Iridium 
and Globalstar has had to endure a spectrum auction. In the E{J,  S-PCS  frequencies 
are due to be assigned without auctioning. 
A  fundamental  residual  market  access  barrier  in  the  US  (although  not  in  direct 
conjunction  with  satellite  services)  is  the  limitation  on  foreign  ownership  for  a 
common carrier radio  licence to  20 per cent (direct) or 100 per cent (indirect).  The 
European  telecommunications  market,  the  world's  second  largest,  is  open  to 
competitive satellite systems with significant US investment (e.g., the US-licensed S-
PCS  systems).  Foreign ownership  restrictions  do  not  occur (except  in  France  and 
Portugal)  in the  EU  for  foreign  satellite networks ·or  services.  In contrast,  market 
access for European satellite systems (or with significant European investment) to the 
world's largest telecommunications  market  is  not  secured  and  is  subject  to  vague 
preconditions or subject to costs in the order of the total system costs (e.g.,  for the 
UK-licensed ICO system). In contrast to US companies operating in the EU (except in 
France  and  Portugal),  European  enterprises  in  the  US  are  barred  from  decisive 
freedom of  decision-making (a direct share greater than 20 per cent is not possible)~ 
Each of  the US trade barriers identified above leads to an unbalanced disadvantage for 
the competitiveness of  European enterprises seeking access to global markets. 
United States - Telecommunications Equipment 
Government procurement 
The  issue  of procurement  in  the  telecommunications  sector  remains  unresolved 
between the EU and the US.  Buy America rules continue to  apply to  purchases of 
telecom  equipment  by  rural  telephone  co-operatives  fmanced  by  the  Rural 
Electrification Administration. Furthermore, US  telecommunication companies have 
historically bought equipment from North American suppliers. 
Although the EU has sought negotiated solutions to these problems, neither the new 
GP A nor bilateral obligations cover this sector. One of  the principal difficulties is the 
criteria for establishing which particular utilities should be included. The EU believes 
that  coverage  should  not  specifically  distinguish  between  public  and  private . 
companies,  but  should  focus  on  the  underlying  conditions  which  .lead 
telecommunications companies to  pursue procurement policies that  tend  to  favour 
particular national suppliers. These conditions include, first,  insulation from  market 
forces through the possession of a monopoly or a dominant position over a network, · 
or through the possession of  special rights relating to the management of  the network; 
and second, the means which government may use to influence the operations of an 
-109-entity, such as  regulation of tariffs and. financing,  or  ''authorisation to operate. Thus, 
the EU argues that both publicly owned and private status utilities operating under 
monopoly or dominant conditions should be covered - this would introduce a higher 
level of  transparency and would lead to improved market access. 
As a result of  the failure to liberalise purchases of  telecom equipment, the US decided 
in 1993 to impose sanctions against the EU and certain Member States under Title 
VII of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The sanctions bar EU 
suppliers from bidding, inter alia, for US Federal government contracts that are below 
the threshold values of the WTO Agreement of Government Procurement. The EU 
responded with counter-sanctions (Regulation 1461/93) that also bar US bidders from 
applying for contracts awarded by central government agencies below the threshold 
values.  Fallowing the  bilateral  Marrakesh  procurement  agreement  of April  1994, 
which liberalised around US $100 billion of  procurement opportunities on both sides, 
the  EU  considers  that  sanctions  are  an  unnecessary  impediment  to  the  bilateral 
relationship, and is urging a reciprocal lifting of  sanctions. 
13.40  VENEZUELA 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
A) schedules of  specific commitments 
need for a representative office in Venezuela to  get a licence,  for  all  legal 
effects. 
exclusions: broadcast and television services. 
B) lists of  Article II (MFN) exemptions 
none. 
~ 110-14.  ANNEX 5: COUNTRY FICHE STRUCTURE 
COUNTRY 
1.- INTRODUCTION. 
General features of  trade policy. 
Domestic structure of  the sector.  Competitive analysis. 
2.- TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Applied tariffs. 
Tariff predictability (bindings). 
Tariff quotas. 
3.- NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. 
Registration, documentation,  customs procedures. 
Levies and charges (other than import duties). 
Minimum import prices. 
Import prohibitions. 
Import licensing. 
Import quotas. 
Import surveillance. 
State trading enterprises. 
Import cartels. 
Standards and other technical requirements. 
Government procurement. 
Local content schemes . 
.  Import balancing requirements. 
Pricing and marketing qrrangements. 
Anti-dumping, countervailing duty actions and safeguard measures. 
Export restrictions. 
Subsidies. 
Other. 
4.- INVESTMENT RELATED MEASURES. 
Direct foreign investment limitations. 
Profit repatriation limits. 
Foreign-exchange measures. 
Tax; discrimination. 
- 111 -15.  ANNEX 6: SAP RWG MEMBERS 
The  Satellite  Action  Plan  Regulatory  Working  Group  is  open  to  any  interested 
organisation. It currently includes representatives from the following organizations: 
Alcatel 
Alenia Aerospazio Space Division 
BT 
Cable & Wireless  · 
Compagniy des Signaux 
CISI 
Daimler-Benz A.ktiengesellschaft 
DeTeMobil Deutsche Telekom MobilNet GmbH (T  -Mobil) 
debitel 
ECTEL 
ETNO 
ERO 
ETO 
ETSI 
European Commission 
EUROSPACE 
EUTELSAT 
France Telecom 
GE Capital Satellites Europe 
Gleiss Lutz Hootz Hirsch 
Hispasat, S.A. 
Hogan & Hartson LLP 
I-CO Global Communications 
Inmarsat 
Iridium Italia 
lridiumLLC 
Matra Marconi Space 
MCS Europe 
Odyssey 
o.tel.o 
PTT Telecom BV 
SiemensAG 
Skybridge 
Societe Europeenne des Satellites 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey 
Swedish Space Corporation 
Telecom Italia 
Telenor Satellite Services 
Telesp~io 
Telia 
·VAT- Association of  Telecom Companies in Germany 
WRG Consultants Ltd 
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